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Comparing Democratization in the East and the West

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Abstract

This paper ascertains the differences and similarities of democratic transition and consolidation in Asia and Eastern Europe. To this end, this study focuses on the four important aspects of democratization: the modes of democratic transitions, the institutional choices after the transitions, the magnitudes and patterns of democratic development, and the levels and patterns of popular support for democracy. As a result, we concluded that the modes of democratic transition did not vary across the two regions, whereas there are remarkable differences in institutional choices, democratic progress, and attitudinal orientation toward democracy.

The current, third-wave of democratization began to spread from Southern Europe to Latin America and other regions in the mid-1970s. After over two decades of steady diffusion, it has now reached every region of the globe stretching from Central and Eastern Europe to South America and from Asia to Africa. How does the process of democratization differ across various regions? Do the differences really matter for the successful establishment of complete rule by the people and for the people? These questions have recently become a subject of increasing concern in the comparative study of democratization.[1]

To date, much of the cross-regional research on democratic transitions and consolidations has been devoted to comparing Southern Europe, Latin America, and Central and Eastern Europe.[2] In the literature on third-wave democracies, only a handful of cross-regional studies have attempted to compare and distinguish the Asian patterns of democratization from what has been noted especially in former Communist Europe.[3] Even these attempts are extremely limited in both breadth and depth. As a result, little is known about how the contours, dynamics, and sources of democratization in the Asian states differ from those in the former Communist European countries.

This paper is a first systematic effort to compare Asia and post-Communist Europe in terms of four important aspects of democratization. Specifically, the paper first compares the modes of democratic transition in the two regions. Then it focuses on the institutional dimension of democratization in these regions with an emphasis on governmental structure and electoral systems. This is followed by a comparative analysis of substantive democratic progress or retrogression in the two regions. Finally, this paper will identify regional differences in the general levels and patterns of popular support for democracy. In a nutshell, the present inquiry seeks to offer a comprehensive account of Asia-Europe differences and similarities in democratization during the mid-1980s and 1990s. To this end it examines not only the transition and consolidation phases of democratization, but also its three key dimensions featuring, respectively, institutions, political rights and civil liberties, and pro-democratic and anti-authoritarian political orientations among the mass public.

In Asia a total of nine countries completed their transition to democracy during the mid-1980s and late-1990s. The nine countries are Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Pakistan has recently reverted to military rule and can no longer be considered a new democracy. In Eastern Europe seven countries ended decades of Communist rule, and joined in the current wave of democratization by the late 1980s and early 1990s; they are: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Of the 15 member states of the former Soviet Union, eight still remain under authoritarian rule or are in a state of civil war. Only seven of those member states can be considered new democracies; they are: Estonia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine. With the subsequent breakup of Czechoslovakia into two separate states, a total of 15 post-Communist European countries are under investigation, along with nine Asian countries in the third wave of democratization. All member countries of former Yugoslavia are not included in this regional comparison for the reason that the process of their democratization has been distinguished from that of their former Communist European peers by successive waves of violent ethnic cleansing.

Conceptualization

In the large body of the literature on third-wave democracies; there is consensus that democratization is a continuing process of change or transformation that proceeds in multiple directions and at different paces. Being a dynamic process, it involves a multitude of events and phases that do not necessarily evolve in a teleological fashion. To properly understand such a process, this present study rejects the notion that democratization, as a movement toward democracy, is a dichotomous or unidirectional phenomenon. Instead of focusing on one particular event or phase, such as the introduction or consolidation of democracy, this study seeks to examine upward and downward movements toward democracy. By examining where new democracies are coming from and where they are now, this paper plans to offer a dynamic account of those movements.

Democratization is conceptualized here as a multi-dimensional phenomenon. Political scientists tend to equate democracy merely with free competitive elections and fail to examine the human meaning of democratic change, especially from the perspective of the masses experiencing it.[4] For the masses who have suffered a great deal of political oppression and injustice, democracy symbolizes much more than the abolition of repressive political institutions and the replacement of authoritarian political leaders. Democracy represents opportunities and resources for a better quality of life. It also represents "a more equitable and humane society."[5] Grounded in the substantive notion that democracy is rule for the people, the present study takes into account the extent to which those masses experience political rights and civil liberties in the wake of democratic regime change.

Democratization is also conceptualized as a multi-level phenomenon. It is a process of transformation taking place at the levels of the political regime itself, political institutions, and individual citizens. At the macro levels democratization involves the replacement of an authoritarian regime with a democratic one, and the installation of institutions that represent the interests and preferences of the ordinary citizenry. Various changes in the laws, institutions, and other formal rules, however, will not matter unless individual citizens broaden, deepen, and strengthen their support for democracy not only as political ideals, but also as political practices. To move toward the completion of democracy requires changes in the cultural values that those citizens uphold. Democratic support among the mass public is, therefore, considered in this study as an essential component of democratization.

Theoretically democratization is viewed as being shaped by the political and cultural legacies of the past. Path-determined theories of change suggest that new democracies reflect their differences in starting points, and take on different paths toward the completion of democracy.[6] The legacies of developmental dictatorship in Asia and post-totalitarian rule in Europe are hypothesized to have differentially shaped the process of democratization in the respective region. Theories of cultural uniqueness hold that fundamental differences in Asian and post-Communist European values make for regional variation in democratization.[7]

Databases

Several sets of data were assembled for the present comparative study of democratization across the regions of Asia and former Communist Europe. The divergent modes of democratic transitions were compared across the two regions with references of some earlier studies on this subject.[8] The regional difference in institutional democratization was explored primarily on the basis of the data compiled by the International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance in Stockholm. Annual accounts of political rights and civil liberties by Freedom House (hereinafter FH) in New York served as the primary database for our regional comparison of substantive democratization. Finally, the third wave of the World Value Surveys (hereinafter WVS), conducted in 1995 and 1996, was the main database for ascertaining the regional difference in cultural democratization.

Modes of Democratic Transition

Huntington classified democratic transitions into three distinct modes: replacement, transformation, and transplacement.[9] According to him, the first mode of replacement refers to the transition in which opposition groups successfully oust the group in power and establish a democratic regime. The second mode of transformation takes place when the elites in power play the key role in ending authoritarian rule and establishing a new democratic regime. The third mode of transplacement involves both the ruling elites and opposition forces, whose joint actions lead to the installation of a democratic regime. This particular mode of transi-

tion is further distinguished in this present study from that of pacted transition in order to highlight the regional differences more precisely. While both modes feature joint actions between the two rival groups, it is the pacted mode that allows the ruling elites to make formal accords with the opposition groups before they step down. A pact may include an 'exit guarantee' for the old elites who have abused human rights or personalized national wealth. In pact bargaining, thus, the property rights of the old elites or the interests of the military are likely to be guaranteed. The outgoing leaders want to make sure that there would be no prosecution or retaliation against their wrongdoings at the exchange of power. Therefore, the political pacts are sometimes considered conservative and even reactionary in nature.[10] In the transplacement mode the ruling elites accept the opposition's demands first without formal agreements behind the scene or at a roundtable. In this mode the incumbents sometimes resign in response to the democratic demands made by the opposition forces. Then a serious negotiation takes place among the various groups of political leaders and ordinary citizens in order to draft a new constitution and establish the schedule for elections.

The first two columns of Tables 1 and 2, respectively, list the names of nine Asian and 15 post-Communist European countries in the third-wave of democratization, and the modes of their transitions to democratic rule. In Asia, six of nine countries (67%) brought about democracy by the mode of transplacement. They were Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, and South Korea. Each of the other three countries ushered in democracy by a different mode, i.e., replacement in the Philippines, transformation in Taiwan, and pacted transition in Thailand.

Table 1. **Democratization in Asia**

Country	Transition Mode	Government Type	Pre-transition: combined rating*	2000-2001: combined rating	Difference	Pattern of Progress
Bangladesh	Transplacement	Parliamentary	3.8: 1989-1990	3.5 (partly)	0.3	Fluctuating
Indonesia	Tranplacement	Semi-	6.25: 1996-1997	3.5 (partly)	2.8	Progressive
Mongolia	Transplacement	Semi-	2.5: 1991-1992	2.5 (free)	0	Stable
Nepal	Transplacement	Parliamentary	3.3: 1989-1990	3.5 (partly)	-0.2	Stable
Pakistan	Transplacement	Semi-	3.8: 1986-1987	5.5 (not)	-1.7	Fluctuating
Philippines	Replacement	Presidential	3.5: 1984-1985	2.5 (free)	1	Fluctuating
S. Korea	Transplacement	Presidential	4.3: 1985-1986	2.0 (free)	2.3	Stable
Taiwan	Transformation	Presidential	4.0: 1990-1991	1.5 (free)	2.5	Progressive
Thailand	Pacted	Parliamentary	4.3: 1990-1991	2.5 (free)	1.8	Progressive
Average			3.7	2.97	0.98	

Note: * Political rights and civil liberties were respectively rated on 7-point scales, from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). These ratings were combined and averaged into a similar 7-point scale. The combined ratings were then divided into three categories—free (1-3 points), partly free (3-5.5), and not free (5.5-7). Source: Handbook of Electoral System Design 1997. Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

In former Communist Europe, ten of 14 new democracies (71%) came into being by the mode of transplacement. These include Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, the Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Ukraine. Two new democracies, East Germany and Romania, were established through the mode of replacement. On the other hand, Poland is the only country in this area that took on the mode of pacted transition. Russia is also the only country in this region where democracy was established by

the mode of transformation in which ruling elites played the key role.

Table 2. **Democratization in Former Communist Europe**

Country	Transition Mode	Government Type	Pre-transition: combined rating*	2000-2001: combined rating	Difference	Pattern of Progress
Albania	Transplacement	Parliamentary	5.3: 1989-1990	4.5 (partly)	0.8	Retrogressive
Bulgaria	Transplacement	Parliamentary	3.0: 1989-1990	2.5 (free)	0.5	Fluctuating
Czech Rep.	Transplacement	Parliamentary	4.0: 1988-1989	1.5 (free)	2.5	Stable
E. Germany	Replacement	Semi	3.8: 1988-1989	1.5 (free)	2.3	Stable
Estonia	Transplacement	Parliamentary	2.8: 1990-1991	1.5 (free)	1.3	Progressive
Hungary	Transplacement	Parliamentary	2.8: 1988-1989	1.5 (free)	1.3	Stable
Kyrgyz	Transplacement	Presidential	4.5: 1991	5.5 (not)	-1	Retrogressive
Latvia	Transplacement	Parliamentary	3.0: 1991-1992	1.5 (free)	1.5	Progressive
Lithuania	Transplacement	Semi	2.5: 1990-1991	1.5 (free)	1	Stable
Moldova	Transplacement	Semi	4.5: 1990	3.0 (free)	1.5	Progressive
Poland	Pacted	Semi	4.3: 1987-1988	1.5 (free)	2.8	Stable
Romania	Replacement	Presidential	6.3: 1988-1989	2.0 (free)	4.3	Progressive
Russia	Transformation	Presidential	5.5: 1987-1988	5.0 (partly)	0.5	Retrogressive
Slovakia	Transplacement	Parliamentary	N/A	1.5 (free)	N/A	Progressive
Ukraine	Transplacement	Presidential	3.0: 1990	4.5 (partly)	-1.5	Retrogressive
Average			4	2.6	1.27	

Note: *free (1-3), partly free (3-5.5), and not free (5.5-7). *FH scores were only available for the noted single year in the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Ukraine. Source: Handbook of Electoral System Design 1997. Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

In the two continents the current wave of global democratization washed up on their shores by all four different modes of transitions. Across the two regions transplacement was the most prevalent mode of democratic transition, while transformation and pacted transition were the least popular mode. It is fair to conclude that Asia and post-Communist Europe differ very little in the way democratic political order was planted, each on their respective soil, although their cultural legacies and political histories were vastly different.

Institutional Democratization

Democratization, as a movement toward democracy, requires the restructuring of authoritarian institutions into democratic ones. This process of institution building necessarily involves the making of two important choices, one concerning the general form of democratic government, and the other dealing with the particular system of electing legislators.[11] What forms of democratic government are most and least popular in Asia and post-Communist Europe? What systems of elections are most and least popular in each of the two regions? This section addresses these two questions to determine how the two regions differ in the institutional makeup of democracy.

Forms of Government

Three forms of democratic government are considered to identify regional difference in governmental structure. They are generally known as presidentialism, parliamentarism, and semi-presidentialism (or semi-parliamentarism). In the presidential form of government there is no fusion of executive and legislative powers. As a result, the president is elected directly by ordinary citizens, not by their legislators, to serve for a fixed term. In normal circumstances, the president cannot be forced to resign by the legislature. In the parliamentary form of government, executive and legislative

powers are fused in such a way that the head of the executive branch is selected by the legislature, and can be dismissed from office by its vote of no confidence. In the semi-presidential or semi-parliamentary form, there are two leaders of the executive branch, a president and a prime minister, who share executive powers. The president is elected directly by the voting public for a fixed term. His or her prime minister can stay in power only with the legislature's approval and support.

The third column of Tables 1 and 2 shows the distribution of these three forms across new democracies in Asia and former Communist Europe. In Asia nine countries are evenly divided into each of these three forms. The Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan have adopted the presidential form, while Bangladesh, Nepal, and Thailand have done the parliamentary form. In Indonesia, Mongolia, and Pakistan, the semi-presidential or semi-parliamentary government has been chosen. From this distribution, it is clear that there is no prevalent form of democratic government in Asia.

In post-Communist Europe, however, nearly half (47%) of new democracies have adopted parliamentary government.[12] Of the 15 countries in this region, this form of government has been put in place in seven countries, including Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, and Slovakia. The semi-presidential system has been adopted in four countries, including East Germany, Lithuania, Moldova, and Poland. The presidential system has been adopted in another group of four countries: the Kyrgyz Republic, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine.

While there is no prevalent form of government in Asia, parliamentary government is preferred to the other two forms of government by a large margin of nearly two to one in post-Communist Europe. In addition, the pre-democratic governmental structure remains, by and large, intact in Asia. In the former Communist region, however, such structure has been largely altered after transition to democracy in order to prevent the concentration of power. These are two notable regional differences in institutional democratization.

Electoral Systems

Three principal forms of parliamentary elections are considered to identify regional differences in electoral systems.[13] They are: (1) pluralist and majority system that includes the first-past-the post and block vote formulae; (2) proportional system that includes the party list and mixed member formulae; and (3) semi-proportional system combining pluralist and proportional systems. As in the forms of government, the distribution of electoral systems significantly varies across the two regions.

In Asia plurality (or majority) is the most popular system of electing legislators. This system has been adopted in six of nine countries (67%). The first-past-the post formula of the pluralist system has been used in Bangladesh, Mongolia, Nepal, and Pakistan, while its bloc vote formula has been used in the Philippines and Thailand. The semi-proportional system has been used in South Korea and Taiwan. The proportional system has been adopted only in Indonesia. In striking contrast, the proportional system is the most

popular electoral system among new democracies in post-Communist Europe. Nine out of 15 (60%) countries have adopted this system, in one form or another. Its party list formula is currently used in seven countries—Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. The mixed member formula is used in East Germany and Hungary. Next to this system of proportional representation is the semi-proportional system used in four countries—Albania, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine. The majority system is used in two countries, the Kyrgyz Republic and Moldova. None of the new democracies in this region has adopted the pluralist system, which is most popular in Asia. The electoral system that has been dominant among new democracies in Asia has not been adopted by their peers in post-Communist Europe. The system that has been dominant in the latter, on the other hand, has been avoided by their peers in the former. In electing their parliaments, the two regions are diametrically opposed to each other. Undoubtedly, this is another notable regional difference in institutional democratization.

What institutional models of democracy are most and least prevalent in the two regions? In Asia, the parliamentary form of government, combined with the plurality system, is most prevalent. Three of nine Asian new democracies (30%)—Bangladesh, Nepal, and Thailand—feature this model of democracy. This model is the one avoided by all new democracies of post-Communist Europe. Most prevalent in this region is the parliamentary form of government combined with the proportional system, which exists in six of 15 countries (40%)—Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, and Slovakia. This particular model is the one rejected by all new Asian democracies. Institutionally, new democracies in the two regions are the opposites of each other.

Substantive Democratization

Democratization involves much more than the election of governors and legislators. Substantively it refers to enacting legislation and implementing public policy in response to the changing preferences and demands of the citizenry. It also refers to the expansion of political rights and civil liberties that the masses can exercise as citizens of a democratic state. Using the combined ratings of political rights and civil liberties annually compiled by FH, this section seeks to compare substantive democratization in the two regions. Each year's ratings are reported in the following year's January/February issue of its *Freedom Review* since 1973. In this annual report, first political rights and civil liberties are, respectively, rated on a 7-point scale ranging from a low of 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). These ratings are combined and averaged into a similar 7-point scale. Then, the combined ratings are divided into three categories: being free (1-3 points), partly free (3-5.5 points), and not free (5.5-7 points).

Level of Democracy

How do Asia and former Communist Europe compare in terms of the current levels of substantive democratization? This question is explored with the combined ratings for the

year 2000-2001 (see the fifth column of Tables 1 and 2).[14] The country ratings for new democracies in Asia are 1.5 for Taiwan, 2.0 for South Korea, 2.5 for Mongolia, 2.5 for the Philippines, 2.5 for Thailand, 3.5 for Bangladesh, 3.5 for Indonesia, 3.5 for Nepal, and 5.5 for Pakistan. These ratings indicate that five of nine third-wave democracies in Asia are free, three are partly free, and one not free. In this area less than two-thirds (56%) of those democracies are currently rated as being free.

In post-Communist Europe, the combined averaged ratings are 1.5 for the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia; 2.0 for Romania; 2.5 for Bulgaria; 3.0 for Moldova; 4.5 for Albania and Ukraine; 5.0 for Russia; and 5.5 for the Kyrgyz Republic. According to FH's verbal scale, 10 of the 15 European new democracies are free; four are partly free; and one is not free. In post-Communist Europe, free countries account for 66.7 percent. When this average figure between 2000 and 2001 is compared with the one for Asia as a whole, it is fair to conclude that the general levels of freedom or substantive democracy are higher in post-Communist Europe than in Asia. In other words, the average combined rating of 2.60 (free) in post-Communist Europe is better than that of post-authoritarian Asia (2.97, free).

Magnitude of Democratic Change

How do the two regions compare in terms of the extent to which freedom or substantive democracy has progressed in the wake of democratic regime change? To explore this question, the extent of changes in the level of freedom is estimated for each country by subtracting, from its average rating for the 2000-2001 period, the one for the two years prior to its transition to a democracy. The timing of democratic transition is measured by the year when a founding election was held in each country. A founding election is the first democratic election after political liberalization.[15] Although we do not fully follow Shumpeterian minimalist notion of democracy, there is no doubt that founding election provides a good and universal measurement of when democratic transition genuinely occurred by forming a new democratic government.[16]

In five of nine Asian countries (55%) political rights and civil liberties have been expanded to significantly greater degrees (see column 6 of Table 1). In the wake of their transition to democracy, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand have been transformed from partly free to free countries, and Indonesia has been transformed from not free to partly free. Their increases in the general level of freedom averaged 0.98 points on FH's 7-point scale, which suggests a meager progress in the general level of substantial democracy between the periods of pre-transition and 2000-2001. Of these four countries Indonesia has experienced the greatest degree of increase with a difference of 2.8. Bangladesh, Mongolia and Nepal, by and large, remain where they were during the pre-transition period.[17] Pakistan is the only country that has experienced a significant decrease in the overall level of freedom. Democracy simply no longer exists in this country in the aftermath of a successful military coup in October 1999.

Before its transition to democracy in 1988, the country was rated as partly free.

In former Communist Europe, the Kyrgyz Republic has experienced such a major setback from partly free to not free at the turn of the millennium. Only four of 14 countries (29%) have achieved no substantive progress (see column 6 of Table 2). Albania, Russia, and Ukraine remain partly free, as they were before they joined the family of third-wave democracies more than a decade ago. Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, and Lithuania, on the other hand, remain free, as they were a couple of years before they held the founding election.[18] Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, East Germany, Moldova, and Poland have improved their standing from being partly free to free states.

In terms of the magnitude of progress six countries (43%) have made significant advances. Included in this group of advancing democracies are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, East Germany, Moldova, Poland, and Romania. Especially, three countries—the Czech Republic, Poland, and Romania—have gained the greatest degrees of progress in expanding freedom with more than 2.5 points on the same scale. These post-Communist societies achieved greater degrees of democratic progress (1.27), on average, than their counterparts in Asia (0.98). This is partly resulted from the fact that Communist regimes in Europe were more repressive than authoritarian regimes in Asia. In fact, the average rating for the pre-transition period in the nine new Asian democracies is 3.7, which is lower than that of their counterparts (4.0).

Patterns of Democratic Change

Democratization is not a unidirectional phenomenon. Like many other political phenomena, it can evolve in a multitude of different directions and at different paces.[19] To compare the dynamics of substantive democratization in the two regions over time, this study has ascertained four distinct patterns by examining how the general amount or level of freedom available to the ordinary citizens has changed in a country since its transition to democracy a decade ago. First, the pattern of democratization becomes steadily positive or upward when the aggregate level of political rights and civil liberties increases on a continuing basis. Second, with continuing decreases in its aggregate level, the pattern becomes steadily negative in nature or downward in spiral. Third, with a combination of upward and downward changes in the freedom level, the pattern becomes erratic or fluctuating. Finally, the pattern becomes neutral with little or no significant change to the level in either upward or downward directions.

In Asia three of nine countries (33%)—Indonesia, Taiwan, and Thailand—have been steadily upward in their journey toward a greater democracy. In the case of Taiwan, for example, the general level of freedom has improved steadily from 5.0 in 1990, to 1.5 in the year 2000, on FH's 7-point freedom scale. Its current level of political rights and civil liberties compares favorably with those of consolidated democracies in Western Europe. A group of three countries (33%)—Bangladesh, Pakistan, and the Philippines, the freedom level has been fluctuating considerably with upward

and downward movements during the past decade. The fluctuation in FH ratings is especially most severe in Pakistan, which finally returned to a military rule. Another group of three countries (33%)—Mongolia, Nepal, and South Korea—have been on a stable course with little change in either direction, positive or negative. FH ratings for these three countries have remained virtually identical since 1993. None of the nine Asian new democracies has been moving steadily downward toward a lesser democracy.

Among 15 post-Communist European countries a group of five countries (33%) has steadily become more democratic over the past decade. They are Estonia, Latvia, Moldova, Romania, and Slovakia. Of these steadily improving democracies, Romania has achieved the most impressive record of democratic progress. The country's freedom rating has changed for the better from 7.0 in 1990, to 2.0 in the year 2001. Another group of five countries (33%), on the other hand, has changed little for the better or the worse. Included in this group of stable new democracies are the Czech Republic, East Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, and Poland. In four other countries (27%)—Albania, the Kyrgyz Republic, Russia, and Ukraine, significant decreases have occurred in the levels of freedom. Bulgaria is the only country in the region where the fluctuating pattern of democratic change has occurred.

There is no single pattern representing much of the dynamics of democratization in each of the two regions (see the far right column of Tables 1 and 2). Nonetheless, there is one notable regional difference in the pattern of democratic change. It concerns the incidence of backward democratization, i.e., democratic retrogression. While one-quarter of European new democracies have steadily regressed from what they were a decade ago, none of their Asian counterparts has experienced such steady downward movement.[20]

Cultural Democratization

Numerous surveys have documented the levels and origins of support for democratization in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America.[21] These surveys offer a couple of valuable insights that will assist us in comparing popular support for democracy cross-regionally. First, as empirical research has recently revealed, there is a significant gulf between these two levels of democratic support: normative and empirical levels.[22] To ordinary citizens, who live most of their lives under authoritarian rule, democracy at one level represents political ideals or values to be fulfilled. At another level, democracy refers to a political regime, and the actual workings of the regime itself, which governs people's lives on a daily basis. The normative level deals with democracy-in-principle, while the empirical level is concerned with the various aspects of democracy-in-practice.[23] A full accounting of democratic support, therefore, can be made only when both levels of support are considered together.

Second, democratic support, especially in new democracies, involves more than favorable orientations to democratic ideals and practices. To their citizens with little experience and limited sophistication in democratic politics, democracy or dictatorship fails to offer a satisfying solution to many problems facing their societies. Under such uncertainty, many

of these democratic novices, more often than not, do embrace both democratic and authoritarian political propensities concurrently. A growth in their pro-democratic orientations, moreover, does not necessarily bring about a corresponding decline in their anti-authoritarian orientations and vice versa. Popular support for democracy in emerging democracies, therefore, depends on a majority of their citizenry, who not only accept it, but also reject its authoritarian and other non-democratic alternatives.[24]

To compare the levels and patterns of democratic support in the two regions we analyzed data from the WVS III conducted during the period of 1995-96 (see Appendix for the wording of these questions). In Asia the survey data are available for Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan. In former Communist Europe they are available for Bulgaria, East Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine. It should be noted, however, that all the survey items to be explored in this section are not available for Pakistan and Poland.

Support for Democracy-in-Principle

To what extent do individuals prefer democracy-in-principle to other types of political systems? To explore this question we chose a pair of WVS items designed to tap one's absolute and relative preference for democracy. Affirmative responses to these two questions were jointly considered to estimate the general level of democratic system preference. In every country only a minority showed no attachment to both the absolute and relative preferences for the democratic systems. As Table 3 indicates, the proportions in Asia averaged 3 percent. They varied from 1 percent for Bangladesh, to 6 percent for the Philippines. In contrast, the average of the post-Communist countries were 10 percent (see Table 4). It ranged considerably from 2 percent for East Germany, to 31 percent for Russia. Those not at all in favor of democracy as a political system were, as a whole, more than three times higher in the post-Communist states than in the Asian states. On the other hand, those fully in favor of democracy were, as a whole, slightly higher in the latter (81%) than the former (75%). Moreover, the absolute and relative preferences for the democratic systems were higher in Asia (86% and 87%) than in the post-Communist European countries (83% and 72%), respectively. When these four ratings were considered together, it is clear that support for democracy-in-principle was generally higher among the Asian countries than those of the post-Communist states.

Among those who lived all or most of their lives in an authoritarian or totalitarian system, preference for democracy-in-principle does not necessarily mean a complete rejection of non-democratic rule. To what extent do individuals in the two regions oppose non-democratic rule in principle? To explore this question we chose another pair of WVS items: one concerning a civilian dictatorship and the other a military dictatorship. In every country a minority remained fully attached to authoritarian rule by refusing to reject any of civilian and military dictatorships. The proportions of those authoritarians in Asia were, on average, 16 percent, whereas those of the post-Communist countries were 7 percent, while

Table 3. ***Support for Democracy in Asia***

Levels and Patterns of Support	Bangladesh	Pakistan	Philippines	S.Korea	Taiwan	Mean
System Preferences						
Absolute	98.10%	68.10%	84.40%	84.60%	93.10%	85.70%
Relative	97.4		76.9	91.6	83.5	87.4
None	0.9		5.9	2.6	2.9	3.1
Both	96.6		67.6	78.7	80.2	80.8
Antiauthoritarianism						
Civilian Dictatorship	93.3	38.5	34.6	68.2	59	58.7
Military Dictatorship	93.2	59.8	46.7	94.9	84.4	75.8
None	1.3	28.6	34.7	3.8	10.9	15.9
Both	88.5	26.9	15.9	67.3	54.8	50.7
Average Index	3.9		2.4	3.4	3.2	3.2
Institutional Confidence						
Political Parties	70.8	31	45.2	24.9	35.6	41.5
Parliament	84.3		60	31.1	39.2	53.7
None	11		34.6	65.8	47.8	39.8
Both	66.4		39.9	21.9	29.6	39.5
Procedural Efficacy						
Managing Economy	88.5		55.1	77.9	73.7	73.8
Maintaining Order	82.6		50.6	77.1	66.3	69.2
None	7.6		31.1	13.4	15.1	16.8
Both	79.4		36.7	68.5	55.5	60
Average Index	3.3		2.1	2.1	2.2	2.4
Types of Support						
No Support	0.9		34.7	10.7	10.7	14.3
Normative Support	17.2		28	63.4	51.3	40
Empirical Support	0.9		17.6	3.2	8.7	7.6
Full Support	81		19.8	22.6	29.3	38.2
(N)	1525	733	1200	1249	1452	

Source: World Value Surveys III. The WVS III did not cover post transition politics in Indonesia.

anti-authoritarians of any kind accounted for almost the same proportion in the two regions (51% vs. 50%). In Asia anti-civilian-dictatorship was, as a whole, higher (59%) than in the post-Communist countries (51%); anti-military-dictatorship was higher in the latter (90%) than in the former (76%). Perhaps the experience of the military-backed totalitarian regime pulled the post-Communist Europeans away from the military authoritarianism far more than the Asians.

Both pro-democratic and anti-authoritarian orientations were considered together in order to ascertain differences in the overall levels and patterns of support for democracy-in-principle or normative support for democracy. To compare such differences in the patterns of normative democratic support, we singled out those who were fully pro-democratic and fully anti-authoritarian in regime preference as *genuine supporters* of democracy-in-principle. Genuine normative democrats constituted 51 percent of the Asians and 43 percent of the former Communist Europeans. On the other hand, the proportions of such true democratic believers were significantly higher for Aisa than for its counterpart. On the other hand, the proportion of post-Communist Europeans who were fully anti-democratic and fully pro-authoritarian was three times larger than that of the Asians (1.6% vs. 0.5%). Therefore, from a normative perspective, the Asians were more ardent in supporting the democratic systems than the post-Communist Europeans.

Nonetheless, the normative democratic support appears not to be a serious problem threatening the fate of new democracies in either region, which is suggested by the average of the combined index for democratic support. An index of normative democratic support was constructed by summing up the values of two 3-point scales (0-2), tapping democratic system preference and anti-authoritarianism, respectively. On this index, ranging from a low of 0 (no support) to a high of 4 (full support), the Asian countries averaged 3.2 and the former Communist countries 3.1. When these percentage figures are compared across the two regions,

the overall levels of support for democracy-in-principle exceeded the midpoint of a 5-point index, a score of 2 in the mid-1990s.

Surprisingly enough, it is Bangladesh that demonstrated the most positive features of normative support for democracy in Asia. Bangladesh people showed the highest proportions of democratic system preferences as well as anti-authoritarianism. Also, genuine democrats accounted for 87 percent and die-hard authoritarians 0.1 percent in Bangladesh. The average index reached the highest 3.9. In sharp contrast, the Philippines showed the smallest proportion of full democratic support (68%) and the largest proportion of no democratic support (6%). In addition, the proportion of anti-dictatorship of any kinds was the smallest (16%) and the proportion of fully authoritarians was the largest (35%). The supporters of democracy-in-principle accounted for the smallest 10 percent.

In the former Communist countries East Germany and Russia were located at the both extreme ends of the spectrum. In East Germany genuine democrats constituted 76 percent and die-hard authoritarians 0.3 percent. These percentage points were the most positive among its fellow post-Communist European countries. In addition, the average index revealed the highest 3.7. By contrast, 30 percent of Russians claimed to be genuine democrats, while 6 percent still identified themselves with die-hard authoritarians. The average index was the lowest 2.5.

Support for Democracy-in-Action

To what extent do the citizens of the new democracies support the actual workings of the regime in power? To measure and compare the levels of support for democracy-in-action across the two regions, another two pairs of items were selected from the WVS. The first pair concerns popular confidence for political parties and parliament, the two key institutions of representative democracy. The second pair deals with the perceived efficacy of government agencies to tackle economic and social problems by the democratic methods or procedures.

Tables 3 and 4 suggest that institutional confidence was quite low in every country. In fact, the category of institutional confidence commonly revealed the most negative features in the new democracies. Only 42 percent and 54 percent of Asians felt, on average, confident in either political

Table 3. **Support for Democracy in Post-Communist Europe**

Levels and Patterns of Support	Bulgaria	E. Germany	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Moldova	Poland	Russia	Ukraine	Mean
System Preferences										
Absolute	85.90%	95.20%	88.6	86.60%	87.60%	85.10%		57.60%	80.20%	83.40%
Relative	80.6	92.3	89.7	83.4	90.3	72.6	88.40%	58.9	76.5	71.7
None	9	1.9	3.6	6.3	3.7	9.1		30.7	11.8	9.5
Both	78.6	89.3	83.3	77.4	84.3	68.3		49.9	72.2	75.4
Antiauthoritarianism										
Civilian Dictatorship	37.3	82.3	62.5	53.9	36.3	42.8		49.6	45.5	51.3
Military Dictatorship	83.2	97.9	95	94.8	94.2	89.1		79	88.2	90.2
None	11.9	1.4	3.7	3.8	4.3	8		14.1	8.5	7
Both	35.4	81.7	61.8	53.3	35.6	39.8		44.5	45	49.6
Average Index	3	3.7	3.4	3.2	3.1	3		2.5	3	3.1
Institutional Confidence										
Political Parties	29.2	10.2	23.2	10.3	14.4	17.6	12.8	19.4	20.2	17.5
Parliament	45.3	16.7	43.8	25	26.5	40.9	34.5	22.6	37.8	32.6
None	51.1	80.3	54.7	73.4	71.9	54.9	64.8	70.8	60.3	64.7
Both	25.4	6.5	21.2	8.3	10.5	13.5	10.7	11.9	17.5	13.9
Procedural Efficacy										
Managing Economy	55.3	77.1	77	72.4	57.6	47.9	53.3	39.9	56.9	59.7
Maintaining Order	54.6	77.4	67.5	49.5	62.4	48.3	24.3	29.1	45.1	50.9
None	34.2	12.4	17	21.9	29	37.5	44.6	56	37.5	32.2
Both	45.9	66.4	61.7	44.6	51	34.2	23.2	26.3	40.7	43.8
Average Index	1.9	1.8	2.1	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.2	1.1	1.6	1.6
Types of Support										
No Support	20	5.5	10.9	16.7	16.6	24.3		46.8	27.2	21
Normative Support	44.2	79.4	53.5	67.1	63.9	54		40.7	53.4	57
Empirical Support	2.8	0.5	2.4	1.6	1.7	2.6		1.5	2.4	1.9
Full Support	33	14.7	33.2	14.6	17.8	19.1		11.1	17	20.1
(N)	1072	1009	1021	1200	1009	984	1153	2040	2811	

Source: World Value Surveys III.

parties or parliament, respectively. As many as every two in five Asians (40%) had confidence in neither democratic institution; about the same proportion expressed the very opposite opinion. In addition, the confidence of the post-Communist Europeans in political parties (18%) was the lowest across all the categories as well as across the two regions, which was followed by their confidence in parliament (33%). A majority (65%) of these Europeans had confidence in neither institution, and only 14 percent expressed their confidence in both political parties and parliament. As in normative support, the Asians offered, on average, a bit more positive assessment of institutional confidence than the former Communist Europeans.

With respect to procedural efficacy, a majority of the citizens in Asia, as a whole, perceived democracy as the method of governance that was capable of managing economic affairs (74%) and maintaining social order (70%). Only 17 percent did not endorsed democracy's capacity to tackle those two most important tasks of governance, whereas 60 percent offered the full endorsement of democratic governance. In addition, 60 percent of the post-Communist Europeans endorsed the idea that democracy was capable of managing economy and 51 percent did so about managing order. While nearly one-third of people (32%) in the post-Communist countries dismissed democracy outright as incapable of handling any of its economic or social problems, 44 percent believed democracy capable of managing both economy and order. Generally, the Asians were more likely to endorse the procedural efficacy of democracy than the post-Communist Europeans.

Confidence in representative democratic institutions and endorsement of the efficacy of democratic government are considered together to compare the overall levels of support for democracy-in-action or empirical support for democracy across the two regions. As in the case of normative democratic support, two 3-point scales of institutional confidence and governmental efficacy were combined into an index of empirical democratic support. On this 5-point index, ranging from a low of 0 (no support) to a high of 4 (full support), the Asians averaged 2.4, whereas the post-Communist Europeans averaged 1.6. Evidently the Asian new democracies registered greater levels of empirical democratic support than their

counterparts. In none of the Asian new democracies was the overall level of empirical democratic support lower than the midpoint of the 5-point index, i.e., a score of 2, but only Estonia (2.1) among post-Communist European countries passed the midpoint. This finding suggests that new democracies in post-Communist Europe lacked a great deal in support for democracy-in-action.

As in the normative support category, citizens of Bangladesh distinguished themselves from their fellow new Asian democracies by endorsing institutional confidence and procedural efficacy by a big margin. The South Koreans, however, revealed the worst confidence in democratic institutions and the Philippines showed the worst evaluations about the procedural efficacy of its political system. Likewise, the ordering of the post-Communist European countries changed in the category of institutional confidence. The confidence in democratic institutions was the highest in Bulgaria; it became the lowest in East Germany. Yet East Germany regained the most positive status with respect to procedural efficacy and Russia showed again the most negative features.

Types of Overall Support for Democracy

The general levels of normative and empirical democratic support are considered together to explore regional differences in the quality of democratic support. To this end, 5-point indices of normative and empirical democratic support were first dichotomized into low (0-2) and high (3-4) categories, using the midpoint as a cutoff. Those two categories of normative and empirical support were then considered together to identify four distinct types of democratic support. The most negative type of *non-democrats* includes those who support democracy neither normatively nor empirically. The most positive type of *fully committed democrats* includes those who support it both normatively and empirically. Between these extreme patterns are two other types of *partial supporters of democracy*, i.e. those who support democracy-in-principle only and those who support democracy-in-action only.

Fully committed democrats in Asia (38%) were found, as a whole, twice more frequently than in post-Communist Europe (20%). The proportions ranged from 20 percent for the Philippines, to 81 percent for Bangladesh in Asia. Among the post-Communist Europeans the proportions ranged from 11 percent for Russia to 33 percent for Estonia and Bulgaria. By contrast the general level of unqualified commitment to the political ideals as well as political practices of democracy was higher in post-Communist countries (21%) than in post-authoritarian Asia (14%). The proportions of the non-democrats in Asia ranged from 1 percent of Bangladesh, to 35 percent for the Philippines; their counterparts in the post-Communist countries ranged from 6 percent (East Germany), to 47 percent (Russia). Generally speaking, self-identified democrats were more numerous in Asia than in post-Communist Europe.

Another noteworthy is that normative support was far greater than empirical support in both regions. On average the Asians offered normative support five times more than the empirical support (40% vs. 8%). Likewise, post-Communist Europeans endorsed support for democracy-in-principle

about thirty times more than support for democracy-in-practice (57% vs. 2%). In principle citizens of new democracies in the two continents offered support, and they were eager for democracy after decades of non-democracy, but they were disappointed by or dissatisfied with the actual performance of new democratic regimes.

Overall 81 percent of citizens in Bangladesh identified themselves as fully committed democrats, while only 1 percent identified themselves as non-democrats. These figures were the most impressive throughout the countries under investigation. At the other extreme end is Russia. Almost half of Russians (47%) identified themselves as non-democrats; only 11 percent subscribed to democracy from both normative and empirical perspectives.

Summary and Conclusions

This study has compared the processes of democratic transition and consolidation in Asia and former-Communist Europe. In terms of the prevalent mode of transition, the two regions differ very little; a majority of their new democracies were instituted by joint actions between the ruling and opposition forces, i.e., the transplacement mode. In contrast, transformation and pacted transition were commonly the least popular mode in the two regions.

A greater difference between the two regions concerns the makeup of political institutions. The parliamentary structure of government formed by the proportional system is the most common form in post-Communist Europe. This particular model of democratic institution has been rejected by all new democracies in Asia. The presidential form of government elected according to the pluralist system, which was rejected by all of post-Communist European democracies, was and is most popular in Asia. As far as the institutional dimension of democratization is concerned, the two regions have very little in common.

The two regions differ considerably in the extent to which their citizens have lived in freedom in the wake of democratic regime change. On the whole, a larger proportion of new democracies in post-Communist Europe exist as free states, and they have made greater progress in expanding freedom on a steady basis. It is also in this region where a greater proportion of those countries became less free states during the past decade. On the contrary, none of their Asian counterparts has experienced such steady downward movement, while the democratic progresses made in the new Asian democracies, on average, during the same years, measured by FH, appear to be smaller as compared to the European peers.

The most notable difference has to do with the cultural dimension of democratization. In the two regions, a majority of the masses is yet to embrace democracy as the most preferable regime or a lesser evil. The people who remain unattached to democracy, either normatively or empirically, appear after years of democratic rule to vary a great deal across the regions. In the two post-authoritarian East, non-democrats comprise a very small minority. By striking contrast, they constitute a substantial majority in the two post-Communist states. In the Eastern world of new democracies, one or the other type of democrat, constitutes a large

majority. Such inference may be inconclusive to be generalized in the context of the East and the West. Hopefully, future research will expand this across many other countries in the two continents with the WVS IV (1999-2000).

What conclusions can be drawn on the basis of these findings? On the whole, a regional difference in democratization is more likely to emerge in the phase of consolidation than that of transition. During the consolidation phase regional difference is more likely to persist with the unwillingness of the masses to embrace democracy as the most preferred political system rather than the inability of their political system to guarantee political rights and civil liberties on an increasing basis.[25] The legacies of Communist rule have been conducive to the destruction of the old government structure designed to maintain one-party dictatorship. Those Communist legacies of the West, however, appear to be more detrimental to the growth of democratic legitimacy and the maintenance of a free state rather than the authoritarian legacies of the East. These regional differences are likely to affect the ultimate fate of the current wave of democratization in each region.

ENDNOTES

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, 2001.

1. For instance, Valerie Bunce, “Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations,” *Comparative Political Studies*, 33 (August/September 2000); Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam, *Disaffected Democracies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

2. See, for example, Valerie Bunce, “Can We Compare Democratization in the East Versus the South?” *Journal of Democracy*, 6 (July 1995); Valerie Bunce, “Regional Differences in democratization: The East Versus the South,” *Post- Soviet Affairs*, 14 (July/September 1998); Ruth Berlins Collier, *Paths Toward Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jurgen Puhle, eds., *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996); Gerardo Munck and Carol Skalnik Leff, “Modes of Transition and Democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective,” *Comparative Politics*, 29 (April 1997); Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transition from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Philippe C Schmitter with Terry Lynn Karl, “The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Go?” *Slavic Review*, 53 (Spring 1994).

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4. Evelyn Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens, “The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy: Formal, Participatory, and Social Dimensions,” *Comparative Politics*, 29 (April 1997).

5. C. B. Macpherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977).

6. Collier, 1999; Richard Rose and Doh Chull Shin, “Democratization Backwards: The Problems of Third-Wave Democracies,” *British Journal of Political Science*, 31 (April 2001).

7. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

8. For example, Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Carl Goldstein, “KMT Power Grows Out of a Holstered Gun,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 132 (May 8, 1986); Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Modes of transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe,” *International Social Science Journal* XLIII (1991); Michael McFaul, “The Fourth Wave: Democracy and Dictatorship in the Post-Communist World,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, 2001; Munck and Leff, 1997; Henry Kamm, “Thousands of Hungarians March to Commemorate Revolts in 1988,” *New York Times*, (March 16, 1989), A12; Ghia Nodia, “How Different are Postcommunist Transitions?” *Journal of Democracy*, 7 (October 1996); Serge Schmemann, “1000,000 Protest in Leipzig in Largest Rally in Decades,” *New York Times,* (October 17, 1989), A12; Christopher Young, “The Strategy of Political Liberalization: A Comparative View of Gorbachev’s Reform,” *World Politics*, 45 (October 1992).

9. Huntington, 1991.

10. Thailand’s regime transition in 1992 well portrays what the pacted transition is. Upon the military strongman Suchinda’s inauguration in April 1992, opposition leader Chamlong Srimuang, the former Mayor of Bangkok, went on a hunger strike. His protest was followed by popular demonstrations to demand the former general’s resignation. The snowballing protests made Suchinda declare a state of emergency on May 18 and the military troops cracked down on protesters, which resulted in a blood-shedding tragedy. Since Suchinda attempted to stick to the hard line stance and the pro-democracy movements never stopped their demonstrations, the king met with Suchinda and Chamlong on May 21 in order to stop further bloodshed. The king understood an amnesty offer would encourage Suchinda to resign. Upon receiving the king’s grant of clemency, Suchinda stepped down on May 24.

11. Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty Six Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).

12. Gerald M. Easter, “Preference for Presidentialism: Postcommunist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS,” *World Politics*, 49 (January 1997).

13. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IIDE), *Handbook of Electoral System Design* (Stockholm: IIDE, 1997).

14. Ali Piano and Arch Puddington, “The 2000 Freedom House Survey,” *Journal of Democracy*, 12 (January 2001).

15. O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986.

16. For some former Soviet republics, the other possible option may be the year of independence as suggested at the panel where an earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, 2001. But the independence is not always equivalent to democratic transition, as in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Moreover, the independence is not compatible with many other democratic transitions in Asia and post-Communist Europe.

17. This is primarily because political liberalization took place a couple of years before their democratic founding elections.

18. As in some Asian countries, some of the post-Communist states took considerable time before their founding elections. Therefore, it should be noted that the average ratings for the pre-transition period are lower than expected in some cases. Moreover, these new independent former Soviet republics do not have FH scores until their independence in 1990 and received lower FH estimates since the independence.

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20. The Pakistani case does not reveal such steady downward movement in the 1980s and 1990s. Rather, it shows a severe fluctuation, although Pakistan recently returned to a military authoritarian rule.

21. Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes, "Africans' Surprising Universalism," *Journal of Democracy* 12 (January 2001); Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, and Doh Chull Shin, "Halting Progress in Korea and Taiwan," *Journal of Democracy* 12 (January 2001); Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer, *Democracy and its Alternatives* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1998); Marta Lagos, "Between Stability and Crisis in Latin America," *Journal of Democracy*, 12 (January 2001).

22. John Mueller, *Capitalism and Ralph's Pretty Good Grocery* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Richard Rose, Doh C. Shin, and Neil Munro, "The Tension between the Democratic Ideal and Reality: South Korea," in Pippa Norris, eds., *Critical Citizens*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Shin, 1999.

23. See David Easton, *A System Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965); Hans-Dieter Klingemann, "Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis," in Pippa Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Shin and McDonough, 1999.

24. Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, 1998.

25. Ralph Dahrendorf, *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1990).

APPENDIX

SURVEY QUESTIONS

A. Democratic System Preferences

V157. For having a democratic political system, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? **(Absolute Preferences)**

V163. Could you tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly with the statement: Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government. **(Relative Preferences)**

B. Antiauthoritarian Orientations

V154. For having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections, would you say it is very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? **(Anti-Civilian-Dictatorship)**

V156. For having the army rule, would you say it is very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? **(Anti-Military-Dictatorship)**

C. Institutional Confidence

V143. Could you tell me how much confidence you have in **political parties**: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?

V144. Could you tell me how much confidence you have in **parliament**: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?

D. Procedural Efficacy

V160. People sometimes say that in a democracy the **economic system** runs badly. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with them?

V162. People sometimes say that democracies aren't good at **maintaining order**. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with them?

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