



UNIVERSITY of  
SAN FRANCISCO

An annual  
publication of the  
**University of  
San Francisco  
Center for the  
Pacific Rim**  
Copyright 2003

**Editors**

Stephen J. Roddy  
Joaquin Gonzalez

**Editorial  
Consultants**

Barbara K. Bundy  
Hartmut Fischer  
Richard J. Kozicki  
Stephen Uhalley, Jr.  
Xiaoxin Wu

**Editorial Board**

Yoko Arisaka  
Bih-hsya Hsieh  
Uldis Kruze  
Man-lui Lau  
Mark Mir  
Noriko Nagata  
John K. Nelson  
Kyoko Suda  
Bruce Wydick

*Asia Pacific: Perspectives*  
Center for the Pacific Rim  
2130 Fulton St, LM202  
San Francisco, CA  
94117-1080

Tel: (415) 422-6357  
Fax: (415) 422-5933  
perspectives@usfca.edu

# Asia Pacific:

# PERSPECTIVES

*an electronic journal*

Volume III · Number 1

May · 2003

**CONTENTS**

*Nuclear Nonproliferation: A Hidden but Contentious Issue in US-Japan Relations During the Carter Administration (1977-1981)*  
>>..... Charles S. Costello III 1

**An Interview with 2002 Kiriya Chair Rosemary Foot on Human Rights, the United States, and the Asia Pacific**  
>>..... Joaquin L. Gonzalez III 7

*Persistence of Interlocking Institutions: Big Business Policy Under the Kim Dae Jung Government*  
>>..... Jiho Jang 10

*Shifting Boundaries: The Double Life of Walls in Beijing, 1949-1965*  
>>..... Duanfang Lu 17

*North Korean Realities*  
>>..... James McAdam 25

*Asian American Mental Health Issues*  
>>..... Michael Menaster 31

*Christian Higher Education: A Case for the Study of the History of Christianity in China*  
>>..... Peter Tze Ming Ng 35

*Comparing Democratization in the East and the West*  
>>..... Doh Chull Shin and Junhan Lee 40

*Zebra Crossings: Perspectives on Pedestrian Safety in China*  
>>..... Yu Qingling, Zhang Qiao, Wang Min, and Yan Jun 50

*Asia Pacific: Perspectives* is a peer-reviewed journal published once a year in May. It welcomes submissions from all fields of the social sciences and the humanities with relevance to the Asia Pacific region.\* In keeping with the Jesuit traditions of the University of San Francisco, *Asia Pacific: Perspectives* commits itself to the highest standards of learning and scholarship.

Our task is to inform public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent views and ideas that promote cross-cultural understanding, tolerance, and the dissemination of knowledge unreservedly. Papers adopting a comparative, interdisciplinary approach will be especially welcome. **Graduate students are strongly encouraged to submit their work for consideration.**

\* 'Asia Pacific region' as used here includes East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Oceania, and the Russian Far East.

## An Interview with 2002 Kiryama Chair Rosemary Foot on Human Rights, the United States, and the Asia Pacific

by Joaquin L. Gonzalez III, Ph.D.

Rosemary Foot is Professor of International Relations and John Swire Senior Research Fellow in the International Relations of East Asia at St. Antony's College, Oxford University, and at the time of the interview was Kiriyama Distinguished Visiting Professor at the University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim.

Joaquin L. Gonzalez III is Associate Professor of Public Management at Golden Gate University, Visiting Professor of Politics at the University of San Francisco, a Kiriyama Fellow at the USF Center for the Pacific Rim, and one of the editors of *Asia Pacific: Perspectives*.

**Jay Gonzalez (G):** *You are at the tail-end of your experience here at the Center, how would you rate your overall experience so far? How has it been useful to you?*

**Rosemary Foot (F):** I think it's been useful to me in two ways: first, having the time to do research. The support here has been very good, from very basic matters such as having a computer up and running right from the first day, virtually, and having a research assistant that I could use for up to 10 hours a week or more. And, even if the library doesn't have everything that I want, you can get material from other libraries reasonably quickly. The electronic databases are also useful for the sorts of projects that I'm working on at the moment.

I've also traveled, I've given talks about my main research project—the one you heard about in my lecture—at various places, up and down the West Coast, including Canada, and to different audiences—sometimes mainly faculty, sometimes mainly students. This has resulted often in surprisingly similar reactions, and so that makes it clearer where I need to do more work and where I'm more convincing in my arguments. The research has, then, generally gone well. I've also had the time to finish off some other papers that needed to be completed.

Secondly, however, it has been useful to me on the teaching side because it's a long time since I taught in a university other than Oxford. The students at USF came from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds, were somewhat older than those I normally teach at Oxford and some of them were working full-time. They didn't have as much time to devote to the class readings, so I tried to think very hard about how to make the material interesting, challenging, but not overwhelming. I enjoyed it very much. I felt I got to know the students quite well. I also redesigned the course to make it more focused on the post Cold War era, and that again has been useful for me because I'm going to incorporate some of the sections I've redesigned into the teaching that I do back at Oxford.

**G:** *So it's been mutual, since we benefited from having your inputs into redesigning the curriculum, and it seems that you're going to use your lessons here, too.*

**F:** That's right: to re-jig my course back at Oxford and to try some of the questions that I tackled here over there; so it's been very valuable from that point of view. It's also a good location to meet other people...

**G:** *Scholars from similar or related endeavors.*

**F:** Yes.

**G:** *On the teaching, we've received interesting feedback from the students. Of course, initially, they were adjusting to the style that you brought from Oxford into USF, but eventually they appreciated it, and they actually enjoyed it very much.*

**F:** I hope so. They certainly have been very kind to me; they've been very generous and very welcoming. Yes, I hope they did enjoy it. Obviously, I made some mistakes. I think I started with some reading that was too abstract. But once we got over that, I tried to explain why I used that particular piece of writing, and what the author was trying to do. I think after that it went reasonably well. Of course, I did set a lot of reading. It's very hard, and I'm sure you find the same thing, but it's hard to teach and get real debate going unless you give students a range of arguments, a range of different viewpoints. Particularly when one works on contemporary topics, there's still a real and often inconclusive debate going on in the literature. In order to introduce students to that debate, you've just got to give them a range of reading, but that can amount to quite a lot in any one week. And when you're also expecting them to write papers and so on, it's a lot to cope with..

**G:** *It takes a while for them to situate themselves in that debate even after reading the materials you've assigned.*

**F:** It does. Several times students have said to me, well, those arguments are convincing and so are those, so how do I distinguish between them? And my reply has been that we are always in the position of having to weigh opposing arguments. The only thing you can do is try and follow the logic of what is said and look at the evidence that has been brought to bear on a particular question. And it takes time of course, but it's the only way we can develop critical faculties. We are often faced with opposing arguments; trying to weigh them is part of the whole academic endeavor.

**G:** *Let me return to the research question. Could we go back to what is the overall purpose of some of the research questions you came with before you began as Kiriyama Chair? Could you give us something of an intellectual autobiography?*

**F:** At the most general level, I've always been interested in the processes and material interests that shape behavior in the international system -- the behavior of the most important political actors of interest to us in IR. I'm not referring solely to state behavior. It can be bureaucracies, it can be social movements, it can be NGOs, and so on. So at the general level, one could think of it as an interest in global diplomacy.

To be more specific about my interests, for a long time I had worked on international relations in the Asia-Pacific, with a focus on security questions. But partly because the way that scholars thought about security began to undergo change in the last 10-15 years—what do we mean by security, who is secure, what are we trying to secure—I started to change my thinking too. I began to be interested in human rights issues in particular, and to think about the ways in which those issues related to ideas of personal security.

I was also interested in how different states reacted to the international human rights regime. Obviously the region that we both work on is made up of a variety of different kinds of political regimes, some of which are very attuned to international norms on human rights, and others which are much more resistant. And yet they get drawn into this discourse about human rights whether willingly or reluctantly. So I was interested in understanding how and why states get drawn in.

This involved an interest in the strategies that various global actors apply in order to draw states into support for these norms -- or at least rhetorical support of these norms. And that led me into this work on the global community and China's human rights discourse. In the course of doing that work, having studied mainly the security and foreign policy literatures in the past, I realized that I would have to immerse myself deeply in literature on human rights. What is the human rights regime? How has it evolved over time? What degree of consensus does there exist about the central elements in that regime? Having looked at what had happened, particularly in the post 1945 period to the current day, I had a clearer sense of the limits and also achievements of the human rights idea.

Then there was the major shock of September 11th. The discussion among international relations scholars started to revolve around questions about the extent of the transformation of the security environment, and claims were made that we had returned to an era very reminiscent of the Cold War period. The US administration post September 11th started to set a new security agenda and I was interested in investigating whether this left any room for human rights matters: hence the topic of my Kiriyama lecture.

As is usually the case with me in the way I approach research topics, I started with a question. It's very important to me to have a single relatively sharp question in my head and from that, I then take off (or don't take off). That's generally the most productive way for me.

**G:** *So the narrow question this time was?*

**F:** What has happened to America's external human rights policy post September 11? The idea that is often expounded is that we treat policy areas as though they are in hierarchical order: there's security, there's trade, there's human rights, there's this, there's that. The assumption was quickly made that security concerns were being given overriding priority and human rights concerns had gone right down the list in terms of their importance. I still haven't reached hard and fast conclusions about where I stand on this debate, partly because it is a difficult intellectual problem, but also because it is a current issue...

**G:** *It keeps moving, you can't step back and see.*

**F:** Exactly; but I think that makes for quite an interesting lecture and I think it makes for a relatively interesting short piece of writing which I'm planning on doing next. Maybe over the longer term I might just keep tabs on the debate and then find the moment when I can actually step back and write something longer and deeper. My intention at the moment is not to rush into a book, but to write shorter pieces, and then decide what I want to do.

**G:** *I know you expounded on it in your Kiriyama lecture, but can you tell us about some of the things that you've discovered which you found especially challenging with respect to the question you set in your lecture?*

**F:** I think some of the most difficult matters to sort out in my mind are the extent to which discourse constrains and shapes policy. I put quite a lot of store by discourse, by what is said, and the way in which policymakers in democratic and open societies can be trapped by statements they have made in the past. But set against that are some other very important political signals. If I could give you a China example, then an Indonesian one: there's a lot in the rhetorical record obviously that indicates persistent levels of criticism by US governments of China's human rights record. But set against that discourse—which as I say I've always taken seriously—is other behavior such as the meeting at the Crawford ranch between Bush and Jiang. Human rights questions were also discussed, but the signal that's also sent by inviting Jiang to this highly prized meeting at the family home, can lead to the understanding on the part of outsiders that US concerns over China's human rights record will in no sense constrain this relationship. So it's trying to weigh those things and convince myself and others that I can still put some store by my arguments about discourse and entrapment.

With Indonesia, again American officials are on record as stating that they can't restore ties with the Indonesian military because there has not been a full accounting for the military's role in past human rights abuses. And yet it's quite clear from conversations I've had with various people now about Indonesia that the Indonesian military feels that it's not under any obligation to do very much, that US pressure for an accounting actually has diminished. The military are not listening to the words; they're looking at something else. From that something else they're taking signals that they don't have to take the criticism about the human rights record very seriously. That's the message that was given to me in interviews. The TNI really do feel less under attack for their behavior in this new era. In a way, I'm less optimistic about my original argument now, after interviewing in Washington, than when I gave the Kiriyama lecture in mid October. I don't think the original findings are wholly wrong, but I think they need to be made less strongly. I think there's more of a struggle than I indicated in the lecture.

**G:** *So you're basically saying that it is important to weigh both the effects of discourse and of action; that there are a complex range of factors that are shaping behavior?*

**F:** Yes. The other area that I'm still puzzling about—as you know my three cases were China, Indonesia, and Malaysia—now, Indonesia and Malaysia are much more critical to the struggle against terrorism than is China. The rhetoric about human rights is stronger in the case of China than it is in the case of the other two.

**G:** *Indonesia and Malaysia...*

**F:** One could explain that by saying, well, problems are much greater in China, actually, than they are in Indonesia and Malaysia. But you could also explain it by the fact that the struggle against terrorism is much hotter in Indonesia and Malaysia than in China. In the case of China, if it does house terrorists at all, they're relatively few in number and the power of the state is so great that they're not likely to be a major global threat, certainly not much of a threat to the US. But the issue of terrorism in Indonesia is more important. I am referring to such matters as the presence of terrorist cells, the Bali bombing, all of these things. Malaysia has also been the site of terrorist activity and planning. These Southeast Asian countries are referred to as the second front in the struggle against terrorism. The US rhetoric on human rights may well be lower simply because the terrorist threat is graver in these two countries, in as far as the Bush administration interprets it. Or it may be because US domestic interest in human rights abuses in Malaysia and Indonesia is lower than is the case with China. There are competing explanations which I need to think through and to try to weigh.

The third issue I'm thinking about with relation to, not the lecture, but to the larger piece of writing, is whether to move beyond these three examples—to consider again the matter of case selection. I am thinking about adding to my cases in order to try to make a more generalized argument and also to try to make a better attempt at sorting out the issues I've just raised. That's really what's been going on in my head in the six weeks since I gave the lecture and also since I spent a week in Washington conducting interviews. That week has been very important in making me think about the issues again.

**G:** *You were saying you were thinking of adding countries. What countries were you thinking of beyond China, Indonesia, and Malaysia that would somehow fit in and reinforce?*

**F:** Not reinforce: I think there are some countries that would make it harder for my argument, harder for my original argument. If I'm beginning to think about this as countries in the front line, or the second line, with China as a third front country in the struggle, then I do need to turn to that frontline struggle and perhaps look at some of the Central Asian states and Pakistan.

**G:** *When I was reading the announcement for your talk on "Human Rights, US, and the Asia Pacific", I immediately thought: Is Rosemary suggesting a significant paradigm shift after September 11?*

**F:** I partly chose that event and the title of the lecture in order to provoke interest. If I answered my question in the affirmative, I would have been saying that the normative evolution that we recognize as the post 1945 movement towards the establishment of an international human rights regime, and greater attention to human rights, had been stopped in its tracks. And that would have been an important finding – as is the reverse conclusion. I was also wanting to use the lecture as a vehicle for arguing that the evolution of the human rights idea has been accompanied by an evolution in the idea of security. One thing we have to recognize is that human rights and security are no longer de-linked in the way a question like that contained in my lecture title implies. So I was using the lecture as a vehicle for introducing, not a new idea, not my idea, but as a way of introducing or repeating the idea that actually human rights and security shouldn't be thought of as opposing propositions anyway. Those were the main conceptual drivers for the lecture.

**G:** *I like your approach when you said you prefer to start with a narrow question and only later on make decisions about whether a book will derive from that question, or an article – or indeed, no writing at all!*

**F:** Exactly. Some of the questions raised at the lecture—yours on migrant labor, Professor Rule's on refugees, among others—have given me ideas about how I might expand my investigation. I'm intrigued too about some of the reasons why I didn't pay a bit more attention to these issue areas in the lecture.

**G:** *Yes, the refugees, the movement of labor, and all that, because they are part of this.*

**F:** Yes, there are a variety of conventions that relate to the matter of human rights protection even if we tend to focus primarily on the two International Covenants: the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights and the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights. I need to think about a broader definition of rights than the one I used—implicitly—in my lecture.

**G:** *So there has been quite a lot of rethinking going on since the lecture?*

**F:** There certainly has—which demonstrates the value of being given the opportunity "to think out loud". I'm grateful for that opportunity and for the questions that have been raised.

**G:** *Thanks for giving us your thoughts – both in the lecture and today.*