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Asia Pacific: Perspectives is a peer-reviewed journal published once a year in May. It welcomes submissions from all fields of the social sciences and the humanities with relevance to the Asia Pacific region.* In keeping with the Jesuit traditions of the University of San Francisco, *Asia Pacific: Perspectives* commits itself to the highest standards of learning and scholarship.

Our task is to inform public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent views and ideas that promote cross-cultural understanding, tolerance, and the dissemination of knowledge unreservedly. Papers adopting a comparative, interdisciplinary approach will be especially welcome. **Graduate students are strongly encouraged to submit their work for consideration.**

* 'Asia Pacific region' as used here includes East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Oceania, and the Russian Far East.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: A Hidden but Contentious Issue in US-Japan Relations During the Carter Administration (1977-1981)

by Charles S. Costello III, M.A. candidate

Abstract

This paper is a study of specific aspects of the relations between the United States and Japan during the Carter Administration, centering three subjects: [1] Jimmy Carter's relationship with the Japanese prior to becoming the President of the United States, [2] the Tokai Nuclear facility in Japan and its impact on U.S.-Japan relations during the first year of the administration, and [3] a look at the relation of these issues and nuclear non-proliferation in today's world.

Making substantial use of over 380 declassified documents obtained from the National Archives and Records Administration and the Jimmy Carter Library, the paper sheds valuable light on the obscure but important conflict over the Tokai nuclear facility which threatened the good relationship between the U.S. and Japan to the extent that then Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda publicly referred to its resolution as a "life and death" issue for Japan.

Introduction

A diligent reader of former President Jimmy Carter's memoir *Keeping Faith* (New York, 1982), would probably be impressed with the many pages devoted to describing the Iran hostage crisis, the negotiation of the SALT II Treaty with the Soviet Union, and the ill-fated plan to withdraw American ground troops from South Korea. US relations with Japan hardly appear in Carter's version of his presidency, almost as if they were nonexistent. The same can be said after reviewing *Power and Principle* (New York, 1983), the memoir of Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski. But was this in fact the case?

In fact, long before the international confrontation between the US and North Korea in the 1990s over nuclear energy facilities and the related issue of reprocessing nuclear fuel into weapons grade plutonium, a political battle of a similar type was brewing between the new Carter administration and its counterparts in Japan. This conflict between allies pitted two vital interests against each other. Carter was committed to the principles of nuclear non-proliferation and was not about to see one of America's key allies breach that precept. Japan's leaders, on the other hand, saw the need for rapid construction and use of nuclear power facilities as vital to the economic interests of their nation, having been reminded of their energy vulnerability by the Arab oil embargo of 1973. America's Ambassador to Japan, Mike Mansfield, recalled that Prime Minister Fukuda called the situation a "life or death" issue.¹

Depending substantially on over 400 pages of highly sensitive recently declassified documents from the National

Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and the Carter Library, this paper focuses on the issue of Japan's nuclear energy development, specifically the Tokai reprocessing facility and how it became a very contentious issue during the first year of Carter's presidency. This issue threatened to cause "irreparable damage"² between the new Carter administration and Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda.

The declassified documents reveal just how contentious the nuclear energy issue became, and how Carter was forced to work out a compromise with his Pacific ally on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation concerning the Tokai nuclear reprocessing facility in Ibaraki Prefecture near Tokyo. The US side eventually agreed to permit the startup or 'hot testing' of the new facility using US-origin fuel for a period of two years until 1979, thus satisfying Japan's need for the continued development and testing of nuclear energy as a viable alternative energy source for the entire country. Based on the lack of information concerning Japan in the memoirs of Jimmy Carter and Zbigniew Brzezinski, it appeared that the Carter Administration thought the relationship with the Government of Japan was a good one and, for the most part, it was. The declassified documents, however, tell a very different story.³

Some background information to help understand Carter's 'nuclear-mindset' is necessary to understand what occurred during the first eight months of Carter's presidency. While Governor of Georgia, Carter had a good relationship with the Japanese. He maintained strong ties in both the business and political arenas. Carter, a devoutly religious man himself, had a few close Japanese friends who had converted to Christianity. The first, Tadeo Yoshida, president of the YKK Zipper Company, was a well-known philanthropist who invested heavily in the State of Georgia while Carter was Governor. The second was Masayoshi Ohira, the Prime Minister of Japan beginning in 1979 and a member of the Trilateral Commission during the Tokyo Summit in 1975 when he first met Carter. Ohira would become one of three heads of state with whom President Carter would feel the closest personal ties (the other two were Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and President Omar Torrijos of Panama).⁴

In 1973 Jimmy Carter was chosen to be part of the Trilateral Commission to bring together business, political, and academic leaders from the three developed areas of the world—Western Europe, Japan and North America—essentially to foster dialogue and cooperation on common problems.⁵ In May 1975 Carter was scheduled to attend a meeting of the Trilateral Commission in Japan. At this point he was already a candidate for the presidency; this trip was to be his only overseas trip during the campaign.⁶

In Japan Carter visited the Diet and was eager to meet with other Japanese government leaders, but they were not convinced it was worth their time to meet with him. Eventually Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira, Vice Premier Takeo Fukuda, and Prime Minister Takeo Miki received him. The most important aspect of the trip was the opportunity it provided for Carter to enhance his relationship with his fellow commission members.⁷ It is evident that Carter had

built up a good relationship with high-ranking Japanese businessmen and officials prior to his presidency.

One of the first things Carter did as President was to send Vice President Walter Mondale on a trip to Asia. This was in line with the first goal of the new administration, namely to improve relations with Western Europe and Japan. This gesture of goodwill went a long way to improving the U.S. relationship with Japan that had stalled or derailed somewhat because of the Nixon shocks, the unilateral measures imposed by the United States on U.S. - Japan trade.⁸

One of the few references to Japan's nuclear energy policy in either Carter's or Brzezinski's memoirs is a reference by Brzezinski to a weekly report that he gave only to the President. In his weekly report of March 18, 1977 he mentions Japan and reprocessing: "I want to alert you to the extreme sensitivity of the Japanese over the impact of our nonproliferation initiatives. Our new policy has seriously complicated Japan's nuclear power planning and objectives."⁹ Prior to this reference, however, the secret documents revealed that a number of important discussions had already taken place. Beginning the Tokai dialogue

We begin discussion of the Carter documents in late January 1977, soon after Vice President Mondale was sent to Japan. In a secret document from the Department of State the memorandum of conversations between the Vice President and Prime Minister Fukuda begin the dialogue that would eventually threaten the good mutual relationship between the two countries.

During Mondale's first day of talks introductions and pleasantries were exchanged. Topics included economic issues and GNP as well as laying the groundwork for the two administrations to work closely together.¹⁰ On the second day, however, one of the main issues was that of the security of the Korean peninsula and the withdrawal of ground forces. During his campaign, Carter had mentioned pulling troops out of South Korea. The Vice President reassured the Prime Minister that when the President spoke of the withdrawal of ground forces, he had always stressed that it would be done in the closest consultation with the governments of both the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan.¹¹

Mondale goes on to say that in that second day of discussions there were several other points he wished to discuss. First, with respect to nuclear proliferation, he said the U.S. had pressed both Germany and France to exercise great care with respect to sales of sensitive materials and technologies, that reprocessing facilities that could produce weapons-grade material are "simply bomb factories."¹² This was a sensitive topic indeed, and given Japan's history, their decision to develop nuclear energy was made with great care. This decision, combined with their almost total dependence on foreign oil, meant that the Japanese had no choice but to develop alternate-energy sources; nuclear energy was the most viable source for their self-sufficient energy policy.

This decision marks the first time in the Carter administration's dealings with the Japanese that the subject of nuclear reprocessing emerged; one would think that the Vice President could have been more sensitive than to call the reprocessing plants "simply bomb factories." In making

reference to the Germans and French, the Vice President was laying the groundwork for further discussions by making reference to the goals of the nonproliferation treaty. This treaty and other attempts at arms control have since formed the basis of what has been an attempt by two nations, albeit a difficult one, to control the spread of nuclear weapons around the world.

Since the end of World War II nuclear arms control has revolved around three kinds of negotiations: controls on testing and development of nuclear weapons, such as the Partial Test Ban Treaty; controls on the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that currently do not have them, such as the Nonproliferation Treaty; and ceilings on the numbers of weapons that the two superpowers deploy, such as Salt I, Salt II.¹³ Salt I was signed on May 26, 1972. President Carter and Leonid Breznev of the Soviet Union would later sign Salt II in June 1979.

Prior to the signing of the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1968 a number of crucial events occurred related to the spread of nuclear technology. In December 1953 President Eisenhower announced the "Atoms for Peace" program at the United Nations, essentially permitting American corporations to sell reactors and fissile materials abroad. And as part of the plan, in 1957, the UN established the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to attempt to account for the flow of fissile material in and out of each reactor, in order to make sure that it was not being diverted to make weapons. As might have been expected, by the mid-1960's, most European countries and a surprising number of Third World countries, such as Israel, India, Pakistan, South Africa, Iran and Argentina, were all operating nuclear reactors.¹⁴

When the Nonproliferation Treaty was signed in 1968, the U.S, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain agreed not to transfer technology that would permit the development of nuclear weapons in other countries. The other signatories of the treaty agreed not to develop nuclear weapons. France and China did not sign the agreement; neither Charles DeGaulle nor Mao Tse-Tung wanted to undermine their country's respective infant nuclear weapons programs.¹⁵

An incident which greatly influenced Carter's stand on nuclear energy occurred early in 1952 when a nuclear reactor at an experimental installation in Chalk River, Canada, suffered a meltdown and radioactive material escaped into the atmosphere. The Canadian government made an urgent request to the Atomic Energy Commission for assistance in disassembling the damaged nuclear reactor core.

"Carter was a member of the team dispatched to the site. A duplicate mock-up of the reactor was constructed on a nearby tennis court, in which the men were able to practice each tedious step of the dismantling process. The intensity of the radiation at the core meant that each man could spend only ninety seconds in the reactor. In teams of three they descended far beneath the ground, where their work was monitored by closed-circuit television. Every time they removed a bolt or fitting, the equivalent piece was removed from the mock-up. Finally, Carter and his two colleagues descended into the reactor and worked furiously but methodically for their allotted time. Eventually the reactor was completely disassembled. The experience made a deep impression on Carter, perhaps more so than he knew at the time."¹⁶

Uncertainties of the Economies of Nuclear Reprocessing

On March 15, 1977 Secretary of State Cyrus Vance briefed President Carter on his upcoming meeting with Japanese Ambassador Togo. One of the main topics to be discussed was the U.S. Nuclear Policy, in particular the issue of Japanese concern that emerging U.S. nuclear fuel reprocessing policy, and a possible moratorium on reprocessing, might restrict development of Japan's domestic nuclear energy program. A particularly urgent agenda for Japan was to assure US permission to begin operation of its US\$200 million Tokai Mura nuclear power facility, then approaching start-up, which depended on fuel of U.S. origin.¹⁷

This memo contains the first mention of the Tokai nuclear facility included in the declassified documents. The Tokai Mura facility is located in Ibaraki prefecture, northeast of the Tokyo or Kanto region.¹⁸ The Japanese administration was under considerable political pressure both at home and abroad not only to continue development of an alternative energy source, but to put the over US\$200 million of investment to work. They felt it was time to begin "hot testing" and that the US was beginning to contradict itself on its policy with Japan. Comments were also made suggesting that the Japanese were being treated differently from the Germans or French, both of whom already had facilities similar to the Tokai plant.

In another briefing dated March 20, 1977 Cyrus Vance prepared the President for upcoming discussions with Prime Minister Fukuda. He begins by saying, "Because of the extreme concern Japan feels for the possible shape of new U.S. policy toward nuclear reprocessing, Fukuda sent a special representative, Ryukishi Imai, to hold discussions with U.S. officials. Imai forcefully argued that the objectives of nonproliferation can be achieved by limiting access to reprocessing to the only four states which can justify a full fuel cycle (U.S., USSR, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan); that Japan signed the NPT (nonproliferation treaty) to obtain benefits under Article IV for peaceful development, which the U.S. now seems about to deny; and that Japan had developed its nuclear program, including the Tokai facility, following U.S. guidance and stimulus. Imai suggested that a sudden change of mind by the US would cause distrust and suspicion."¹⁹

The Tokai Mura issue was escalating and President Carter was due to make his first trip abroad as President to attend the economic summit in Great Britain. The prime minister of Japan, Takeo Fukuda, would attend as would the leaders of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy.

Just what was the Carter administration's policy? It appeared that not everyone in the administration shared the same understanding of U.S. nuclear policy and would, therefore, make conflicting policy statements. Perhaps these were just misinterpretations, but nevertheless, the Japanese were beginning to get the feeling that the issue simply was not as pressing for the U.S. Government as it was for them. In April 1977 the Carter administration continued to look at how they should approach nuclear development issues and assembled a governmental team to explore possible resolutions. In a briefing for the President, Warren Christopher, a member of

the Carter team, emphasizes that "the Japanese government faces severe and probably unacceptable embarrassment if the prototype facility cannot be used in some form. The Japanese media and the mass media view this issue as a nationalistic one in which resource-poor Japan is being denied energy self-sufficiency. We have therefore developed an approach which will explore with the GOJ [Government of Japan] the feasibility of operating Tokai on an experimental basis, with a modified process which does not produce separated plutonium."²⁰ Separated plutonium is the material used to produce nuclear weapons.

In May 1977 a telegram to the Secretary of State details a conversation in which Prime Minister Fukuda told Carter that resolution of the Tokai Mura issue was critical for him. In conversation Carter told Fukuda that he would tell the Department of State to re-examine the matter and see to it that the issue would not embarrass Fukuda. The telegram goes on to say, "Fukuda had been most impressed by Carter's statement on Japan at a press conference announcing a new U.S. nuclear policy on April 7, but then had been disturbed by statements made subsequently by lower level officials which contradicted the President's remarks."²² The issue was beginning to cause friction and even mistrust in the less than five-month old Carter Administration.

What Were the Options?

In a memo to Zbigniew Brzezinski dated May 27, 1977 the results of an options paper completed by the State Department were available and were being analyzed by the ACDA (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency). Among a series of options ACDA preferred Option 3 with a few caveats:

"ACDA prefers Option 3 with respect to the use of Tokai, but believes that the U.S. should not offer the possibility of the U.S. providing plutonium for the next Japanese breeder reactor (the 'Monju'), nor should the U.S. agree to permit U.S.-origin fuel to be reprocessed for that purpose. We have calculated that the British-supplied 'Magnox' reactor at Tokai can provide sufficient plutonium to meet this Japanese breeder need. Since we have no say over the disposition of spent fuel from that reactor, the Japanese could send the fuel to the UK for reprocessing."²³

What did this option mean politically for the Carter Administration? The memo goes on to detail additional reasons why this would be the best option, because it would:

- Avoid the appearance of the U.S. actively supporting foreign plutonium breeder work
- Avoid the transfer of Japanese fuel of U.S. origin for reprocessing
- Circumvent the need to make an advanced commitment on light-water reprocessing at Windscale (which is already functioning for Magnox fuel but not light water fuel)
- Treat the Japanese the same as the Germans, in that both were having fuel reprocessed over which we have no control.²⁴

Were the Japanese not already being treated the same as the Europeans were being treated or did the Government of Japan have a gripe with the Carter Administration?

The Issue Reaches Extreme Levels

In late July and August of 1977 the number of declassified documents dealing with the Tokai issue increased dramatically and the pressure began to build for both the Carter Administration and the Government of Japan to come up with a negotiated compromise. It was evident from these documents that if things were not done quickly, the relationship between the two administrations would quickly sour, more so than appeared in the public arena. On July 12, 1977 a telegram from Ambassador Mike Mansfield begins with the subject line: "The Reprocessing issue and future U.S.-Japan relations."²⁵

Appointing Mansfield as Ambassador to Japan was a good move for the Carter Administration as evidenced by the above-referred telegram sent only a few weeks into his ambassadorship. It was clear by the tone of the message that the issue was indeed one that threatened the U.S.-Japan relationship. Mansfield noted that high-level Japanese officials claimed that the U.S. did not understand Japan's extraordinary energy predicament nor its commitment to solely peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Finally, in bullet item six, he commented that "the repercussions will be long lasting, severe, and widespread...to procrastinate longer will act to harden each side's position."²⁶

Mansfield

To Cy.

Inform Mansfield that I will personally expedite the decision. He can tell Fukuda. Give me options without delay.

RELATIONS

NOW

PAGE

RESOLVE

BE

JC

FIGURE 1. Carter comments on the Mansfield memo dated July 12, 1977

Many of the secret documents contained notes and scribbled items from a number of people, but President Carter often wrote long notes as shown in the document below from the Mansfield memo. The note below is particularly interesting in that President Carter (JC) says that he will personally expedite the compromise decision.²⁷

The Stakes Were High

Just what was at stake over what Prime Minister Fukuda publicly called "a life and death issue for Japan"? From a Japanese standpoint, nuclear energy was indispensable to the future of Japan and vital to the development of Japan's economy as a whole.²⁸ The U.S. standpoint tried to balance nonproliferation concerns and insure that pending nonproliferation legislation would not be impacted by a Tokai decision. The U.S. government also hoped to use this to rationalize reprocessing facilities for similar purposes in other countries.²⁹ One of the biggest risks was whether or not this type of facility could produce weapons-grade material that could be separated out as plutonium and ultimately be used in a nuclear weapon.

In a memo from Zbigniew Brzezinski to the President on August 13 the Secretary puts the Tokai issue rather simply: "Tokai is bound to appear as an exception to our general standpoint against reprocessing. The key issue is thus how an exception can be made with as little damage as possible to our non-proliferation objectives. None of the technical options is very good from the standpoint of those objectives; the best—coprocessing—pushes the Japanese in a direction not regarded as promising on non-proliferation grounds. Limiting damage to non-proliferation objectives will depend on what political measures accompany any technical solutions."³⁰

As pointed out by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in a memo dated August 3, 1977, "Whatever nonproliferation advantages would be obtained from coprocessing of blending in terms of national diversion would depend on whether there was a facility capable of separating the plutonium. (In fact, given such a facility, the plutonium may be separated out, possibly in a matter of days without much difficulty)."³¹ The greatest risk was clearly the ability to produce separated plutonium. Another issue was, of course, financial; if modifications were to be made to the Tokai facility because of a policy change, who would pay for the changes?

Serious Negotiations Finally Begin

As the end of August approached both administrations began to negotiate a compromise agreement that would be mutually satisfactory and allow the facility to begin operation, at least in part without much delay. The conversion of part of Tokai to a coprocessing facility that would be incapable of producing pure plutonium would satisfy the U.S. nonproliferation objectives.

It appears from a series of memos detailing the final negotiations from the Japanese point of view, that the Japanese were willing to offer to delay construction of a plutonium conversion plant. The plant was one of the most critical items in the entire Japanese program for the utilization of

plutonium in advanced reactors. Without the conversion plant, the plutonium produced at Tokai could not be used as reactor fuel.³²

Finally, on August 31, 1977 a secret memo from Brzezinski to the President outlined his and the negotiating team's final recommendations (supported by ACDA) to accept an agreement that "in essence, the Japanese (1) want to defer decision on coprocessing for two years, subject to R & D and INFCEP; (2) recognize that U.S. originated fuel will not be available beyond the two-year period unless they accept coprocessing; and (3) are willing to impose a voluntary deferment on the construction of their proposed plutonium conversion plant, despite their financial commitments to proceed."³³

Conclusion

In the end, the Tokai Mura issue was resolved. The declassified documents show that the situation was indeed a serious one in the history of U.S.-Japan relations; they contain remarks and interpretations indicating that the relationship had been seriously at risk. Through careful negotiations the U.S. was able to negotiate a number of concessions acceptable to both sides which ensured a continuing good U.S.-Japan relationship throughout the Carter Administration.

Ironically, while President Carter and his top officials focused on issues such as nuclear proliferation and weapons grade plutonium, they neglected the issue of nuclear safety. Even more paradoxically, the accident at Three Mile Island occurred during Carter's Administration. The accident and subsequent leakage of radioactive material almost led to a total meltdown. The three mile island incident occurred in the middle of the Iranian revolution, which interrupted the world's oil supply and precipitated the energy crisis in 1979. Soon after Three Mile Island, Carter personally visited the accident site to assure the American people that nuclear safety was foremost in his thinking.

Tragically and coincidentally, the worst accident in the history of the Japanese nuclear industry occurred at the Tokai facility on September 30, 1999. Three workers received high doses of radiation in a Japanese plant that was preparing fuel for an experimental reactor. The accident was caused by bringing together an excess of uranium that was enriched to a relatively high level, causing what is called a 'criticality' to occur.³⁴ It is likely that more people were affected at Tokai; the 'official' estimates downplay the final degree of radiation and subsequent contamination that was released during the accident. The Carter Administration was ultimately trying to prevent an accident just such as this one.

As one of the most active ex-presidents in history, Jimmy Carter remains active in the area of nuclear nonproliferation and safety. He was one of the individuals most influential in negotiating an agreement with North Korea that ultimately—and unfortunately—failed. Human rights were a constant theme in the Carter presidency and Carter was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on October 11, 2002 for his untiring commitment to human rights and peace in the world today.

As we have witnessed in recent months, countries such as North Korea may have, in fact, obtained the means to pro-

duce nuclear weapons, (perhaps in part because of nuclear reprocessing facilities at Yongbon). It appears that the Carter Administration had good reason to exercise caution in its negotiations on issues that could impact nonproliferation and the nuclear future of the world. The declassified documents discussed in this paper show that the Tokai Mura debate did, in fact, greatly impact U.S.-Japan relations. In the end though, the issue strengthened the U.S. and Japan relationship for the remainder of Carter's term.

ENDNOTES

1. NLC-98-273, Declassified documents. Document dated, August 13, 1977. Declassified on May 28, 1999.
2. NLC-98-273, (May 28, 1999).
3. The original idea for this paper began in the summer of 2002 after a visit to the Carter Library in Atlanta, Georgia by Professor Uldis Kruze of the University of San Francisco. While consulting with an archivist there, he performed a search of recently declassified documents relating to Japan during the Carter Administration. Further research by the author, a graduate student in the Master of Arts in Asia Pacific Studies program at the USF Center for the Pacific Rim revealed that Professor Kruze's initial search explored only one-quarter of the declassified materials relating to Japan. The total number of declassified materials approaches 1800 pages. 400 of these earlier and now declassified documents were subsequently ordered from the Carter Library; this paper is based on these sources. The author wishes to express his gratitude to Professor Kruze for making these resources available.
4. Bourne, Peter G., 1997. Jimmy Carter: A comprehensive biography from Plains to Post Presidency. New York, NY. Simon and Schuster. p. 392.
5. Bourne, (1997) p. 240.
6. Bourne, (1997) p. 266.
7. Bourne, (1977) p. 268.
8. Brzezinski, (1983) p. 289.
9. Brzezinski, (1983) p. 557.
10. NLC-96-182, Declassified 1/16/98. Memorandum of conversations dated January 31, 1977, from the Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda's office, Tokyo, Japan.
11. NLC-96-182, (February 1, 1977) p. 1.
12. NLC-96-182, (February 1, 1977) p. 3.
13. Berkowitz, Bruce D., Calculated Risks, A century of arms control, why it has failed, and how it can be made to work. Simon and Schuster, 1987. p. 18-19.
14. Berkowitz, (1987) p. 173-174.
15. Berkowitz, (1987) p. 174.
16. Bourne, (1997) p. 74-75.
17. NLC-98-266, Declassified 5/24/99. Briefing from Cyrus Vance dated March 15, 1977, on the Presidents upcoming meeting on March 16 with Ambassador Togo.
18. "A profile of Ibaraki," http://www.pref.ibaraki.jp/bukyoku/seikan/kokuko/en/profile/pro_02.htm.
19. NLC-98-266, Declassified 5/24/99. Briefing from Cyrus Vance dated March 15, 1977 concerning the President discussions with Fukuda on Nuclear Reprocessing.
20. NLC-98-266, Declassified May 21, 1999. Memo dated April 2, 1977, from Warren Christopher about Nuclear reprocessing questions with Japan.
21. NLC-98-269, Declassified May 25, 1999. Telegram dated May 1977, incoming telegram to the Secretary of State.
22. NLC-98-269, (May, 27, 1977) p. 2.

23. NLC-98-271, Declassified February 16, 1999. Memo dated May 24, 1977, from the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
24. NLC-98-271, (May 27, 1977) p. 1.
25. NLC-98-269, Declassified May 25, 1999. Telegram dated July 12, 1977, from Ambassador Mansfield to Secretary Vance.
26. NLC-98-269, (July 12, 1977) p. 3-4.
27. NLC-98-269, (July 12, 1977) p. 1. The secret documents containing this note and others have been included at the end of the paper, as an addendum. They provide a sample of the actual declassified documents that form the basis of this paper.
28. NLC-98-273, Declassified 6/4/99. Telegram dated August 26, 1977, from Prime Minister Fukuda to President Carter.
29. NLC-98-275, Declassified 2/10/99. Memo dated August 2, 1977, to Zbigniew Brzezinski concerning Tokai plant options paper.
30. NLC-98-273, Declassified 6/4/99. Memo dated August 13, 1977, from Zbigniew Brzezinski to The President.
31. NLC-98-276, Declassified 2/20/99. Memo dated August 3, 1977, to Zbigniew Brzezinski from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
32. NLC-98-274, Declassified 5/25/99. Telegram dated August 31, 1977, to Brzezinski from the Gerard Smith and Mansfield in Tokyo.
33. NLC-98-273, Declassified 6/4/99. Memo dated August 31, 1977, to The President, from the Zbigniew Brzezinski.
34. <http://www.uic.com.au/nip52.htm>, Tokaimura criticality accident. Nuclear Issues Briefing Paper # 52, June 2000.

Charles Costello holds an English degree from Santa Clara University, but he also studied at the University of Durham in Great Britain and at San Francisco's own Golden Gate University. An experienced technical writer and project manager, Charles worked for a number of the big names in the tech field, including IBM and TRW, before launching his own technical writing business. He is currently a student in the Master of Arts in Asia Pacific Studies program at the University of San Francisco.