CONTENTS

The Changed World of South Asia:
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India after September 11
>>.........................................................Richard J. Kozicki 1

U.S. Base Mania in Central Asia
>>..................................................Patrick Lloyd Hatcher 11

The Making of an Integrated National Grain Market in China
>>..............................................................Wubiao Zhou 17
The Changed World of South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India after September 11
by Richard J. Kozicki, Ph.D.

Abstract
The unprecedented attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 dramatically reoriented American policy interests in South Asia. Before the attacks, the George W. Bush administration had nearly relegated Pakistan to the category of a ‘rogue state’ because of its coup against a democratically elected government, its support for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, its involvement in terrorist insurgency in the Indian-controlled Kashmir, and its involvement in nuclear and ballistic missiles deals with China and North Korea. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, the Bush administration did a complete volte-face in its dealings with Pakistan. However, this shift has further aggravated tensions in South Asia. This paper discusses why.

The horrendous attacks of September 11 on the World Trade Center have resulted in countless observations on the changed world of the United States and the general international community. The focus and scope of this essay is more limited, although regionally large: South Asia, particularly the countries of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India as the most critical portion of this vast region. They have experienced significant political change before and, notably, changes during the six months since September 11. More can probably be expected. But this juncture affords an opportunity for an examination of the changing international scene in present South Asia while providing some brief historical background material for contextual purposes.

Several pertinent questions may be posed at the outset of this overview, among them: How did Afghanistan fall into such a sorry condition that a terrorist non-Afghan organization, the Al Qaeda, was established within and operated from Afghan territory? How involved has neighboring Pakistan been in this highly disruptive development of a militant Islamist force and international network? What have been the implications and challenges for India, Pakistan’s southern neighbor and standing adversary, especially in regard to the dangerous issue of Kashmir? Can another Indo-Pakistani war be averted with both countries being ominously nuclear-weapons states since 1998? What are the important linkages and spillovers of events and actions in one of the three states—Afghanistan Pakistan, India—on the others? And what valid national interests do states outside the immediate South Asia region have in its international affairs, notably the United States?

Afghanistan: Externally and Internally Besieged
The land-locked area of Afghanistan has had a long history of invasions by various peoples and armies. In the 19th century it became a leading locale for major power competition amidst the Afghan ethnocentric mosaic. The imperial “Great Game” between Tsarist Russia and Britain (namely the Raj in India) was contested as each rival sought to exert power and influence among the diverse and fiercely independent Afghan tribes. In 1919 Britain, by treaty, gave up its Afghan interests. A semblance of Afghan national government appeared, some friendship treaties were concluded and frontiers demarked. But forging a genuine national unity among the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and other tribes has remained an on-going socio-political challenge. As Louis Dupree wrote in his encyclopedic work, Afghanistan (although almost totally Islamic) does not have a uniform national culture and has been “attempting to create a nation-state out of a hodgepodge of ethnic and linguistic groups.”

During the 40-year reign of King Zahir Shah (1933-1973), there was an improved appearance of Afghan national unity and stability. But this was far from complete, as tribalism and local warlordism were omnipresent. Zahir Shah’s ouster by his cousin Mohammed Daoud was followed by a Republic being declared, new power struggles in Kabul, assassinations of leaders (some were communists), Soviet political penetration and, in December 1979, a full-scale invasion by the Soviet Union. With Cold War overtones and international involvement, a new great game of sorts tragically occurred in the 1980’s in Afghanistan. There was an explosion of guerrilla warfare, with the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, and other countries funneling arms and funds to the rebel mujahideen. The 1980’s were a devastating decade for Afghanistan. In addition to great physical destruction, some six million Afghans eventually became refugees, mainly in Pakistan and Iran. Soviet withdrawal finally took place after 15,000 Russian war-dead in February 1989. Soon afterwards, in untimely and undue haste, the United States and other interested powers disengaged themselves from the plight of Afghanistan—then battered and sorely torn, in growing disarray, and more fragmented than ever.

The nominal government in Kabul, headed by a venerable Tajik, Burhanuddin Rabbani, as president, proved ineffective and incapable of achieving national power. By 1992, a period of clear anarchy had begun. It was marked by factional power struggles, a rise of warlordism and the spread of inter-tribal warfare. Within two years a militant Islamist group in Kandahar became well known. Terming the Taliban (Religious Students Movement), it promised Islamic discipline and governmental stability and order, and its number of supporters and fighters grew rapidly. In 1996, the Taliban militia captured Kabul, deposed Rabbani, controlled most of Afghanistan, and began to impose a strict Islamic regime based on its fundamentalist interpretation of Islam under Mullah Muhammad Omar’s leadership. This meant, among other things, outlawing music, banning women from education and workplaces and public executions in sports stadiums. The Taliban’s world view was part of what Fouad Ajami has aptly described as a “fierce, redemptive Islam”6, one operative variously in Muslim lands. This involves a dual feature: challenging conservative Arab governments favorable to the West, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and actively confronting the ‘corrupting’ Western powers wherever possible, especially the United States.
Concurrently, a nexus and dovetailing of interests developed in the mid-1990’s between Taliban-led Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden, the exiled wealthy Saudi businessman who became the leading proponent of a militant Islamist theology and the purveyor for measures of holy terror. Following his sojourn in radical Sudan in the early 1990’s, a safe haven of sanctuary was granted to bin Laden by the kindred new Taliban regime in Kabul. He then proceeded to truly create with noteworthy help from Egyptian revolutionaries also exiled in Afghanistan his Al Qaeda (‘the base’) organization, training facilities and global network. Muhammad Omar and Osama bin Laden became, in effect, confreres in jihad (‘holy war’).

The vulnerability of fragmented Afghanistan to foreign penetration and influence was historic but it was not simply a vacuum of power. The close relationship developed between the Taliban and bin Laden’s expanding organization in Afghanistan was grounded in a similarity of their fundamentalist views of Islam and its proper role in the world. This was mutually reinforcing but the Al Qaeda, not the Taliban, was more geared to activism and militancy outside of Afghanistan.

Other helping hands or contributors to the establishment and role of the Taliban in Afghanistan were individuals in Saudi Arabia donating funds and in neighboring Pakistan, which had made an increasingly conservative Islamic turn after 1979. The latter shares a 1,500 mile border with Afghanistan and would also be impelled by geopolitical considerations with regard to India. A discussion of Pakistan in South Asia must be give here.

Pakistan: Toward Major Changes in Policy?

As an independent entity since Partition in 1947, Pakistan has had a continuous, sometimes revolving set of problems and issues challenging its becoming a successful nation-state. These have included, ironically, its quest for national identity as an Islamic state (how progressive or conservative?) with various and sometimes halting efforts toward realizing economic viability and political stability (half its governance has been under a series of military national leaders), and a readiness in foreign affairs to rely significantly on external powers for economic, political, and military assistance (namely to counter the abidingly perceived threat of much larger neighboring India). The four Indo-Pakistani armed conflicts since 1947, plus the lingering issue of Kashmir, have, understandably, intensified Pakistan’s perception of India as its chief adversary. The 1971 war and the emergence of Pakistan’s eastern wing as independent Bangladesh (with critical help from India) was especially traumatic. “Dismemberment” cried Islamabad, and no amount of U.S. ‘tilt’ toward Pakistan could prevent it.

Fifteen years earlier in the Cold War, Pakistan had become a U.S.-supported ‘front line’ state in the global struggle against international Communism. Pakistan welcomed U.S. military and economic assistance, granted U.S. base rights on its soil, and joined both the SEATO and CENTO anti-Communist pacts. As President Field Marshall Ayub Khan declared in the early 1960s, Pakistan had become the United States’ ‘most allied ally’. The relationship seemed quite firm, and over the decade 1954-65 Pakistan was the recipient of some $2 billion from the U.S. in military and economic aid. A trend was apparently started, even though Pakistan chose for security reasons to look south toward India rather than north beyond Afghanistan toward the Soviet Union.

During the early 1960’s, Afghanistan became a different foreign policy concern for Pakistan. The “Pashtunistan” issue arose when Pashtuns in Pakistan attempted a political reunification with their ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Pakistan closed its Afghan borders to discourage such efforts and they eventually faded.

In 1963, much to the surprise of Washington, Pakistan began a special relationship with Communist China, which also had a major armed border clash with India in the Himalayas in the fall of 1962. The close Pakistan-U.S. relationship, however, survived until the second Indo-Pakistani war in September 1965, after which the U.S. (and Britain) placed an arms embargo against both Pakistan and India. The disappointment—was that Pakistan (plus the U.S. ‘tilt’) was unable to prevent the secession in 1971 of Bangladesh. (A case study and lesson in realpolitik was accorded Washington). By the 1970’s, Pakistan was allocating about 50 percent of its budget for defense and arms procurement (including from China) and with another 20 percent going for debt servicing. Relatively few funds were left for needed domestic economic and social programs, with questions raised as to whether it was becoming a ‘failed’ state. In 1977, General Zia ul-Haq led another Pakistani military takeover of government. This lasted eleven years and further damaged the state’s image.

Fortunately in the early 1980’s, Pakistan returned to ‘front line’ status and U.S. largesse soon after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The new Reagan Administration withdrew the arms embargo and lavished economic and military aid on Pakistan (India had already turned to Moscow after 1965 as its chief arms supplier). Equally important, during the 1980s Pakistan served as the main conduit for military, technical and financial assistance to the mujahideen fighting the Soviet invaders in Afghanistan.

The disparate mujahideen were rightly seen as ‘freedom fighters’, even though they were commonly at mutual odds and sometimes joined by an assortment of fighters from outside Afghanistan (‘Afghan Arabs’), including some individual Pakistanis. They were all combating the Soviet invaders. Saudi funds and U.S. arms (particularly ‘Stinger’ missiles) were vital in this armed Cold War struggle north of the Khyber Pass, which finally resulted in the Soviet withdrawal in February 1989.

Especially noteworthy here were the controversial linkages established in this process between the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its Pakistani counterpart as a spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The military-led and staffed ISI had grown markedly in influence with regard to not only intelligence-gathering and assessment but also apparently policy formulation and execution. This became so much so by the late 1990s, observers began to see the ISI as a ‘rogue’ agency in the near-failed state of Pakistan, or at least one with serious ‘rogue pockets’.

http://www.pacificrim.usfca.edu/research/perspectives

South Asia After September 11 / Kosicki · 2
India had long taken careful note of the expanding role and authority of Pakistan’s ISI, accusing it of providing support to a Sikh secessionist movement (‘Khalistan’) in India’s Punjab state in the 1980s. This was later crushed by New Delhi but the terms and charges of ‘cross-border’ and ‘state-sponsored terrorism’ were already in common usage. They would be repeatedly used in the case of divided Kashmir in the 1990s, the most dangerous issue and historic flashpoint for Indo-Pakistani armed clashes and tensions through September 11 and after.

In passing to a consideration of independent India, a note must be added of another aspect of Pakistan’s ISI, one seemingly domestic in character but with growing international implications in South Asia. This presumably followed the public decision of President General Zia ul-Haq’s announcement in 1979 that Pakistan should become a more Islamic state based on a closer adherence to the Shari’atli (Islamic law). In any event, close ties would be developed from the 1980s between military staffers and senior figures in the ISI with militant Islamists and their organizations in Pakistan. (More on this below.)

India: Resurgent Regional and Asian Power

Mahatma Gandhi bemoaned the 1947 partition of the Indian subcontinent as the ‘vivisection’ of India. But he sadly accepted the resultant bifurcated Pakistan as a neighbor and argued that all related agreements must be fully honored. For this ‘pro-Pakistani’ stand he would be assassinated by a Hindu fanatic in January 1948.

The incendiary blend of religion and politics would not be limited to anyone part of South Asia. It clearly, we are periodically reminded, remains a great and recurring challenge for independent India. Communal riots between Hindus and Muslims do break out from time to time and lives are lost. However, taking into account the complexity and scope of India’s ethnic diversity, it can be said that a fair degree of harmony and stability generally prevails.

India, the largest and most diverse country in South Asia, has not experienced further balkanization after partition (confounding the many pessimists) and New Delhi is determined that it will not. Instead, under able and committed civilian leadership, it adopted a constitution enshrining parliamentary principles and institutions, then proceeded to become a secular and social democracy. Regular national and state (provincial) elections, the rule of law, and the fact of no military takeovers, are genuine sources of Indian national pride—any disappointments regarding the pace of economic and social development notwithstanding.

In addition, throughout the Cold War India steadfastly rejected joining any alliances and held to the principled policy of nonalignment advocated by her longtime mentor and first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru (1947-64). The general corollary and posture by India of peaceful coexistence among nations was interrupted four times in armed clashes with neighbors (three with Pakistan, 1947-48, 1965, 1971; and one with China, 1962). Commentators and analysts usually accorded India major regional power status but falling short of its potential for real international influence beyond South Asia. Comparisons of India with China as a dynamic actor in world affairs have been inevitable and unfavorable. On the other hand, Pakistan, to the irritation of New Delhi, has seen itself as a regional ‘balancer’ to India (a view shared for years by the U.S.), although in reality this status was artificially sustained by external aid from the U.S. and later China. (The Bangladesh breakaway in 1971 and Pakistan’s becoming a member of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1979 helped to correct this picture.)

India’s ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ (PNE) in 1974 added a new dimension to India as a power, although the Indian government of Indira Gandhi’s premiership foreswore that this would not lead to India’s developing nuclear weaponry. It nonetheless served as a notice to China, which had first exploded a nuclear device ten years earlier, and also to Pakistan, Beijing’s semi-client partner. In effect, in the offing in New Delhi was a reassessment of the objective use of power and its instrumentalities. Increased purchases of military hardware to India (mainly from the Soviet Union) and the growth of domestic Indian ordnance were additional indices. In the 1980s, India made definite military responses to separatist movements in the Punjab, northeast India, and Kashmir. There was also an ill-fated Indian military incursion into Sri Lanka, where it had been invited by the Sri Lankan government fighting tenacious Tamil rebels in the north and east of the island nation. India seemed more confident as an international actor in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but it gained no luster by its halting criticisms of China’s 1979 (‘punitive’) incursion into Vietnam or, more importantly, of the full-scale Soviet military intervention into Afghanistan in December 1979. Not sharing any frontier with Afghanistan, India was not in any strategic position to move any arms and equipment directly to the Afghan mujahideen, even if it were so inclined. Evidently New Delhi was not.

During the 1990s several notable international and domestic events and actions affect India’s perceived role in South Asian and general world affairs. The following can be listed here:

2. More fragmentation in the Indian federal political system as the venerable secular Congress Party weakened and faced rising Hindu nationalism, symbolized by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).
3. An historic decision to modify the traditional Indian socialist economy and pursue a policy of ‘liberalization’ (privatization).
4. Terrible Hindu-Muslim communal riots following the destruction by militant Hindu mobs of a sixteenth century Muslim mosque in Ayodhya, in the state of Uttar Pradesh.
5. Increasing insurgency in (Indian-held) Kashmir by Kashmiri militants seeking independence, resulting in heavy Indian armed response.
6. The assumption of national power and the central Indian government by a BJP-led coalition in 1998.
7. The detonation in May 1998 of five nuclear weapons devices by India, followed immediately with successful nuclear explosions by Pakistan.

http://www.pacificrim.usfca.edu/research/perspectives
8. Limited but intensive mountain warfare in the summer of 1999 in the Kargil sector of Kashmir when ‘freedom fighters’ from the Pakistan side of the Line of Control (LOC) took up positions on the Indian side.


10. The Pakistani policy of lending full support to the Taliban, which began in the mid-1990s, continued unabated under the new military regime in Islamabad until shortly after September 11, 2001.

A detailed discussion of the above-listed and inter-related developments and in South Asia is beyond the scope of this essay. But some of them must be noted as interfacing with and having considerable spill over and influence. India had virtually lost a major export market and arms supplier, Russia, at least for some time. New Delhi, however, did not rush forward to embrace the sole remaining super power, the United States. On the other hand, with the Cold War officially over questions were naturally asked about the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) and its future: who would India and like-minded states be nonaligned against now? Would not a new thrust in Indian foreign policy based partly on substantial economic growth and modernization of India’s armed forces and defense be the future course, including probably a visible Indian nuclear deterrence? Why not plan for a ‘Great India’?

In the meantime, Pakistan was cementing its special relationship with China, amidst reports of nuclear and missile technology transfers being made from Beijing to Islamabad. With the Russians gone from fragmented Afghanistan (and unlikely to return), Pakistan began to view the adjacent tormented land as an opportunity for penetration and gaining ‘strategic depth’ against India—assuming some order would emerge in Kabul from growing chaos there. Here, as in other moments, measures would be taken or contemplated in the context of the distrustful Indo-Pakistan relationship.

India did, on the whole, enjoy sustained economic growth during the 1990s under the new economic policy of privatization and selectively welcoming foreign investment. Born out of a foreign exchange crisis, the policy released Indian energies, and an annual average growth rate later resulted of almost seven percent. Moreover, India succeeded in avoiding the widespread Asian financial crisis (‘flu’) of the late 1990s. Defense modernization of India advanced apace, and defense be the future course, including probably a visible Indian nuclear deterrence? Why not plan for a ‘Great India’?

In February 1999, that relationship was, as many saw it, moving to a more hopeful footing when India’s Prime Minister, Atul Bihari Vajpayee, made a goodwill gesture and trip to Pakistan. The potential mutual benefits from ‘bus diplomacy’ faded rapidly, however, only a few months later. The occupation of strategic Himalayan locations along the LOC in Kashmir by ‘freedom fighters’ crossing over from the Pakistani side (presumably with regular Pakistani help) required a determined and costly Indian military response. The United States provided some diplomatic cover to Islamabad toward the withdrawal westward of the incursive force from the Kashmir LOC in September. On October 5, 1999, the Pakistani army coup headed by General Pervez Musharraf took place.

Prospects now for any rapprochement between India and Pakistan seemed dismal. India continued to accuse Pakistan of ‘state-sponsored terrorism’ in Kashmir, while Pakistan denied this and took the high road saying India was thwarting the Kashmiris ‘right to self-determination’. Underlying all the accusations and posturing was the great mutual distrust extending back more than half a century. Somewhat ironically, it would finally take the cataclysmic event of September 11, originating in neighboring Afghanistan, to encourage significant policy changes in India and Pakistan.

**Convergence of Issues, Political Conflicts and Policy Changes**

The centrality of Pakistan in the South Asian conflagration is obvious. Geo-strategically situated between Afghanistan and India and sharing lengthy borders with each (over 1,500 miles), Pakistan had related policies to formulate and
roles to play. The question would be the acceptability of these policies to their neighbors, particularly India.

India’s tense post-Cold War security environment may have improved during the late 1990s but it was still focused on Pakistan and China. Nuclear proliferation in May 1998 by India was a signal to both countries. India’s relations with China recovered soon from a subsequent brief period of tension and the two giant Asian neighbors moved pragmatically toward building a new relationship, border and other Sino-Indian issues notwithstanding.13

There was not a similar development between India and Pakistan. The mutual visits by their chief executives in February 1994 and July 2000 resulted in no relaxation of Indo-Pakistani tensions. On the contrary, the Indians, by contrast, witnessed increased insurrection in Kashmir during the 1990s as cross-border penetration and crossings had become, they charged, a premier activity of Pakistan. Moreover, the government there enabled militant Islamist to function openly and even aided them. Patience in India was wearing thin, and it was not limited to Hindu nationalists.

Simply put, as noted above, the nurturing and support the Taliban in Afghanistan received from Pakistan meant that the activity moved in a northern and western direction. Quetta to Kandahar was the basic direction. The ‘moral and political’ Pakistani support (only?) given to Kashmiri rebels, termed ‘freedom fighters’ by Islamabad, meant that the activity there moved in an eastern and southern direction. Another factor here was the surplus of mujahideen in the area with fighting skills after the Afghan war with the Soviets, and the ensuing Afghan chaos before the Taliban victory.

Moreover, also available in Pakistan were funds, training facilities and madressas (religious schools), which rapidly multiplied as sources for future young holy warriors and offered a curriculum dubbed ‘Jihad 101’. Two influential militant Islamist organizations operated freely in Pakistan to the great concern of Indians: The Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (Army of Muhammad) and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (Army of the Pure). In addition, from his sanctuary in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden had pledged publicly in 1998 to wage war on America, Israel and India.

Looking backward, no one at the time in the American CIA or foreign intelligence agencies could gauge the transformation of Al Qaeda from an obscure group of Muslim extremists to a global terrorist organization. The bombings later that year of the American embassies in East Africa were eye-openers. Perhaps, most important was Osama bin Laden’s decision “to act as a framer of terrorism, providing crucial financial and logistical assistance to locally sponsored plots brought to his organization by Islamic extremists. This new approach gave his group a much broader range of possible targets.”14 India could well have become one of them before the horrendous terrorist overreach of September 11.

The issue of Islamist extremism and terrorism, plans of supporting governments, special agencies and individual leaders, had been joined by the American response and call for an international coalition to fight the ‘war on terrorism’ diplomatically, financially and militarily. It resulted in other positive responses, including India’s. But it also involved policy dilemmas and needs, and opportunities for policy changes.

The most critical would be for Pakistan: how to avert becoming an international pariah and remain a relatively viable entity while containing the many Islamic extremists within the country. For India, it meant how far to cooperate in the war on terrorism and possibly modify its security policy without losing the country’s security independence. New Delhi would also seek (unsuccessfully) to have the terrorism experienced in north India and allegedly originating from Pakistan tied to the international war on terrorism.

Pakistan was one of the three countries to maintain full diplomatic relations with Taliban-led Afghanistan. The other two, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, severed their ties first. Pakistan did not do so finally until late November, after the military defeat of the Taliban was almost total.

About the same time, the Pakistan Information Secretary said at a press conference that the country had come through the crisis ‘safely’. Pakistan had supported the war on terrorism as a “matter of principle” but that, “If we would not support the international coalition, one cannot imagine the consequences for Pakistan.” He added that this was not done for “any economic considerations.”15

It was not an easy road for Pakistan to negotiate over the course of the two months after September 11. After the initial decision to join the anti-Taliban (and anti-Al Qaeda) international coalition, the passage was made hesitantly, if not reluctantly. General Musharraf had to face continuous vigorous public demonstrations, notably in Peshawar, Quetta and Karachi, protesting the decision to abandon the Taliban and join the U.S.-led international coalition. Islamic militants were out in force in the ethnic Pashtun urban areas (Lahore in the Punjab was relatively calm). Pakistan, repeatedly hailed by Washington as a “crucial” partner and ally, naturally expected rewards, hoping not only for debt relief but also for the release of F-16 fighters purchased earlier (the latter was denied). By late October, the U.S. had given Pakistan $600 million in cash and was preparing an aid package “likely to total several billion dollars” including “sweeping” debt rescheduling, and various grants and trade benefits.16 As one observer put it at the start of the new year:

The survival of Pakistan in its existing form is a vital U.S. security interest, one that trumps all other American interests in the country. A collapse of Pakistan—into internal anarchy or an Islamist revolution—would cripple the global campaign against Islamist terrorism. Strengthening the Pakistani state and cementing its cooperation with the West have thus become immensely important to Washington.17

There was still the question of Pakistan’s ISI, plus the militant Islamic groups and profusion of madressas (Islamic religious schools) in Pakistan. From the 1980s, the ISI had formed links with militant groups in Pakistan, Afghanistan and in Indian-controlled Kashmir. It was staffed primarily by military intelligence officers, including some so-called ‘jihadi generals’. General Musharraf replaced a hard-line ISI head in the fall of 2001 but moved more cautiously in restructuring and shutting down cell units, especially those involved in Kashmir-related operations, with some progress reported by
early 2002. Concurrently, in mid-January the Pakistani President vowed over television to purge Islamic militant groups, including those abetting militant actions and violence in Indian-held Kashmir, and a round-up of some 1,400 people and closing of offices started. India indicated it would wait for “evidence on the ground” (No revolving doors or repackaging, please.)

A long-range problem centers on curriculum revision and the madrassas. Here, science and math are absent while intensive Islamic religious studies prevail, including the glory of jihad. More basic education would seem a desired change; not providing breeding grounds for young Islamic militant recruits. General Musharraf has pledged to do this in the 39,000 Pakistani madrassas (these were reportedly totaling only 3,000 in the late 1970s). It remains to be seen what can be done to create a moderate, progressive vision for Islam in Pakistan. Skeptics are not limited to neighboring India.

General Musharraf’s noteworthy televised speech of January 12 promised such a vision. Protest demonstrations had already subsided significantly by November 2001 and his innate sense of confidence and political timing had evidently grown remarkably. It was probably impelled partly by the full-scale mobilization of Indian military forces along the northern Indo-Pakistani border after terrorist attacks on the Kashmir Legislative Assembly and the Indian Parliament in October and December. (More on this below.)

As year 2001 was ending, popular Pakistani as well as official reassessments of Pakistan’s abortive policy in Afghanistan were apparent. Some self-reproaches were duly included. Dawn, the leading Pakistani newspaper, politely welcomed the “historic Bonn accord”, gave tribute to the diverse Afghan delegates’ “wisdom and realism”, and noted President Musharraf’s assurance that Pakistan would provide “all possible assistance and cooperation” to the Afghan “interim set-up” in the task of national reconstruction.

But a pro-Taliban Pakistan policy in its near north and west had clearly failed. A typical signed op-ed article in Dawn, entitled “The Afghanistan Boomerang”, conceded that Afghanistan was “earmarked” to be Pakistan’s “western strategic depth” but treated like an “accidental colony” and kept in “some form of surrogate occupation through the Taliban by exporting and encouraging them through a few fundamentalist organizations.” The author then charged that Pakistan was “summarily ejected from Afghanistan and finds itself ostensibly a coalition partner only in name...not being taken into confidence on most major matters.”

Another angry Pakistani writer evincing strong anti-U.S. sentiments penned an op-ed piece entitled “Our Taliban Policy in Tatters.” He claimed that all the U.S. Presidents from Jimmy Carter (sic) to George W. Bush, have been “among the authors of the blinding Taliban flash-in-the-pan of our times.” He lamented the “shame and resultant heartache from our reckless Taliban enterprise” and called for a Pakistan national commission to examine “our Afghanistan disaster.”

Possibly the most severe indictment came from the editorial staff of Dawn, Pakistan’s leading newspaper. In early December, they discovered the “passing into history” of the Taliban, scoring its “harsh policies and narrow and obscu-
strengthen the military-to-military and defense ties between our two countries, which I think are so important.”26 Further Indo-U.S. discussions and progress would follow during the coming months.

India had already won many diplomatic points for showing military restraint and by not crossing the LOC during the Kargil warfare in Kashmir in the summer of 1999. Hardliners in India had urged a policy of hot pursuit against Pakistani military bases and ‘jihad’ training facilities located in the Pakistan-held third of Kashmir. New Delhi desisted then. But the shocking suicide attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13 was for most Indians a national indignity and the last straw. Would New Delhi show restraint now?

Moreover, with a decided view to forestalling a general Indo-Pakistani war and its harmful effect on mopping-up operations against terrorism in Afghanistan, what might the U.S. be able to do? (An important collateral U.S. concern was that Pakistani troops positioned on the Afghan-Pakistan border to intercept fleeing Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters would be shifted southwards to the Pakistan-Indian border.) A flurry of diplomatic visits would take place in South Asia in December 2001 and January 2002, heightened by more visits from Powell and Rumsfeld to reduce tensions.

The Pakistan government condemned the attack by “armed intruders” (five in number, all among the 12 dead) on the Indian Parliament “strongly” and “unequivocally”. The brief statement made no mention of the possible origin or identity of the attackers. (New Delhi swiftly pointed fingers at Pakistan). *Dawn* also condemned the “senseless” terrorist action (some make “sense?”) and hoped Indian Prime Minister Atul Bihari Vajpayee would maintain his equanimity and “not succumb to pressure from the hawks within his own ranks who seem keen to exploit the latest incident to score anti-Pakistan points.” (Some BJP members of Parliament were urging Mr. Vajpayee to follow “the U.S. model on terrorism” and pursue a policy of “hot pursuit” against the militants.) *Dawn* added that “Indo-Pakistan relations remain brittle and at a low ebb”, and with wars in Afghanistan and the Middle East, the “last thing the world needs now is a renewed confrontation between two nuclear powers in South Asia.”27 Two weeks later *Dawn* asked (and feared), with war rhetoric rising and large numbers of troops “amassing along their borders, whether India and Pakistan were closer to the brink.”28

Fortunately, although mobilization of forces along the borders continued (India had clearly decided to utilize ‘coercive diplomacy’ and to keep the pressure on Pakistan), there was a reduction of tensions by mid-January 2002. Some of this was attributable to President Musharraf’s televised speech of January 12 in which he banned the Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Toiba militant groups, declaring that Pakistan would “not allow its territory to be used for any terrorist activity.” India welcomed this major policy ‘shift’ conditionally. New Delhi reaffirmed its call for a “bilateral dialogue” (no third party) on Kashmir awaited Pakistan action “on the ground,”—recording its disappointment that Pakistan still refused to hand over 20 persons named on a list by India as “Indian mafia bosses and criminals”. Some credit was accorded American pressure on Pakistan, while Secretary of State Powell’s visit to India in January was described by Jaswant Singh, India’s External Affairs Minister, as “part of the normal process of consultation,” not any mediation.29

A confident India was firmly positioned on the South Asian center stage, skeptical of Pakistan’s President Musharraf but giving him time to deliver on his promises. At the same time, it continued to conduct joint defense and “energy security” discussions with the U.S. (started in fall of 2000). These involve strategic ties, large arms sales, joint naval and military exercise, and prospective Indo-U.S. joint ventures in the defense sector.

All of this extraordinary activity and shifts in defense policies has been aptly described as a “Dramatic U Turn.”30 In January the Chinese Premier, Zhu Rongji, was on a quiet six-day state visit to India was courteously greeted and almost ignored. All of the above suggests an assertive India poised for a more active role on the wider global stage, but not necessarily in tandem with the United States, which still shows a disturbing preference for unilateralism, rather than joining international coalitions.

**America, Afghanistan and the Aftermath**

The globalization of the ‘war on terrorism’, immediate and future, is a continuing official American design which can be both reassuring and disquieting. Would America’s intensive military involvement in Afghanistan since October 5 and sudden victory in mid-November be matched by a skillful—and sensitive—handling of the political and economic aftermath there? In addition, where it is also indicated with regard to the neighboring rival countries of India and Pakistan?

There is room for both optimism and pessimism. Most important, the U.S. has made repeated public statements that it will not simply abandon Afghanistan after all the fighting ends. However, U.S. participation in needed peace keeping work outside of Kabul would still seem very desirable.31

The apparent reluctance of the U.S. to participate in any expanded international peacekeeping force in the insecure Afghan hinterland may be linked, in part, to a ‘Somali syndrome’—namely the ill-fated experience of American military as peace-keepers in that anarchic land in 1993-94. Moreover, any notable increase in the number of American military casualties in Afghanistan (thus far minimal) before the November 2002 U.S. national elections could have a negative political impact for Washington. Finally, there is some justification for the argument that the U.S. has already fought (with its Northern Alliance proxy ground forces) the major share of the war against the Taliban and the Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

It is appropriate to recall here the remarks by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan in early March at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. He deplored the failure of the world to act on warning signs in battered Afghanistan during the 1990s and noted: “There is a clear, if complicated, trail from the absence of engagement with Afghanistan in the 1990’s to the creation of a terrorist haven there to the attacks on the World Trade Center.” Mr. Annan emphasized the urgent need to create a “secure environment” in areas other
than Kabul, places where it was “much more problematic,” noted that calls to train an Afghan military force to maintain security was fine, but than added, “what do you do in the meantime?”32 Indeed, various estimates for achieving a 12,000 man Afghan military force, well-trained and ethnically integrated, generally range up to five years of required time.

Since mid-November, the U.S. has been U.S. engaged in a quasi-war against terrorism after Kabul fell and the Taliban folded or ‘melted away’. Some Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants went searching for cozy caves like Tora Bora as sanctuaries along the very mountainous and porous Afghanistan border with Pakistan. ‘Operation Anaconda’ in early March has revealed the ferocity of particularly those remnants in Paktia province. They have been composed of Arabs, Chechans, Pakistani and possibly other “dead-enders”, as U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld dubbed these fight-to-the-death combatants.

Pakistan has had a mixed record in the interdiction of fleeing Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters along the difficult mountainous border with Afghanistan. Reports persist of “large numbers” of fugitive fighters finding sanctuaries across the rugged frontier in Pakistan, moving back and forth easily, and regrouping for planned guerrilla attacks in Afghanistan. On the other hand, Pakistani “police commandos” in cooperation with the F.B.I. agents recently made a successful raid on an Al Qaeda sanctuary in the city of Faisalabad in the interior, 200 miles from the closest Afghan border point. This location in itself is a matter of definite additional concern.33

And the search for Osama bin Laden and Mullah Muhammad Omar still goes on. In the meantime, Hamid Karzai has officially and effectively performed as the Chairman of the interim Afghan National Government. Immediately after his installation on December 22 he began work on the delicate matter of inter-tribal diplomacy. His political skills were soon seen as impressive, including handling several entrenched warlords (for example, Rashid Dostum, the powerful Uzbek leader in Mazar-i-Sharif, was co-opted and appointed Deputy Defense Minister). He has also been well served by the trio of talented moderate Tajiks drawn from the Northern Alliance as leading cabinet officers.34 However, concerns for the safety and security of the several members of the Interim Afghan National Government remain very real. In early April 2002, a round-up took place of hundreds of political foes allegedly planning a bombing campaign in Kabul to topple, or at the least, to destabilize Mr. Karzai’s regime. Two weeks later a bomb tore through a crowd in Jalalabad that had lined the street to welcome the visiting interim Defense Minister, Muhammad Fahim. Four people were killed but Mr. Fahim was unhurt.35

In January and February, Hamid Karzai made various diplomatic trips outside of Afghanistan, touching bases, expressing thanks and engaging in talks in Washington, London, Tokyo, Teheran, Islamabad, and New Delhi. Focusing here on Afghanistan’s neighborhood, no trips were made to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan or to China (that could come later). In Tehran, Karzai hailed the Iranians as “brothers” and thanks were sincerely given for the $560 million in aid over five years pledged by Iran at the Tokyo meeting. Karzai’s visit to Islamabad was correct, almost perfunctory. He thanked Pakistan for accepting some three million Afghan refugees and noted the bonds of Islam. But no references to recent Afghan history and Pakistan’s controversial role in it as bygones were made.

In India on the other hand, the reception on February 26 and 27 was almost effusive. Karzai had done college studies there at Simla, and India today would willingly serve as a counter-weight to Pakistan if it sought to exert again any undue influence in Afghan affairs. India’s Prime Minister Vajpayee warmly welcomed Chairman Karzai, who expressed his “overwhelming joy” to be in India. At a luncheon he hosted in honor of Chairman Karzai, Prime Minister Vajpayee stated:

“We assure you that the Indian people are committed to stand by our Afghan friends in this hour of need. The task of rebuilding and reconstructing Afghanistan is enormous. Our unflinching and unconditional cooperation is available to the Afghan nation, as it pursues the return of prosperity and restoration of peace and stability in Afghanistan. We have made some contributions towards humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and rehabilitation. We are prepared to do much more.”36

The tasks before the leaders and people of Afghanistan six months after September 11 remain awesome. A premier list should include: legitimizing and stabilizing the fragile interim national government; framing an agreeable national constitution and infusing the rule of law; rebuilding a land long ravaged by war and four years of drought; overcoming, at least countering, the factional strife personified by the discordant warlords (“They all want to be kings”, said a UN official last fall); providing the Afghans much-needed social and economic services (health, education, infrastructure) and, in the process, working steadfastly to realize a genuine all-Afghan national consciousness while respecting ethnic diversity—a vital, long-term task for the peoples of Afghanistan.

From June 10 to 16, 2002, a traditional Afghan Grand Council (Loya Jirga) is scheduled to meet in Kabul. Hopefully, the assembled representatives will be disciplined and critically helpful toward fashioning a future governance for Afghanistan, not allowing their discussions to become a faction-driven cacophony. The disturbing prospect is that in any sharp competition for portfolios and seats at the table the present Interim Afghan National Government will be emasculated. This could result in more Afghan uncertainty, if not, renewed chaos.

The above list could be enlarged and elaborated upon, such as, securing strategic foreign aid or, simply, encouraging the arts in a land of poets to flourish again. One of the ‘new’ Afghan poets, (all enthusiastically nationalistic), Mohammed Yasin Niazi, has recently written:

We saw the results of the work of the ignorant.  
Now we should be rational  
It is time for open windows  
Through which the sun shines.37

Words well worth heeding by all interested in the well-being and future of Afghanistan in Asia.
ENDEPNOTES

1. A mild debate continues as to whether Afghanistan should be assigned to the region of South Asia, Central Asia or the Middle East. The distinct north-south line extending southwards from the juncture of Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Iran clearly delineates the Iran-Afghanistan and Iran-Pakistan borders, leaving Iran and other Middle Eastern countries to the west. Afghanistan’s northern border touches the three countries of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, all long identified as part of Central Asia, even when under Soviet domination. Moreover, the respected Bibliography of Asian Studies, published by the Association for Asian Studies, has always listed Afghanistan and the entries posted for it under South Asia.

2. In the preparation of this paper, the author has benefited greatly from reports and commentaries published in the New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle, Times of India (Mumbai), India Today (New Delhi), and Dawn (Karachi), particularly for the post-September 11 period, plus the valued Asian Survey (Berkeley).

3. The drawing and confirming of the Durand Line (1893) in north-western British India left about half the Pashtuns outside of Afghanistan, where they would otherwise be in a clear majority today, not charting residents of Pakistan. In an ethnically coherent demarcation, Feshwer would be an Afghan city and the subsequent “Pashunistan” issue would be moot.


5. In a final analysis, the intensive fighting of the mujahideen forces (including the non-Afghan members), their effective use of American-supplied surface-to-air “Stinger” missiles (deadly on low-flying Soviet helicopters), and the mounting Soviet popular dissent combined to end Moscow’s recent political and military “game” in Afghanistan.


7. Osama bin Laden had already made a positive impression in Afghanistan for his supporting of social and public programs there (hospitals, schools, roads) in the late 1980s. This was repeated in the late 1990s by bin Laden, further ingratiating him to the Afghans, then under Taliban rule. Bin Laden’s increasingly pronounced militancy as an Islamist came after the Gulf War and grew in intensity during 1990s. In addition to certain radical intellectual influences, it was connected to perceived corruption in the governance of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and, quite evidently, to the basing of 5,000 American military personnel in his native Saudi Arabia, land of the holiest Islamic sites, after the Gulf War. A natural issue add-on for him was US constant support for Israel in the prolonged struggle with the Palestinians.


10. Commonly described for almost 30 years after independence as a one-and-a-half party system (the Congress Party and all the ‘rest’), Congress dominance was ending by the mid-1970s. Questions were asked about how stable future Indian national governments would be.


12. Almost 1,000 Indian lives were lost in the extremely difficult mountain area fighting in 1999 along the Kashmir LOC. Indians generally have seen General Pervez Musharraf as the author of the Kargil plan of incursion.


15. Dawn (Karachi), November 19, 2001. President Mushharaff’s prospects for rescheduling of Pakistan’s huge international debt ($38 billion) and getting new loans were limited, especially if Pakistan were floundering in international isolation. By mid-October the U.S. was promising economic assistance and possible debt relief. New York Times, October 21, 2001.


19. New York Times, January 13, 14 and 15, 2002; Times of India, January 13 and 14, 2002. In an op-ed essay, K. Subrahmanyam, the veteran Indian defense studies specialist, discussed the January 12 address of “Pakistan’s Ataturk.” He recalled his September column, when he wrote that Pakistan would “have to undergo a radical transformation as a result of the war against terrorism,” gave credit to General Musharraf’s “moral courage” and need to consolidate “before achieving his risky reforms.” Times of India, January 15, 2002. One is also reminded of the wry remark by the Indian Minister for External Affairs in September, soon after Pakistan joined the international coalition: “It’s nice to have a terrorist state in the war against terrorism.”


24. Dawn, December 9, 2001. Later in December another Pakistani, Kunwar Idris, wrote that Pakistanis have believed that “Pakistan’s foreign policy for more than two decades now is conducted not by the cabinet and the ministry of foreign affairs but by the ISI. This military approach to diplomacy has exacted a heavy price...” Dawn, December 23, 2001.


26. New York Times, 6 November 2001. Just before Secretary of State Colin Powell’s visit to New Delhi in mid-October, untimely Indian shelling of Pakistani border posts in Kashmir underscored South Asia’s volatility. The New York Times editor wrote that Secretary Powell’s “difficult job has been to reinforce the new relationship with Pakistan while reassuring India that its interests will not be overlooked” and concluded that,” with American forces attacking Afghanistan, Washington will have to be very much involved in maintaining the peace between these two old adversaries.” New York Times, October 17, 2001.

27. Dawn, December 14, 2001. India would probably win as the larger country (seven times) a conventional war with Pakistan fairly easily, although it would be costly. This based on past performances by India in such warfare, its one million man army is twice the size of Pakistan’s and its air and naval forces almost three times. The terrible unknown is whether nuclear weapons would be deployed.


31. When the U.S. officially reopened its embassy in Kabul in mid-December, the American special envoy said: “We are here, and we are here to stay.” (The facility was abandoned for security reasons in early 1989.) San Francisco Chronicle, December 18, 2001. During Mr. Hamid Karzai’s visit to Washington in January, President Bush vowed to build “a lasting partnership” with war-torn Afghanistan and offered $50 million to...
help train its military and police force. New York Times, January 29, 2002. This was in addition to the hundreds of millions of US dollars already pledged in direct aid to Afghanistan by Washington.


34. Dr. Abdullah Abdullah (half Pashtun) as foreign minister, Mohammed Fahim as defense minister and Yunis Qanooni as interior minister.


36. Source: Embassy of India, Washington, D.C., March, 2002. India had pledged $100 million to help Afghanistan in November. During Mr. Karzai’s February visit, India added $10 million more. A matching gift, as it were, of $10 million from Pakistan was made by Pakistan’s President on April 2 when he made a brief (36 hour) visit to Kabul and called Chairman Karzai his “brother.” It is uncertain how well this fence-mending foray went – the first visit by a Pakistani president to Kabul in 10 years. New York Times, April 3, 2002.


Richard J. Kozicki is a specialist on the international relations and politics of Asia and the Middle East. He was professor of politics at the University of San Francisco from 1970 to 1993 and has held visiting and academic positions at UC Berkeley’s Centers for South and Southeast Asian Studies, at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, at the East-West Center/University of Hawaii, and at Marquette University. He is the author of a book on the International Relations of South Asia, 1947-80 and numerous scholarly articles.