

Paternalism and Peril: Shifting U.S. Racial Perceptions of the Japanese and Chinese Peoples from World War II to the Early Cold War

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Abstract:

Long before the carnage of the Pacific Theater in the Second World War commenced, U.S. government officials, scholars, shapers of public opinion, and the general public questioned the nature of Asian peoples. At the war's outset, when faced with a visceral enemy and a prominent ally amongst the countries of Asia, officials and opinion-makers alike set out to educate the citizens of the United States about their Asian friends and foes. Many eminent historians such as John Dower, Yukiko Koshiro, and Christopher Thorne have chronicled the racial perceptions of the peoples of the United States and Japan towards one another during World War II and in the early stages of the Cold War, while other scholars have examined the U.S. racial perceptions of the Chinese in these same periods. Members of both scholarly groups acknowledge the transference of various stigmas and associations from Japan to China in the postwar period. As an analysis that looks at prevalent American racial attitudes toward the Japanese and Chinese peoples in both World War II and the Early Cold War, this article will help readers to understand better the nature of this transference. It will provide an introductory assessment of the varying U.S. orientalist and racial perceptions of the Chinese and Japanese peoples from World War II to the early postwar period.

Key Words: race, foreign policy, World War II, Cold War, China, Japan

Introduction and Background

Working from the assumption that racial attitudes and perceptions are fluid social constructs, this article examines the shifting American definitions of the Japanese and Chinese in terms of either paternalism or fears of the Yellow Peril. For the purposes of this article, the Yellow Peril refers to the orientalist conception of a threatening Asian "other" united in intrinsic opposition to the United States and its allies, and devoted to their destruction. The ways that American perceptions of the Chinese and Japanese can change between perilous threat and paternalistic ward in relation to U.S. perspectives, beliefs, and current interests are central to this analysis. More broadly, this case highlights the role that racial perceptions play in U.S. relations.

Such an examination presents a different sort of peril in terms of generalization and conclusions made regarding the groups under consideration. Paternalistic notions and perceptions of a perilous Asian threat represent two prominent characterizations of the Chinese and Japanese peoples in the minds of many Americans. While these characterizations are the focus of this article, additional popular and academic views on the Japanese and Chinese people existed. These included, among others, economic concerns and gendered portrayals. The author wishes to stress that this article represents an attempt at

an accessible, explanatory synthesis of these far-ranging and complex issues. By doing so, the author seeks to provide a wide-angle perspective of American racial perceptions regarding the Japanese and Chinese peoples during these periods in the hopes that particularly students and non-specialists will gain a more comprehensive understanding of these historical trends. This study is not meant to be exhaustive in terms of cataloging all related U.S. racial beliefs, but rather demonstrative of their existence and influence on various groups within the American people regarding perceptions of the Chinese and Japanese. Aspects or implications of these perceptions continue to inform the United States' relations with these two countries to the present day and this article invites readers to observe and to ponder the role of racial perceptions in U.S. foreign relations with China and Japan.

Fleshing out this context requires a small amount of background information. Orientalism refers to the notion of intrinsic otherness about the peoples of Asia and the Middle East as they seem to look, act, think, worship, and value in ways diametrically opposed to those of Europe and North America.¹ For example, whereas the United States is supposedly an open democratic society that values individualism and human life, so-called oriental peoples were thought to prefer oppressive, cruel, authoritarian societies and care nothing for the individual or for human life. In the case of both the Chinese and Japanese, the American historical experience with these two peoples in the time leading up to the Second World War subsequently informed many Americans' wartime perceptions of them.²

Even before the outbreak of hostilities between China and Japan, the American peoples' relationship with Chinese revolved around the paternalistic notion of the people of China as the Americans' little yellow brothers, who needed U.S. help and guidance if they were to survive and to prosper. The Chinese were to be molded in the American image and it was imperative that they follow the United States' direction. Following the decay of the imperial system, propping up China's fledgling democracy became imperative to the U.S., especially in the face of the Japanese onslaught of the 1930s.³

In contrast, Japan exemplified the Yellow Peril in the early twentieth century. A popular novel written by Homer Lea in 1909 called *The Valor of Ignorance* spun a tale of the Japanese invading the Western United States and conquering large portions of the Pacific Coast.⁴ Although such an eventuality seemed far-fetched, U.S. conflict with Japan was not impossible. Despite the ostensible support of Teddy Roosevelt for the Japanese and later Japanese membership in the Entente in World War I, American policymakers did not envisage Japan as a true equal power. One can look at Woodrow Wilson's rejection of the Japanese proposal of a racial equality amendment to the League of Nations Covenant, and subsequent Japanese ire, to glimpse the possibility of conflict to come.⁵ The 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria stoked such concerns.

Before 1931, the U.S. had treated Japan with some degree of paternalistic dismissal despite its efforts to "modernize" or "Westernize" after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Nevertheless, many U.S. officials believed that the chief threat to U.S. interests in Asia would be Japan, but continued to underestimate the Japanese even after their invasion of Northern China which touched off the

Sino-Japanese War in 1937. The nation that claimed to have combined Euro-American technique and knowledge with Japanese spirit did not, in the eyes of most U.S. leaders, register as a true great power. Of course these feelings would change rapidly with the beginning of World War II in the Pacific and the birth of a Japanese bogeyman imbued with all the fears of the Yellow Peril.⁶

Perceptions of the Japanese around the Time of World War II

As tensions mounted in 1941 and the possibility of war with Japan grew, many in the United States Military did not believe that the Japanese would pose much of a challenge. A young U.S. naval officer and later a rear admiral, Gene LaRocque, stationed at Pearl Harbor in the summer of 1941 recalled his and many of his peers' estimation of the Japanese, "We'd thought they were little brown men and we were the great big white men. They were of a lesser species. The Germans were well-known as tremendous fighters and builders, whereas the Japanese would be a pushover." Prior to encountering the Japanese in combat, many misconceptions abounded with respect to their physiological defects and lack of ingenuity, not to mention their fighting skill. LaRocque elaborated on the widespread impression that "the Japanese didn't see well, especially at night—we knew this as a matter of fact. We knew they couldn't build good weapons, they made junky equipment, they just imitated us. All we had to do was get out there and sink 'em."⁷ Although conflict could certainly occur, in many ways the thought remained that Japan and its subjects lagged behind the United States and its citizens and thus did not pose a serious threat. The Japanese had yet to morph into Asian bogeymen.

This outlook pervaded not only the armed forces, but also the government, academia, and the public at large. John Dower has chronicled the multifaceted underestimation of the Japanese by various groups in the United States. Throughout the years preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, Americans remained convinced that among many other things, the Japanese suffered from physiological defects like nearsightedness, balance problems, and numerous vague issues related to brain function. Furthermore, they lacked the industrial and military prowess of the American people to produce effective weapons of war, and to employ them in a skillful and strategic manner. Rather, the Japanese relied upon poor facsimiles of Euro-American technology and convoluted and irrational thought processes that would inevitably produce farcical military engagements when faced with a Euro-American adversary.⁸

Of course all of this would change on December 7, 1941, when the Japanese transformed in the imagination of the U.S. government, military, and citizenry into a superhuman threat, compounded by fears of the Yellow Peril. Disbelief quickly turned to disdain, bitter hatred, and a search for vengeance. After the war ended, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, the U.S. commander at Pearl Harbor during attack, was questioned as to why he was caught so thoroughly off-guard by the Japanese assault. His response to these inquiries revealed both his underestimation of the Japanese people and his persistent racism as he exclaimed "I never thought those little yellow sons-of-bitches could pull off such an attack, so far from Japan."⁹ Put another way from LaRocque's perspective, "It turns out they could see better than we could and their torpedoes, unlike ours, worked."¹⁰

Indeed the Japanese would have to pay for their impudence, as they had stoked the fire of U.S. outrage, and put the nation face-to-face with the possibility of defeat by a yellow horde armed with Western knowledge and all of the savagery and mysticism of the Asian race. To combat this threat, many in the United States would dehumanize the Japanese people as the living manifestation of everything that was not American and thus, the worst kind of evil.

The Japanese manifestation of the Yellow Peril endangered the conceit of the United States and European leadership that they could not be challenged by a mere Asian power. Their worldview revolved around the assessment that whiteness would always trump any Asian opponent no matter how threatening they might be. While this had been called into question with Japan's 1905 defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, Japan had not tested its mettle against the United States directly. The Japanese attack on Hawaii tore down the edifice of American confidence, as historian Thomas Borstelmann has noted that "Japanese audacity in attacking U.S. territory had challenged the very structure of white supremacy that suffused American life in 1941."¹¹ This shocked reverberated into the hearts, minds, and societies of the Euro-American world as it "threatened not just the political order of the western Pacific, but also the social order of the United States and the European colonies."¹² Borstelmann adroitly points out the supporting sentiment expressed by Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles that "The thesis of white supremacy could only exist so long as the white race actually proved supreme."¹³

Pearl Harbor called white supremacy into question and brought the Yellow Peril to the United States' doorstep. *Time* magazine crafted a particularly dramatic impression in one of its earliest post-attack magazine covers featuring Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, commander-in-chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet.¹⁴ Forgoing subtlety, *Time* made the true nature of the enemy abundantly clear. The cover depicted both the background and Yamamoto's face "entirely in a vivid and lurid yellow."¹⁵ *Collier's* magazine eschewed foreboding albeit human depictions of the Japanese and instead printed a cover picture "portraying a Japanese general as a blood-sucking bat flying over the United States ready to drop a bomb."¹⁶ In publications and in the popular consciousness of the people who read them, the Japanese could exist as malicious subhuman creatures bent on the destruction of the American nation itself.

Following the opening gambit of the war, Japanese territorial advances throughout the Pacific including the Philippines and portions of Southeast Asia also called the order and outlook of white superiority into question. After losing the Philippines, the main U.S. Pacific base in Asia, and getting word through newspapers and newsreels of Japanese depravity and merciless treatment of American POWs, vast segments of the American public were sent reeling.¹⁷ Within months, the pall of Japanese imperialism approached Australia, the last major Pacific Allied stronghold. In *Paramount News* newsreel compilations of wartime proceedings, viewers were exposed to grim stories of the march of Japanese conquest. During a 1942 reel, the narrator exclaims "The Japs have made a fantastic conquest clear to the gates of India and Australia, and now Alaska!" referring to the Japanese invasion of the Aleutian Islands in that same year.¹⁸ With American soil compromised, far more than military and political

superiority hung in the balance. The danger posed by the Japanese transcended hazard to land, life, and limb, and extended to the paradigm of white superiority over Asian peoples.

From this fear flowed a multitude of stereotypes and stigmas related to the Japanese and their ominous, irredeemable nature. Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor in January 1942, a government report compiled by the U.S. Office of War Information revealed that forty-one percent of Americans held the opinion that the Japanese “will always want to go to war to make themselves as powerful as possible.”¹⁹ Americans felt that they were facing a foe fueled by militarism and an intense desire to dominate. This conception contrasted sharply with America’s idealized self-image as a reluctant but ready and valiant defender of freedom.

While bigotry towards people of Japanese descent long predated World War II, conceptions of their sub-humanity merged with visions of a cruel, unstoppable juggernaut storming across the Pacific. E. B. Sledge, a Marine who fought in the Pacific War on Guadalcanal and Peleliu commented after the war, “You developed an attitude of no mercy because they had no mercy on us. It was a no quarter, savage kind of thing.” Much of this take-no-prisoners attitude came from indoctrination that U.S. servicemen encountered during their training. Sledge’s boot camp drill instructor had exhorted the recruits “Don’t be afraid to fight the Japs dirty.” Experience of the general inhumane treatment of both sides in the Pacific Theater likely affirmed this conclusion. Sledge reflected that “This hatred towards the Japanese was just a natural feeling that developed elementally.”²⁰ While this sentiment may have felt elemental, in actuality it sprung from the dominant consensus of U.S. society regarding the nature of the Japanese.

Many servicemen in the Pacific Theater were inundated by stories replete with vile characterizations of the Japanese. Roger Tuttrup remembered the narrative imparted to him by the Marine Corps as being filled with assertions that “the Japs are lousy, sneaky, and treacherous - watch out for them.” Robert Lekachman, who served in the Army, recounted that he “had been fed tales of these yellow thugs, sub-humans, with teeth that resembled fangs. If a hundred thousand Japs were killed, so much the better.” All of these traits stood in contrast to the presumption of righteousness on the United States’ side. An enemy this heinous deserved no consideration. The Japanese had to be defeated and if meeting them on their own terms would remove the danger, then so be it. In this way, wholesale slaughter would relieve the burden of the Yellow Peril on the United States.²¹

It was not enough simply to slay Japanese on the battlefield. In case of the United States’ citizenry, widespread anxieties related to the Yellow Peril arrived on their shores with the first wave of immigrants from Asia. From these earliest days to the time in question, Asians, whether American citizens or not, were seen as perpetual foreigners in the United States. When the war began, suspicion of all peoples of Japanese descent, including citizens, pervaded the West Coast and beyond. After Pearl Harbor, second generation Japanese Americans called *nisei* had their businesses boycotted and often fared no better than their first generation parents called *issei* when it came to falling prey to hysteria and violence. One *nisei*, Charles Kikuchi, recorded some instances of people in the

United States lashing out at those of Japanese descent indiscriminately as though they were all threats to the nation. Kikuchi recounted a police officer sneering at a *nisei* storeowner saying “You ask me to be decent after what you ‘Japs’ did to Hawaii?” Furthermore, he related an incident where a “Crowd in Montana attempt[ed] to lynch a ‘Jap.’” Also, some peoples of Chinese descent, fearful of such orientalist anger, chose to wear “Chinese flags so they won’t be mistaken for Japanese.”²² Rationality could not compete with the dragnet conflation of all persons of Japanese descent, and sometimes even other Asian-descended peoples, as traitors or a menace to the United States.

The feeling for many in the press, the government, and the public at large was that those of Japanese descent could never be loyal to the United States, and instead would always serve Japan. As the *Los Angeles Times* put it “A viper is nonetheless a viper wherever the egg is hatched—so a Japanese American, born of Japanese parents—grows up to be a Japanese, not an American.” California Attorney General Earl Warren, later Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, captured the essence of the danger posed by these supposed enemies from within, when he stated that they “may well be the Achilles heel of the entire civilian defense effort,” and that “Unless something is done it may bring about a repetition of Pearl Harbor.”²³ All Japanese and Japanese Americans seemed to be spies and saboteurs in waiting.

Appeals to do something about this supposed nascent threat came from many members of the government, military, and society at large. These urgings played into pre-existing ideas about people of Japanese descent and helped precipitate Franklin Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066. This order gave Lieutenant General John DeWitt, head of the Western Defense Command, the authority to inter over 120,000 people of Japanese descent on the West Coast, two-thirds of whom were American citizens.²⁴ Apparently the gross violation of their civil liberties paled in comparison to the need to contain the imagined fifth column threat emanating from within the United States.

As the war dragged on, many Americans grew ever more fearful of Japanese atrocity, cruelty, and zealotry. As American forces gradually turned the Japanese back and pushed closer to their home islands, resistance stiffened. This fortified U.S. resolve to punish and to defeat the Asian enemy. Matthew Jones, in his excellent study of the role of race and nuclear weapons in Asia asserts that “the bitter fighting during the Pacific island campaigns...paved the way for Hiroshima and Nagasaki: the devastation of the two cities was regarded by most Americans as just retribution for the treacherous attacks in 1941.”²⁵ This is not to say that racial hatred was the deciding factor in the whether or not to drop the atomic bombs on Japan, but it certainly must have functioned as a reassurance for many Americans regarding the decision. Reflecting his ambivalence on the usage of the second atomic bomb on Nagasaki, President Harry Truman stated “I can’t bring myself to believe that, because they are beasts, we should ourselves act in the same manner.”²⁶ Ultimately Truman conceded that dropping the second bomb was necessary and he overcame his doubts for the time being. Despite this vacillation, one thing was certain, the Japanese were beasts and they had to be stopped one way or another.

Perceptions of the Chinese around the Time of World War II

While the United States strove to crush the Japanese menace, it also worked to engender positive feelings, associations, and support for its primary Asian ally in the region, China. This became even more urgent now that the Chinese were helping the United States contain Japanese forces on the Asian mainland. For all the talk of alliances and even of the leadership role the Chinese would play in the postwar world, much of the U.S. regard for the Chinese during World War II remained couched in the realm of paternalism. This manifested in many ways from a resolve to save the Chinese from Japan, and the need to promote China as a stable ally in the region over whom the United States could maintain influence and a degree of control.

Most of the general populace in the United States agreed with the developing consensus that Japan was the “villain” while China was the “good guy.” Earlier American experience with the Chinese in the form of missionary, commercial, and cultural encounters, according to Rana Mitter, encouraged a misperception that the “Chinese aspired to become like Americans, and that it was the job of the Americans to train them to achieve that goal.”²⁷ Consequently the Chinese needed U.S. support and assistance as Americans had a duty to guard their little Asian brother. Continued Japanese atrocities, like the brutal rape and destruction inflicted on the Chinese capital of Nanjing only undergirded these assumptions. Subsequently, the United States would funnel hundreds of millions of dollars in aid to its beleaguered Chinese friends in order to stave off collapse under the weight of Japanese tyranny.²⁸

Embedded deeply in much of the American population’s feelings about China, there existed an image of the Chinese people as a noble and virtuous victim of Japanese rape and abuse.²⁹ This formulation reveals the influence of paternalistic perceptions of the Chinese. The violence wrought upon them by the Japanese hardened the hatred of many in the United States towards Japan while it concurrently enshrined the victimhood of the Chinese as a sort of damsel in distress. In whatever form, the idea of the Chinese as a loyal, albeit lesser, people took root in American understanding of their allies. Popular magazines like *Life* emphasized the great kinship of China with the United States by calling them “a great potential force for freedom and democracy in Asia.”³⁰ Naturally to reach this potential, China required the wisdom and the patronage of the United States.

Publisher Henry Luce, an ardent supporter of the Chinese, captured the spirit of paternalism here as he regarded China as “America’s ward.”³¹ Steeped in these parental terms, Luce turned the efforts of his publishing empire including *Time*, *Life*, and *Fortune* magazines to promoting within the public’s imagination the resolution that China “would be raised up to become a Christian, democratic, industrial nation that mirrored its American ‘parent.’”³² Not only did the United States have a responsibility to protect and to save its Asian charge, but also to uplift it. The Chinese would better themselves by internalizing U.S. political, economic, and cultural ideals. To accomplish this, the government of the United States and its constituents looked to the leader of Nationalist China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Although Chiang vacillated between the need for governance in China and his often competing and overruling desires for power, wealth, and diminishment of his communist rivals, he generally

received favorable evaluations by the American public. Chiang enjoyed the near pathological support of Henry Luce and members of Congress known as the China Lobby. Relentlessly, they pushed for greater support for China overall while glorifying Chiang.³³ The American public found themselves bombarded by countless articles and editorials extolling the virtues of Chiang and his leadership.

Members of the U.S. military painted august portraits of the Generalissimo even in the late 1930s when Admiral Harry Yarnell, commander of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet praised Chiang as a “Man of Destiny” and one who “personified Chinese resistance to Japan.” U.S. missionaries in China often called Chiang and his wife “the most enlightened, patriotic, and able rulers.”³⁴ In reality Chiang ran a corrupt, often ineffectual government, and hapless military campaign against the Japanese. Conspiracies and weaknesses both personal and professional bedeviled him, and this fact was not lost on his many detractors in the United States. For the time being however, he figured as the most viable leader aligned with U.S. interests in the region. While it meant U.S. officials had to overlook his many faults, the United States threw its support behind Chiang. Many inside and outside the U.S. government believed that this backing constituted a virtual blank check to remake China in America’s image.³⁵

Many U.S. authors’ favorable treatment of the Chinese people helped to reinforce these positions amongst the American public. Often these authors heralded what they saw as the virtue of the Chinese and depicted them as the antithesis of the loathsome Japanese. Pearl S. Buck’s well-known 1931 novel, *The Good Earth*, portrayed the Chinese peasantry as “facing incredible natural and human-made hardships with courage and devotion to family.” Later, *The Good Earth* would become the most popular movie ever made in the United States, up until that point, about Asians.³⁶ While definitely not the entire story, the popularity of such portrayals displays their acceptance by the American public as a representation of the Chinese. Buck persistently supported the Chinese and did much to represent them as good Asians, as opposed to the Japanese. Her motives appeared pure but the tone of these concepts carried with it elements of romanticism and paternalism. The Chinese existed as simple, hardworking people who have learned to endure almost perpetual tragedy. Public opinion polls showed that Americans viewed the Chinese most commonly using the words “honest, hard-working, brave, and religious.”³⁷ For the time being, much of the public described Chinese values as kindred to those of the United States.

For Buck, rescue could come in the form of U.S. financial and military aid as she depicted the Chinese as “anti-Japanese resistance fighters” akin to “American pioneers” or “armed peasants” who could fight for and promote the cause of democracy in Asia. Again, the considerable audience for Buck’s work and the concept of the “Americanized Chinese peasant” bespeaks of what Colleen Lye has called the “resonance with the U.S. need for developing a proxy presence in Asia.”³⁸ While Buck evoked the supposed nostalgic pioneer commonalities between Americans and the Chinese, a status relationship nevertheless existed in the popular conception. However much the Chinese may have reminded Americans of their imagined rugged, democracy-spreading past, the role of the Chinese was cast mainly in terms of how they could serve U.S. interests.

Even Chinese communists received propitious reviews from American citizens who read the works of authors Edgar Snow and Agnes Smedley, both of whom had traveled widely in China. Snow recounted his travels with the Red Army in China in his 1938 work *Red Star Over China*, which presented communist leader Mao Zedong in an positive manner. Smedley's *Battle Hymn of China*, published in 1943, depicts her experiences with the Red Army and also characterizes its cause in a complimentary fashion. Interestingly, both books attained wide readership and favorable reviews from the American public.³⁹ It appeared that whether communist or nationalist, the Chinese complemented Americans as innate allies.

Shortly after the United States joined the war, *Time* magazine ran a now infamous article which provided a guide for Americans to discern their Chinese friends from their Japanese enemies. Along with a picture diagramming the various generalized features of the two peoples, which called forth some unseemly pseudoscientific parallels, the magazine printed a description which bears some partial repetition,

The Chinese expression is more likely to be placid, kindly, open; the Japanese more positive, dogmatic, arrogant. Japanese are hesitant, nervous in conversation, laugh loudly at the wrong time. Japanese walk stiffly erect, hard heeled. Chinese, more relaxed, have an easy gait, sometimes shuffle.⁴⁰

From this categorization, the Japanese existed as antagonistic and hostile, whereas the article portrayed the Chinese as good-natured and even charming. Somehow the language also evokes the image of the Chinese as amiable simpletons. Opinion-makers like *Time* worked to advance the view of the stark divide or essential difference between the two peoples.

Alliance with the Chinese seemed quite natural, especially given that they were what the *New York Times* called “a loyal ally with...inexhaustible manpower.” U.S. alliance and aid married with the legions of potential Chinese troops would make a tremendously effective opposition force against Japan. Looking ahead to the postwar world, U.S. leaders placed China at the heart of their Asian policy. Secretary of State Cordell Hull remarked that “If there was ever to be stability in the Far East, it had to be assured with China at the center of any arrangement that was made.”⁴¹ Franklin Roosevelt famously envisioned a postwar order maintained by the ubiquitous Four Policemen, one of whom being China, who would provide stability in Asia, a perennial U.S. concern.

There existed alongside feelings of altruism and empathy a brutal strategic calculus in assisting the Chinese. They could serve “as a vast punching bag on which the Japanese would wear themselves out...If U.S. aid allowed Chinese resistance to continue, Japan’s military expansion could be stymied.”⁴² The Chinese could bog down significant Japanese military forces on the mainland. While saving its little brother in Asia, the United States could also reap the benefits of their seemingly indefatigable ally. As many in the press and inside the U.S. government lauded the Chinese people, they repeatedly referred to China as a spoiler who could preoccupy Japan. The much more advanced and capable United States could then come in and finish the job.

For FDR this logic extended into the postwar period where, as one of his hypothetical Four Policemen, China would serve as a de facto proxy for the

United States in the new international order. The president formulated this idea much to the chagrin of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill who rather unfortunately labeled this as a “faggot vote” for the United States.⁴³ In this dynamic, Churchill fretted that the Chinese would act as a puppet in support of the U.S. agenda, outnumbering the already beleaguered British. As a junior partner, China enjoyed U.S. aid and support, but they came with the expectation that the Chinese would reinforce U.S. interests in wartime and aid in the creation of a new international order at the war’s conclusion.

Becoming Friends with the Japanese in the Early Postwar Era

For the Japanese, the end of the war meant a nation devastated and an empire lying in ashes. From those ruins rose a reconceived Japanese nation, one based on U.S. ideals and values. This reborn Japan would occupy an eerily similar place in the U.S. imagination as wartime China had. As ideological rivalries threatened to consume China, Japan would evolve from specter of Yellow Peril to the American people’s new little Asian brother. The time for reform had come, and with it a shifting both of alliances in Asia and comprehensions of the Chinese and Japanese people.

John Foster Dulles, diplomat and future secretary of state, argued that the Japanese hungered to join the elite Anglo-Saxon club and that the U.S. could take advantage of those feelings in order to build a model Japanese nation aligned with U.S. values and interests.⁴⁴ The alteration of previous U.S. attitudes towards the Japanese demonstrates what John Dower has called the malleability of racial perceptions in Asia. Formerly the scourge of the region, the Japanese and their nation transformed into the United States’ project for rehabilitation and enhancement, along lines envisioned by U.S. leaders.

A *Paramount News* newsreel from 1946, entitled *The Search for Peace*, proclaimed that “Japan must never be allowed to march again...her fanatic barbarism, her war plans must be erased, and Japan’s mind must be trained to the ways of peace and cleansed of the will to war.” Invoking orientalist stereotypes, the narrator of the film went on to say that the American military was up to the task as “GI Joes have trained fez-bedecked Arabs and worked with highland natives,” and further that “much of the world looks to these United States as the guardian of civilization.”⁴⁵ For Americans spanning from average moviegoers to political and military officials, the work ahead in Japan seemed clear. At first the former adversary needed to become a pro-democratic, peaceful nation, and later as geopolitical circumstances evolved, a U.S. ally in the Cold War. Despite this shift in goals with the 1947 Reverse Course in U.S. policy during the Occupation, paternalism remained a central facet of U.S.-Japan relations. The Japanese Yellow Peril had given way and now Japan had become the United States’ ward in desperate need of education in order to become a virtuous and good Asian nation.

These connotations all contain assertions of U.S. superiority and Japanese inferiority relating to their need to assimilate and to acculturate to purported American values and ideals like democracy and, in Douglas MacArthur’s opinion, Christianity. As the head of the Occupation, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) General Douglas MacArthur described his role as a

father figure who would reform the misbehaving Japanese. He characterized his position as a “job of raising seventy million problem children.”⁴⁶ MacArthur, having lived and served in Asia for many years, often claimed as other U.S. officials did, to have an exceptional understanding of Asian peoples. From his posting atop the Occupation hierarchy, he would disseminate all-too-familiar notions to those under his command.

On one occasion he explained that the course of Japan’s historical and racial evolution was due to the fact that as “Oriental peoples” they “suffer from an inferiority complex which leads them to ‘childish brutality’ when they conquer in war and to slavish dependence when they lose.”⁴⁷ Neither MacArthur nor most members of his staff had any firsthand knowledge of Japan or its people before the war. Unfortunately, this did not prevent the Supreme Commander from making sweeping generalizations and mischaracterizations of the Japanese. Reflecting upon his work in the Occupation and the nature of the Japanese, he remarked that the Japanese “in spite of their antiquity measured by time, were in a very tuitionary [*sic*] condition. Measured by the standard of modern civilization, they would be like a boy of twelve as compared to our own development of forty-five years.”⁴⁸ While this condescending comment provoked outrage among many Japanese people, MacArthur meant it somewhat favorably. In his estimation, the Japanese were a childish and misguided people, so it was no surprise that they had fallen prey to extremist ideologies and religions like an impressionable youth. Now the United States needed to help people whom MacArthur believed did not possess the ability to reform themselves. The defeated Japanese needed the sagacity of strong parent figure to put them on the proper course. Determinations such as these coupled with the Supreme Commander’s sweeping authority over the conduct and tenor of the Occupation shows that such thinking played a role in the execution of U.S. policy.

Members of SCAP, an acronym which also came to refer to the Occupation force as a whole, carried their own ideas of their fitness to rule and to remake Japan. Even the often well-intentioned New Dealers who came to work in Japan as part of a grander global crusade to bring about liberal reforms outside the United States were complicit in the belief that they knew what was best for Japan. U.S. troops serving in the Occupation force also laid claim to a good deal of racial condescension exemplified in the usage of terms like “Babysan” for Japanese women.⁴⁹

In many ways, the American Occupation of Japan resembled an updated version of the colonial projects of yesteryear. Armed with the same notions of paternalism, the United States set out on a new civilizing mission in Asia or a revised white man’s burden. As Dower has stated “Their reformist agenda rested on the assumption that, virtually without exception, Western culture and its values were superior to those of the ‘Orient.’”⁵⁰ Steadfast in their conviction, MacArthur and his men descended upon the nation with confidence and bravado, self-assured that they had the prescription for its ills.

The Supreme Commander declared to the Japanese people on December 27, 1945, that they had been saved from the “shackles of militarism, of feudalism, of regimentation of body and soul.” He went on to declare that the Japanese could now enjoy democratic freedoms and a society free from “national

enslavement.”⁵¹ Whereas the militarists had led the Japanese family state astray, the new father figure, MacArthur and by extension the United States, would step in to make things right. From the outset, the Supreme Commander made it crystal clear to the Japanese who was in charge and who knew best for Japan. As a member of Occupation’s Civil Information and Education Section remarked to a Japanese newsman, “General MacArthur desires it to be understood that the Allied Powers do not regard Japan as an equal in any way.”⁵²

Japan was reconstructed with two central goals in mind: demilitarization and democratization. The United States according to the Supreme Commander could bring to “hundreds of millions of backward peoples, now easy prey to the ignorant fatalism of war,” what he called a “heretofore unknown spiritual strength based upon an entirely new concept of human dignity and human purpose and human relationship.”⁵³ During the war, the United States had lambasted Japan as a nation of cattle or sheep that mindlessly obeyed the commands of their leaders to violent and disastrous effect. Now, these so-called “backward peoples” had a new shepherd to guide them out of darkness and into the light.

As impressions of the Japanese as a heartless and ferocious people faded, they were replaced by amicable, almost romanticized imagery. *Life* magazine’s 1945 Christmas edition featured descriptions of the return of Japanese soldiers to their farms and to their peaceful, bucolic, industrious lifestyle. Supposedly this process occurred all over Japan and the magazine entreats the reader to see the Japanese as a “frugal” and “hard-working” people who needed uplift and salvation.⁵⁴ Journalist John LaCerde published in 1946 the book *The Conqueror Comes to Tea: Japan Under MacArthur* in which he explicated the Japanese character in a non-threatening and condescending manner as he claimed the average Japanese “is a sensitive and shy person, who suffers from a national inferiority complex.”⁵⁵ The *New York Times* characterized the United States’ former enemies in 1947 as “docile, meek little Japanese.”⁵⁶ Gone from the zeitgeist were images of the Japanese as beasts and monsters, and instead the American media reconceived them as pliant and agreeable people.

Japan’s place as the United States’ charge and student would become all the more important as the initial reform phase of the Occupation gave way to the recovery phase. In 1947, high ranking officials in the U.S. military and government called with increasing insistence for Japan’s rapid rehabilitation and installment as a partner in the burgeoning battle against communism. To counter the looming communist threat, Japan would serve as a bulwark against the insidious ideology. China’s fall to communism in October of 1949 brought forth fresh urgency for this new dynamic. The outbreak of the Korean War in June of 1950 magnified this issue as the United States needed to secure a firm and devoted ally in Asia to counter the assault of monolithic communism and its masses of villainous Asian devotees.

Harry Truman and his successor, Dwight Eisenhower worked to “keep the Japanese on our side” while revitalizing Japan as what Dean Acheson called the “workshop of Asia” that would support the United States’ Cold War mission.⁵⁷ Truman stated that he agreed with these notions as, “his own thoughts had been following the same line” regarding the potential for Japan.⁵⁸ In this way,

Japan arose as the lynchpin of the United States' policy in Asia and the Japanese became valuable allies. Navy and later Defense Secretary James Forrestal argued that in order to counter the communist threat that the U.S. needed to put "Japan and the other affiliates of the Axis back to work."⁵⁹ Though the Japanese would benefit from this relationship in many ways, especially in economics and defense, they persisted as a junior, albeit necessary partner. Like China before it, Japan would receive U.S. aid and assistance as the United States' new little brother in Asia. These policies continued into the Eisenhower administration, which also viewed Japan as a subordinate nation. Patronage nevertheless occurred in Japan's favor, on numerous occasions, as in 1955 when the United States pushed through Japan's membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade over European objections.⁶⁰

Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, U.S. officials presumed that they alone could undertake the new civilizing mission in Japan calling for its benevolent assimilation. The United States put forth demilitarization and democratization as a framework for rehabilitation and recovery, and then later superseded those tenets with the need to resurrect Japan as a junior partner in the Cold War. In both phases, altered racial perceptions of the Japanese as compliant, juvenile, naïve, but redeemable people guided the formulation and implementation of policy. Towards the conclusion of the Occupation, a 1951 *Reader's Digest* article claimed the United States had brought about a "complete medical revolution" in Japan, which made it the "healthiest" nation in Asia. The United States with its considerable maturity and wisdom had cured its sick patient nation and turned it into a reliable colleague whose people accepted that "the people of America are their friends."⁶¹ The early Cold War witnessed the reformation of Japanese identity in the eyes of the American people and their leaders.

Rebranding the Communist Chinese as Enemies

Just as foes could become friends, friends could become foes, as the case would be with China. After a ruinous war, internecine conflict resumed in China, a nation plagued by weak central governance and widespread poverty. With the Japanese common enemy gone, the nationalists and communists turned their attention to the destruction of the other. Despite the vociferous calls of the China Lobby for the United States to aid the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) against the growing Chinese communist forces under Mao Zedong, many in the Truman administration increasingly viewed this fight as a lost cause. In a June 1947 memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) expressed the viewpoint that while the Nationalists indeed had weaknesses like corruption and decreasing favorability amongst the general Chinese populace, they were still the best force for countering the expansion of communist influence in the region. Despite the recommendations of the JCS, the failings of Chiang and the fissures of the KMT would inspire within the Truman administration a lack of faith in their viability. Many China experts in the State Department known as China Hands communicated the myriad problems weighing upon the KMT and the fact that without massive military and economic aid it would probably succumb to the communists. Secretary of State Dean Acheson would later cite these concerns in 1949 as an explanation of the Truman administration's position that the Chinese

Nationalists and citizenry would lose China to the communists through their own faults, regardless of the actions of the United States. This eventuality came to pass with Mao's declaration of the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949.⁶²

For many in the U.S. government and in society at large, China's fall to communism constituted a cataclysmic event and in the eyes of some, a failure of Truman and his administration. Those who knew better had their voices largely drowned out by the excoriations of Truman's critics. Many Americans developed an almost hysterical concern that the most populous nation in the world had become communist and was thus "lost" by the United States. The communist groundswell would merge with fears of monolithic communism and a resurgent Yellow Peril. A communist China that could call upon the Asian horde had teamed up with the Soviet Union, which had in 1949 developed its own atomic weaponry. Together, these events rekindled Yellow Peril paranoia in the United States. While the focus of this section of the essay centers on the Chinese, it is important to note that alongside fear of the PRC came inflammatory statements that asserted that the Soviets, with whom the Chinese communists were supposedly working in concert, were actually Asiatic as well and thus prone to all of the most vile orientalist stereotypes of Asians.

Following the rise of the PRC, the Chinese would take up the mantle held by the Japanese as fanatical, savage conformists with no will of their own save what Moscow and Beijing dictated to them. As Christian Klein has stated, "the news media presented the Chinese under Mao as an inscrutable mass of political fanatics, a conformist colony of blue-suited ants."⁶³ Much of what made acid churn in the stomachs of Americans had to do with not only the reconceived villainy of the Chinese but also their ingratitude.⁶⁴ The Chinese had received a great deal of material and moral support from the United States. Subsequently, U.S. citizens and officials felt a deep sense of betrayal that scores of the Chinese people had turned against their American guardians after all that they had done for them.

Perhaps no single prior event did more to confirm the danger of communism than the eruption of the Korean War on June 25, 1950 with North Korea's invasion of the South. This outbreak seemed to validate the paranoia of many Americans that communism was monolithic, expansionistic, and militaristic. It seemed to confirm that these Asian peoples were predisposed to extremist ideologies and behaviors. In addition to corroborating communist North Korea's part, with the backing of the USSR, in the yellow menace, it also verified Chinese manifestations of this nightmare.

After largely successful U.S.-led efforts to push the North Koreans back into their territory, Douglas MacArthur, commanding U.S. and United Nations forces, advanced well into North Korea near the Yalu River and the PRC-North Korean border. MacArthur elicited Chinese consternation with his conduct of the campaign, and eventually prompted the invasion of Korea by Chinese forces on November 25, 1950. China's involvement raised the stakes of the war and American racial paranoia. When word of China's participation in the Korean War reached the United States, editors like Hanson Baldwin at the *New York Times* speculated wildly about the mobilization of masses of Asians with evil intent.

He claimed that following the Chinese may be “Mongolians, Soviet Asiatics, and a variety of races” all of whom represented “the most primitive of peoples.”⁶⁵ Perhaps the only thing more terrifying than one horde of Asians was their ability to call other sympathetic groups to their Anti-American banner.

With the U.S.-led forces rocked back on their heels by the Chinese thrust into Korea, old demons resurrected in the new incarnation of the Chinese Red Army. An American newsreel proclaimed that U.S. forces “were being routed by Chinese Red Army Legions, treacherously forced into this war by the unscrupulous leaders of international communism. The G.I.s battle new elements with everything they have, but the latest Communist perfidy in Korea makes the picture grim.”⁶⁶ Traits formerly held by the Japanese appear here in redrafted form such as in the Chinese simultaneously being treacherous and manipulative while also acting like mindless cattle. Even if the Chinese were coerced by their leaders, newsreels like this one propagated the conception of them being too intrinsically weak to resist. The incursion of the Chinese Red Army had implications beyond security concerns, including Chinese duplicity, lack of scruples, and callous sacrifice of lives.

Narratives came pouring forth that exposed the nature of the nefarious Chinese communist forces. Dan Gilbert, an influential evangelical Christian writer, drew parallels between the Chinese offensive and the end of days detailed in the Book of Revelation. He stated that the “rampaging *Yellow Peril* [emphasis in original] will launch mass slaughters that will take the lives of one-third of the human race.” Invoking the intersection of the Red Menace and the Yellow Peril, Gilbert went on to claim that “The Yellow Peril will sweep on, reinforced by the Red Terror, to spread the deeds of the devil and the crimes of Communism all over the world.”⁶⁷ China’s hordes possessed no qualms about sacrificing themselves or others, which made them unstoppable when combined with their human wave tactics. An account entitled *Red China’s Fighting Hordes* written by U.S. Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Brigg, who had survived captivity by the Chinese, portrays the enemy as “countless masses of uninformed robots” dominated by an inherent “sadism and brutality.”⁶⁸ Along the line of the subhuman to superhuman dynamic previously embodied by the Japanese, the Chinese defied the expectation that they lacked technical proficiency. A member of the Eisenhower administration recalled, “I was brought up to think the Chinese couldn’t handle a machine. Now suddenly the Chinese are flying jets!”⁶⁹ Along with these stereotypes, stories emerged that the Chinese and North Koreans could brainwash American POWs, which led to around twenty-two of them deciding to stay in Korea after the war.⁷⁰

Once again, Asians called upon their mystical and occult oriental powers to warp the brains of innocent Americans. This concern married with fears of infiltrators or sleeper agents in the United States helped make movies like the 1962 film *The Manchurian Candidate* a success. Language and depictions used to describe the Japanese during World War II resurfaced with regard to the United States’ new Asian foe. Resurgent danger in Asia required U.S. intervention in the region and vigilance on the homefront in order to pacify another fanatical, ruthless Asian threat.

The incoming Eisenhower administration inherited the Korean War from its predecessor and although Dwight Eisenhower had promised to resolve the Korean issue, he and members of his team had no doubts about the menace they faced. Attitudes relating to the Chinese remained consistent since the creation of the PRC and persisted through Eisenhower's tenure and beyond. The new president labeled the Chinese as "completely reckless, arrogant...and completely indifferent to human losses." Eisenhower hoped to find some solution to the Korean problem, but under U.S. terms and direction. Accordingly, he avowed that the United States had to take an activist role rather than "slinking along in the shadows, hoping that the beast will finally be satiated and cease his predatory tactics before he finally devours us."⁷¹ Just as in the Japanese wartime case, the Chinese became a single crazed beast with no concern for life, least of all its own.

Even after the 1953 armistice in Korea, tensions would continue in the U.S.-PRC relationship which further explicated the nature of prominent American racial antagonism towards the Chinese. During the Offshore Island Crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 1954-55, the U.S. and the PRC came eyeball to eyeball again. Eisenhower interjected the United States, as allies of Taiwan, also known as the Republic of China, into a territorial dispute involving most notably the islands Quemoy and Matsu. Both Taiwan and the PRC claimed ownership of these islands. For his part, Eisenhower trusted neither side as he lamented "We are always wrong when we believe that Orientals think logically as we do." When it came down to it, regardless of political ideology, the U.S. found itself sandwiched between two groups of "irrational Orientals." Whatever their beliefs, Asians "would rather lose everything than lose face."⁷²

When asked about U.S. willingness to employ nuclear weapons in the conflict, Eisenhower's national security advisor, Dillon Anderson opined,

... if atomic weapons had been required to carry out our commitments to [Chiang] or trying to land American forces on the Chinese mainland with 700 million Chinamen, it would have not been the latter. Good God, they can breed them faster in the zone of the interior than you can kill them in the combat zone.⁷³

Here again, if unleashing nuclear weapons upon the Chinese meant stemming the yellow tide of another sinister Asian people, then so be it. After all, so great was the size of the Asian horde, it seemed improbable to some that they could be stopped by conventional means. Beyond this crisis, the PRC would remain a thorn in the United States' side even after the normalization of relations between the two nations during the 1970s. Bitter hatred, suspicion, and fear proved quite resilient in the minds of the American people.

Conclusion

Such fluid racial perceptions would follow both the Chinese and the Japanese through the remainder of the Cold War and beyond. By the 1970s the Japanese would enter into a new prosperity, often heralded as an economic miracle but one that endangered the United States. The Japanese bogeyman had again come knocking at the front door. Stigmas emerged reinvigorated and the Yellow Peril took on a competitive economic dimension. The Americans interpreted Japan's

economic success as an attempt to do financially what they had been unable to do through military means. For the People's Republic of China, an updated economic and military Yellow Peril persists in minds of many Americans, in policy discussions, and perhaps most of all in headlines and popular culture.

This essay demonstrates that within the U.S. government, military, and sources influencing or reflecting public opinion, attitudes of paternalism and fears of the Yellow Peril regarding the Japanese and Chinese maintained a stunning dynamism and persistence. Perhaps an explanation for the longevity of these fears rests in their ability to be transferred so freely amongst Asian people, considered by many in the United States as practically all the same. The easy transferability of prejudice, coupled with American fears, misunderstanding, and apprehension relating to the peoples of Asia, sheds light on this phenomenon's continued existence.

Notes

- ¹ See Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), and Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993).
- ² See John W. Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 3–11.
- ³ For an excellent study regarding China's World War II from 1937–1945 as well as the United States' involvement and perceptions, see Rana Mitter, *Forgotten Ally: China's World War II, 1937–1945* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013).
- ⁴ Rudolf V. A. Janssens, "What Future for Japan?": *U.S. Wartime Planning for the Postwar Era, 1942–1945* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1995), 30.
- ⁵ Paul Gordon Lauren, "Human Rights in History: Diplomacy and Racial Equality at the Paris Peace Conference," *Diplomatic History* 2 (Summer 1978), 257–78.
- ⁶ For a summary of the general role of American ethnic/racial considerations regarding foreign relations including Japan and China, see Alexander DeConde, *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992).
- ⁷ Studs Terkel, *"The Good War": An Oral History of World War II* (New York: The New Press, 1984), 190.
- ⁸ Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 94–110.
- ⁹ Dower, *Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, 9-11, and Iraq* (New York: W.W. Norton; The New Press, 2010), 43.
- ¹⁰ Terkel, *"The Good War,"* 190.
- ¹¹ Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 39.
- ¹² *Ibid.*
- ¹³ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁴ Japanese names are given in the Japanese style with surname first.
- ¹⁵ Alan Brinkley, *The Publisher: Henry Luce and His American Century* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010), 316.
- ¹⁶ ShiPu Wang, "Japan Against Japan: U.S. Propaganda and Yasuo Kuniyoshi's Identity Crisis," *American Art* 22.1 (Spring 2008): 41.
- ¹⁷ Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 22, 44, 51–52.
- ¹⁸ Sumiko Higashi, "Melodrama, Realism, and Race: World War II Newsreels and Propaganda Film," *Cinema Journal* 37.3 (Spring 1988): 46.
- ¹⁹ Janssens, "What Future for Japan?," 39.
- ²⁰ Terkel, *"The Good War,"* 61–62.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, 67, 178.
- ²² Matthew M. Briones, *Jim and Jap Crow: A Cultural History of 1940s Interracial America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 81.
- ²³ Ronald Takaki, *Double Victory: A Multicultural History of America in World War II* (New York: Back Bay Books; Little, Brown and Company, 2000), 146–147.
- ²⁴ Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 79–81.
- ²⁵ Matthew Jones, *After Hiroshima: The United States, Race and Nuclear Weapons in Asia, 1945–1965* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 8.
- ²⁶ Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2005), 202.
- ²⁷ Mitter, *Forgotten Ally*, 52.
- ²⁸ David D. Perlmutter, *Picturing China in the American Press: The Visual Portrayal of Sino-American Relations in Time Magazine, 1949–1973* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007), 5–6.

- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, 9, 11.
- ³⁰ Robert E. Herzstein, *Henry R. Luce, Time and the American Crusade in Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 42.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*, 11.
- ³² Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945–1961* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 176.
- ³³ Herzstein, *Henry R. Luce*, 40–42.
- ³⁴ Michael Schaller, *The United States and China: Into the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 46, 3.
- ³⁵ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 20.
- ³⁶ Schaller, *The United States and China*, 50.
- ³⁷ Herzstein, *Henry R. Luce*, 41.
- ³⁸ Colleen Lye, *America's Asia: Racial Form and American Literature, 1893–1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 240.
- ³⁹ Klein, *Cold War Orientalism*, 122.
- ⁴⁰ Takaki, *Double Victory*, 111.
- ⁴¹ Perlmutter, *Picturing China in the American Press*, 7–8.
- ⁴² Schaller, *The United States and China*, 53.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, 69.
- ⁴⁴ Takeshi Matsuda, *Soft Power and Its Perils: U.S. Cultural Policy in Early Postwar Japan and Permanent Dependency* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 83.
- ⁴⁵ Higashi, "Melodrama, Realism, and Race," 47–48.
- ⁴⁶ Jodi Kim, *Ends of Empire: Asian American Critique of the Cold War* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 119.
- ⁴⁷ Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton; The New Press, 1999), 223.
- ⁴⁸ Naoko Shibusawa, *America's Geisha Ally: Reimagining the Japanese Enemy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 55.
- ⁴⁹ Kim, *Ends of Empire*, 102.
- ⁵⁰ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 211.
- ⁵¹ Message to the Japanese People, Douglas MacArthur, SCAP, Tokyo, December 27, 1945; Appendix F—Statements by General MacArthur; Box 2084; Government Section; Administrative Division, Philosophy of the Occupation, 1945–1948, Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, Record Group 331; National Archives at College Park, Md.
- ⁵² Yukiko Koshiro, "The U.S. Occupation of Japan as a Mutual Racial Experience," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 3.4 (Winter 1994): 312.
- ⁵³ Douglas MacArthur, SCAP, Statement to Congress, "In Support of Appropriations for Occupation Purposes," Tokyo, February 20, 1947; Appendix F—Statements by General MacArthur; Box 2084; Government Section; Administrative Division, Philosophy of the Occupation, 1945–1948, Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, Record Group 331; National Archives at College Park, Md.
- ⁵⁴ Shibusawa, *America's Geisha Ally*, 135.
- ⁵⁵ Koshiro, "The U.S. Occupation of Japan," 312.
- ⁵⁶ Koshiro, *Transpacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 67.
- ⁵⁷ Shibusawa, *America's Geisha Ally*, 258–59.
- ⁵⁸ Janssens, "What Future for Japan?," 290.

- ⁵⁹ Schaller, *The United States and China*, 110.
- ⁶⁰ Koshiro, *Transpacific Racisms*, 219.
- ⁶¹ Klein, *Cold War Orientalism*, 98.
- ⁶² Kim, *Ends of Empire*, 68–71.
- ⁶³ Klein, *Cold War Orientalism*, 37.
- ⁶⁴ Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line*, 106.
- ⁶⁵ Bruce Cummings, *The Korean War: A History* (New York: The Modern Library, 2010), 15.
- ⁶⁶ Schaller, *The United States and China*, 132.
- ⁶⁷ Dan Gilbert, “Why the Yellow Peril Has Turned Red!” (1951) in *Yellow Peril! An Archive of Anti-Asian Fear*, ed. John Kuo Wei Tchen and Dylan Yeats (London: Verso, 2014), 301.
- ⁶⁸ “Red China’s Fighting Hordes” (1952) in *Yellow Peril! An Archive of Anti-Asian Fear*, ed. John Kuo Wei Tchen and Dylan Yeats (London: Verso, 2014), 302.
- ⁶⁹ Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line*, 105–6.
- ⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 82.
- ⁷¹ Michael H. Hunt and Steven I. Levine, *Arc of Empire: America’s Wars in Asia from the Philippines to Vietnam* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 179.
- ⁷² Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 172.
- ⁷³ *Ibid.*, 171.

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- . *Transpacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.
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