Center for Asia Pacific Studies
The Center is San Francisco’s academic gateway to the Asia Pacific, fostering and promoting innovative research, teaching and public programs.
The unprecedented attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 dramatically reoriented American policy interests in South Asia. Before the attacks, the George W. Bush administration had nearly relegated Pakistan to the category of a ‘rogue state’ because of its coup against a democratically elected government, its support for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, its involvement in terrorist insurgency in the Indian-controlled Kashmir, and its involvement in nuclear and ballistic missiles deals with China and North Korea. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, the Bush administration did a complete volte-face in its dealings with Pakistan. However, this shift has further aggravated tensions in South Asia. This paper discusses why.
Before the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, the Defense Department had no military bases in Central Asia. Half a year later it has over a dozen. Why? According to Bush Administration spokesmen, the Armed Forces need these bases to support the War on Terrorism in Afghanistan. Yet their successful (so far) Afghan counter-terrorism effort has been waged from either the decks of four aircraft carriers in nearby waters, from the British Indian Ocean base at Diego Garcia, or from bases in Afghanistan itself. The lust for land bases in areas near China’s borders or in former Soviet republics will draw America into local quarrels for which it has no solutions. The old Cold War tendency to make these bases permanent has already manifested itself in a demand for recreational facilities, pizza parlors, and coffee houses! This paper explains why ‘base-mania’ is the wrong way to fight terrorists.
A market economy will not emerge from a redistributive economy automatically once the state abolishes its redistributive system. Because of the cognitive incompleteness of market actors in post-redistributive societies, and also because of the conflicts between the state and local interests and among local interests, selective state interventions are inevitable and necessary for a successful market transition. By using unique networked trade data, this paper examines the evolution of market patterns in the new market transition economies based on the emergence of an internal grain market under market reform in China. The finding is that local markets, tightly “protected” by local officials, tried to curtail long-distance trade beyond local territories and thus are not starting points for an internal market in China’s national grain market. The emerging internal grain market at the beginning of the 21st century in China is the result of the deliberate actions of the reform-oriented state.