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Systematic Misrepresentation: Analogy and Anthropomorphism in the Work of
Charles and Erasmus Darwin
By Matt McCoy
Analogy can
convert esoteric information into a palatable form by making comparisons
between the unknown and the familiar.
This translation of foreign to familiar relies upon a shared system of
ideas or what we might call common knowledge.
Analogy is useful, as it gives the masses access to concepts in which
they might be otherwise unable to engage.
However, if we consider the act of analogizing more critically, we find
that it bears certain consequences.
Charles and
Erasmus Darwin are among a group of 18th and 19th century
thinkers who employ anthropomorphism, a particular type of analogy which
relates concepts to human qualities, to articulate ideas on a range of
scientific topics. If we accept that
analogy is a translation to the familiar, it makes sense that anthropomorphism
as a type of analogy should be especially prevalent. For what are we more familiar with than ourselves?
Analogy in general
(and anthropomorphism specifically) occurs in various degrees. A writer may, for instance, describe the
parts of a tree in relation to (what he or she believes to be) the
corresponding parts of the human anatomy.
The tree-to-human comparison is an example of an explicit
anthropomorphism, in which the author consciously articulates the connection
between human and tree. However,
anthropomorphism can function more subtly in a text when an author inserts a
word or connoting human form or behavior into a description of an abstract
concept of an inanimate object. These
two examples of applied anthropomorphism are opposite ends of a spectrum that
contains numerous gradations of the technique.
Erasmus Darwin is
a logical starting point for an examination of anthropomorphism, because of his
influence on his grandson's work and because The Loves of Plants, a long poem in which Erasmus imagines the
fertilization of different plant types, is rife with plant-human
comparisons. Erasmus Darwin bases his
project on a genealogical model, a device which has been used for thousands of
years to trace human blood lines. In
the context of this model, Erasmus Darwin addresses the evolutions of plants,
not in terms of cross fertilization between various species, but as "intermarriage"
between families.
Nearly every line
in Erasmus' poem contains explicit anthropomorphism. In describing the Collinsonia
he writes, "With sweet concern the pitying beauty morns, / And sooths with
smiles the jealous pair by turns."[1] The anthropomorphic imagery in these lines
is so strong that without Erasmus' note describing the "single female" and the
"two male" parts of the plant, the reader would be at a loss to understand
Erasmus' comparison between coquettish beauty and botany.[2] His lines on the Iris conjure another image
of a strange sexual relationship. "The
freckled Iris owns a fiercer flame, / And Three unjealous husbands wed the
dame."[3] In both cases, Erasmus Darwin goes beyond
anthropomorphizing the physical form of the plants, and seeks to explain their
arrangements in terms of emotions with words like "jealous" and
"mourning".
One need not be a
brilliant botanist to conclude that Erasmus Darwin's language of emotion-a
distinct property of the human consciousness-has little place in a discussion
of botany, although most readers would probably fail to see anything sinister
in Erasmus Darwin's use of such exaggerated anthropomorphism. One could argue that his work clouds truth
in that it is a misrepresentation of plant behavior. The counter argument would be that Erasmus Darwin does not try to
create a rigidly scientific work here; rather, he creates something artistic
and accessible for a general audience. Nonetheless, Erasmus Darwin's artistic
intent does not excuse him form all culpability, and his work has other
problems in addition to its inaccuracy. The Loves of Plants fortifies a
stereotype of the promiscuous female who "soothes with smiles" men wooing her,
suggesting that such behavior, because it occurs in nature, is somehow inherently
female. Secondly, while Erasmus
Darwin's work is playful (we might say, more artistic than scientific), it
helps to establish the paradigm of gendering plants, or more generally,
organizing nature in terms of human characteristics, a paradigm which becomes
far more problematic in the work of Charles Darwin.
Charles
Darwin's work in botany bears little formal resemblance to that of his
grandfather. Aside for the occasional
rhetorical flourish, Charles Darwin's work in botany is methodical and scientific. While Charles Darwin still incorporates
anthropomorphism, he does so far more subtly than his grandfather, and as such,
his analogies between plants and people look more like scientific truth than
rhetorical device. It is such this
latency in Charles Darwin's anthropomorphism that makes it particularly
dangerous.
Published
in 1877, Charles Darwin's The Different
Forms of Flowers and Plants of the Same Species builds upon Erasmus
Darwin's anthropomorphic analysis of plant fertilization. Charles Darwin's work is not anthropomorphic
in the strictest sense of the word, as it does not make overt comparisons
between plant and human form. But it is
anthropomorphic in the Nietzschean sense, as defined in On Truth and Falsity in their Ultramoral Sense, in that it is a
distinctly human approach to a non-human subject. It is an approach that contains few points that would be "true
in [themselves]', real, and universally valid apart form man," an approach that
seeks to "understand the world as a human-like thing."[4] Consider the following passage: "The
fertilization of either form with the pollen form the other form may
conveniently be called a legitimate union,
form reasons hereafter to be made clear, and that of a form with its own-form
pollen an illegitimate union."[5] Charles Darwin's suspicious diction-legitimate and illegitimate-introduces a
human standard of legality to botany.
It seeks to explain plant production, not in terms of empirical
qualities, size of stalk, color, etc., but rather in terms of a subjective
right and wrong. As was the case with
Erasmus Darwin, Charles Darwin's decision to frame his findings with
anthropomorphic language makes his work digestible, as it is easier to grasp
the concept of right and wrong-legitimate and illegitimate-than it is to
consider a table of empirical differences between plant offspring.
The
problem with Charles Darwin's legalistic language is that it suggests a value
judgment. It suggests that within
nature there exists a right and a wrong.
Such a claim would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove under any
circumstances, but Charles Darwin's approach to his assertion is especially
dubious. He bases the distinction
between legitimate and illegitimate on the variable of seed output, assuming
that higher output is desirable. Had
Charles Darwin wanted to comment on a plant's chance of procreating, he might
have used the terms productive and unproductive to describe the two types
of union; but he chooses to use value-laden terms based on a capitalistic philosophy
in which product is the means by which one measures the success of any
arrangement. We see, then, that
Darwin's anthropomorphism is actually two-fold, for he uses legalistic language
to articulate his ideas, which are themselves the product of a capitalistic
philosophy. As with Erasmus' work, we
could argue that Charles Darwin's anthropomorphism promotes a misunderstanding
of plant functions. But the larger
problem with Charles Darwin's work is that it promotes a misunderstanding of
the human condition in a way I will
attempt to elucidate.
In
showing the progression form Erasmus to Charles Darwin, I have illustrated how
anthropomorphism becomes less overt as it is assimilated into scientific
language. As I have argued,
anthropomorphism is a type of analogy, which is itself a type of metaphor. In the progressive use of anthropomorphism,
we see the process that Nietzsche describes in On Truth and Falsity in the Ultramoral Sense with the metaphor of a
coin losing its value as currency. As
he says, "Truths are . . . worn-out metaphors which have become powerless to affect
the senses; coins which . . . are not longer of account as coins but merely as
metal."[6] In its initial form, anthropomorphism is
valuable for its metaphoric power, its ability to link the foreign with the
familiar. However, when
anthropomorphism becomes part of the vernacular, it loses its metaphoric
identity and becomes instead a type of truth, accepted as inherent to the thing
to which it was once arbitrarily applied.
This solidification of metaphor into truth is the most serious problem
with anthropomorphism, one whose insidiousness I hope to demonstrate with a
final example from Charles Darwin.
Moving
from botany to evolutionary theory, I will examine Charles Darwin's The Origin of Species, paying close
attention to the section entitled, "Struggle for Existence". I am not working
chronologically as The Origin of Species
was published nearly twenty years before The
Different forms of Forms of Flowers and Plants of the Same Species. Therefore, I am not arguing that the views in
The Different Forms of Flowers led to
the opinions and language in The Origin
of Species. Rather, I discuss The Origin of Species last because it
epitomizes the way in which anthropomorphism can foster misinterpretation.
Charles
Darwin warns his reader that he uses "the term Struggle for Existence fin a
large and metaphorical sense," but goes on to bury his caveat under a landslide
of language of human endeavor and conflict.[7] He describes all "organic beings" as
"striving" and "struggling" against "competitors" and "enemies". [8] I will again accept that Darwin's
anthropomorphic enhances the readability of his piece, but it does so at the
cost of confounding the concept of natural selection. Natural selection is an arbitrary process by which some mutation
or set of mutations proves advantageous to certain animals. The animals with the advantageous mutation
live longer and have more opportunities to procreate. Their offspring then, are more likely to have the mutation. Darwin did not have the benefit of modern
genetic science, but he understood the concept of natural selection well enough
to know its fundamental dissimilarity to Lamarck's theory of acquired
inheritance, which states that an organism may change over the course of its
life and pass that change on to its offspring.
One could argue that a world of acquired inheritance would foster some
type of competition between organisms (for instance, a pack of wolves that ran
every day would produce faster offspring than a lazy pack), but the same
argument is true for natural selection.
Verbs like "struggle" and "strive" suggest conscious action, or if not
conscious action (as is the case with plants), at least action rather than
passiveness. Darwin uses the term "War
of Nature" to elucidate natural selection by likening it to human conflict, but
in doing so, he wrongly characterizes the state of nature as a battleground in
which all organisms actively engage in competition for supremacy.
The
consequences of Charles Darwin's anthropomorphic description develop out of the
circular reasoning to which I alluded in the footnote. The process like this: Darwin (or any other
author who uses anthropomorphism) imbues nature with distinctly human
attributes (the desire for power, emotional love, etc.) make its processes
palatable to a general audience. This
type of analogy is so helpful that it gains permanence in scientific discourse,
and more importantly, in popular conceptions of nature. The danger occurs when certain individuals
(Social Darwinists, Scientific Racists, Fascist Dictators, for example) use
these anthropomorphic descriptions of nature as justification for human
behavior. They say, "Because there is
struggle for dominance in nature, so there must there be struggle for dominance
between people, between states, between races". What such thinking fails to see is that "struggle" and "warfare"
as we understand them, are human concepts imposed on nature, just as gender is
a human concept imposed on plants. The
argument that nature justifies human action falls apart when we consider that
humans defined nature in terms of human action.
We
may feel an impulse to reject the Darwins and those like them, whose antiquated
explanations of scientific fact have obscured our ability to understand the
physical world. However, we must resist such an impulse. Even if we so desired,
we could not completely cleanse our thought of the residue from Charles
Darwin's The Origin of Species. His
language is engrained in our understanding of evolution. Rather than avoiding
history's problematic texts in hopes that their effect on posterity will
eventually diminish, we must continue to study them, to expose their flaws, and
to identify the ways in which readers have misinterpreted them. Only through
acknowledging historically mistaken theories can we hope to redefine our
current understanding of the physical world and out relationship to it.
Notes >>
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