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| realism" is simply a synonym for "philosophical
realism" or that "critical" means something different from
"philosophical." "In the latter case, experience shows and reason proves
that it will become necessary to justify realist conclusions with the help of idealist
methods."16 |
| The overarching problem, from Gilson’s standpoint, is
the ambiguity of asserting, on the one hand, that realism is immediate – direct and
spontaneously certain – and, on the other hand, in need of critical reflection. |
An immediate critical realism whose philosophical validity is not immediately evident
may not be self-contradictory, but it is certainly a confused and equivocal notion…On
the one hand, this realism emphatically asserts that it does not presuppose the critique
that justifies it. Quite the contrary, the critique itself presupposes a knowledge of
reality which cannot be dispensed with for a single second. Thus the critique is purely
and exclusively reflexive and therefore secondary. Consequently, we are here concerned
with a critique of realism from within that very realism. On the other hand, if our
apprehension of reality is primary, it will condition the reflection, which renders it
explicit and, as a result, this reflection will not constitute a point of view distinct
from the realism it is supposed to judge. In short, because it has always presupposed
realism, it will never have criticized realism. If immediate critical realism is to
survive, it must constantly shift between two distinct positions, which use the same name.
"Immediate realism" will then signify the immediate apprehension of an external
reality distinct from thought. If it is objected that such a realism is not critical, the
answer will be that it is, because the validity of this apprehension is affirmed only in
virtue of a critical reflection. And if it is objected that it is no longer immediate
since it depends upon a critique, the answer will be that the object of the critique is
precisely to manifest the immediate character of the realism.17
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| What Maritain offers as critique seems little different from
the method Plato advocated in his "theory of the divided line," an attempt to
justify knowing by validating the premises of the various disciplines of knowledge, but
with one crucial omission: the validation of |
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| 16 Thomist Realism, 53 |
| 17 Thomist Realism, 59-60 |
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