By Michael Kocsis

Notes

1. For an example of the first argument see Onuma Yasuaki, "Toward an Intercivilizational Approach to Human Rights." in The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights Joanne Bauer and Daniel Bell, Eds. (Cambridge UP, 1999) 103-123. For an example of the second see Kevin Tan, "Economic Development, Legal Reform, and Rights in Singapore and Taiwan." in The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights. For a clear and persuasive response to some of these arguments see Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytical Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights." American Political Science Review 76 (1982): 303-316.

2. Fernando Teson, "Changing Perceptions of Domestic Jurisdiction and Intervention," in Beyond Sovereignty Tom Farer Ed. (Johns Hopkins UP), 35.

3. Dorothy Jones, "The Declaratory Tradition in Modern International Law." Traditions of International Ethics Terry Nardin and David Mapel eds. (Cambridge University Press), 42-61.

4. Anthony D'Amato, International Law: Process and Prospect (Transnational), 146, 179.

5. Anthony D'Amato, "Human Rights as Customary Law," in International Law: Process and Prospect 179-203.

6. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Harvard University Press), 93.

7. Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States," Philosophy and Public Affairs9 (1980): 209-229.

8. In this sense Hobbes is an agency social contract theorist, rather than an alienation theorist, because under his social contract consent is not part of the justification for state government. Hobbes's government seized control unilaterally, and order in the community was main tained because individual people had not the power to challenge the government. Individuals in Hobbes's state might not have the power to challenge the government, but they would have a special justification for doing so, if they found themselves able, because citizens did not consent to the original contractual relationship the way citizens in Locke's state consented. See Jean Hampton, Political Philosophy (Westview) 49-52.

9. Michael Walzer, Philosophy and Public Affairs9 (1980): 209-229.

10. Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values, (Dordrecht: Boston, 1995),12-13.

11. Ibid., 12-16.

12. Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States," in Philosophy and Public Affairs9 (1980), 215.

13. If these are not faithful, I think this is the most persuasive set of arguments available for Walzer's theory of non-intervention.

14. See Allen Rosen, Kant's Theory of Justice (Cornell University Press), 135. Rosen warns that the relationship between Kant's social contract and the contradiction in conception test is not perfectly clear. Rather than trying to work out this claim, I will use Kant's social contract theory only as an explanation. I acknowledge that examples in Kant suggest that he might side with contemporary cosmopolitans on this issue. See Rosen, Kant's Theory of Justice (Cornell University Press), 135-138.

15. Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton University Press), 13-34.

16. Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States," in Philosophy and Public Affairs9 (1980), 210.

17. David Luban, "Just Wars and Human Rights," PAPA9 (1988): 160-181; Richard Wasserstrom, "Book Review: Just and Unjust Wars," Harvard Law Review, 544.

18. Ibid., 175-176.

19. Kok-Chor Tan, "Humanitarian Intervention: Permissibility and Obligation." M.A. Thesis, Carleton University 1994. 38.

20. United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948) Preamble.

21. Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton University Press), 8.

22. Ibid., 69.

23. Charles Beitz, "Bounded Morality: Justice and the State in World Politics," International Organization33 (1979): 405-424, 413.

24. David Luban, "Just Wars and Human Rights," PAPA9 (1988): 160-81; Richard Wasserstrom, in "Book Review: Just and Unjust Wars," Harvard Law Review, 167-168.

25. Gerald Doppelt, "Walzer's Theory of Morality in International Relations," PAPA8 (1978):9.

26. Kok-Chor Tan, "Humanitarian Intervention: Permissibility and Obligation," 60-61.

27. Allen Rosen, Kant's Theory of Justice, (Cornell University Press), 129.

28. John Ra