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- By
- James T. Bretzke, S.J., S.T.D.
- University of San Francisco
- E-mail: bretzkesj@usfca.edu
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- Natural law deals with morality and character, e.g. right/wrong
- Natural law depends for its existence on human beings AND God
- Natural law’s “objectivity” needs careful understanding and can only be
discovered within the realm of human moral being (conscience)
- Laws of nature deal with the physical universe, e.g. gravity
- Laws of nature are “objective” and bind irrespective of human beings
(e.g. gravity binds even without humans
- Law of nature can be discovered by scientific analysis of the world
outside of us.
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- Natural Law
- Location is primarily within the human person(s) in their relation to
God
- It is not “out there” in the sense of the chemical periodic table of
elements
- Thomas says it is “inscribed” on the human heart (Lex indita non
scripta)
- Law of Nature
- Location is primarily outside in the operations of the physical universe
- Thus, the law of nature is discovered through science and/or observation
of the physical universe and its properties
- A morally bad person could be a gifted chemist, etc.
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- Natural Law
- Going to confession = possible for many; difficult for some
- Confessing to one’s son (a priest) = difficult for some; “morally
impossible” for others
- One set of rules does not necessarily fit all (cf. ST 1-II, Q. 94, art.
4)
- Law of Nature
- NaCl + H2O = Possible
- Au + H2O = Very difficult
- Au + NaCl = Impossible?
- One set of rules fits all
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- Natural Law
- Impossibility refers primarily to moral impossibility, which is necessarily
subjective (i.e., related to an individual subject)
- Thus what is morally “possible” for one individual may be morally impossible
for another
- Moral possibility/impossibility is more difficult to determine, since it
is necessarily subjective.
- Law of Nature
- Impossibility refers to the basic laws of physics, chemistry, biology,
etc. which are “objective” and apply to all
- What is physically impossible is fairly easy to determine.
- Thus birds can fly under their own power, but humans cannot
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- Ontological Claim
- Normative Claim
- Universalist Claim
- Epistemological Claim
- Normable Claim
- Universalizable Claim
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- There is, in some sense, an objective moral order
- Grounded in a human nature
- Which indicates a certain way of being
- And activities consonant with that being
- As well as actions and ways of being not in accord with that nature
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- Not only does this order exist, but we can in some real and significant
sense “know” it
- I.e., we can know both the nature of human being
- And those actions which are consistent with human flourishing
- As well as those which are incompatible with human flourishing
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- This claim builds on the epistemological claim
- It asserts that our moral knowledge can be formulated in a certain way,
in terms of moral norms
- I.e., that certain actions or behaviors are fashioned in terms of
prescriptions and proscriptions
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- This claim is a further specification of the ontological claim (the
objective moral order)
- And this claim flows from the “normable” claim grounded in the
epistemological claim
- I.e., that the moral order “is” in a certain way, that we can norm our
knowledge, and that these norms in fact are binding on us.
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- This builds on the epistemological and normable claims
- I.e., not only can we “know” the moral order in some real sense, and
that we can fashion this knowledge in terms of moral norms
- But these norms can be expressed as universal claims, thus these norms
are “universalizable”
- I.e., norms expressed as binding on all peoples and in all times and in
all places
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- If the moral order actually exists (ontological claim) and is normative
on us
- And if we can both know it and norm moral actions in this order in terms
of universalizable norms
- Then at least some of these moral norms will in fact be universal
- They will be applicable to us and to all others
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- Principle of exitus et reditus (all comes from and returns to God)
- Notion of law in general: ordinance of reason promulgated by a competent
ruler for the common good)
- Human participation in God’s eternal law
- A lex indita non scripta (inscribed on the human heart)
- Distinctions of speculative and practical reason
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- Speculative Reason
- Abstract, “logical” truth
- “Necessarily” true
- Universally true for all
- Exercise of logical wisdom and reasoning
- Some examples…
- Practical Reason
- Reason put into concrete practice
- Affected by “contingency”
- Affected by “fallibility
- Not universally true for all in the same way
- Exercise of prudential wisdom
- Some examples…
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- Universal principles {Speculative Reason}
- Middle Axioms {Speculative & Practical Reason combined}
- Concrete Material Norms {Primarily practical reason}
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- Bonum est faciendum et prosequendum et malum vitandum (ST I-II, q. 94)
- The good is to be done and fostered, and evil avoided
- Look carefully at the grammar…
- Knowable by all as principles of truth, according to speculative reason
- E.g., Drive safely, as in the following?!
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- Moral norms which are generally true and not easily altered
- Lex valet ut in pluribus (the law/norm is valid “in most cases”)
- Yet, according to circumstance and time these norms might be changed or
have “exceptions”
- E.g., drive according to the speed limit
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- Particular and specific, often tied to a particular understanding of
time and/or circumstance
- These may be “incomplete” and/or necessary to alter according to time or
place
- Thus, more “fallible” and more “contingent”
- E.g., drive 15 mph in a school zone
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- Universal Precepts
- Middle Axioms
- Concrete Material Norms
- Always binding, expressed as abstract truths, such as “drive safely”
- Generally true, in most cases (ut in pluribus) but exceptions exist
- Apply to a specific situation but are more open to both change and fallibility
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- Keep in mind that for genuine, human moral action we must never separate
the human agent from the actions s/he performs
- Recall that as humans we are embodied spirit which means we must live in
the concrete world
- Therefore our moral lives must be grounded and evaluated in reference to
our real-life situation
- As Christians we believe that our lived response to our situation is
best seen in terms of discipleship
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- Action in se (“objective” aspect of the act)
- Intention of the moral agent
- Circumstances in which the agent’s intention was made and in which the
action was performed
- While in the tradition these aspects were treated “separately,” in
reality they exist only together, and “simultaneously”
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- 1755 A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end,
and of the circumstances together. An evil end corrupts the action, even
if the object is good in itself (such as praying and fasting "in
order to be seen by men").
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- Finis Operis
- The “end” (goal) of the act in itself
- E.g., surgery to remove a tumor
- Has as its “end” the health of the patient
- Finis Operantis
- The “end” of the agent performing the act
- E.g., doctor who performs the surgery
- Wishes to remove the tumor
- And restore the patient to health
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- If both the Finis operis and the Finis operantis are morally correct we
have a morally right act which strengthens the moral goodness of the
agent
- However, what happens when one Finis is correct and the other incorrect?
- E.g., “doing the right thing for the wrong reasons” (or vice versa)?
- Some illustrative examples…
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- Peter Lombard: The Finis operis provides the evaluation of the moral
act, without reference to the Finis operantis of the agent
- Counter-position of Thomas Aquinas: Finis operis semper reducitur in
finem operantis (The act’s moral end is always found ultimately in the
agent’s intention in performing the act)
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- This position focuses moral meaning primarily and essentially in the
moral agent
- We can still evaluate the “effects” of a moral action and call them
“right” or beneficial
- But the judgment about moral goodness can be made only in reference to a
human person as moral agent,
- Therefore, the Finis operantis is absolutely key
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- Consideration of the agent’s intention is indispensable to the
evaluation of any moral act
- There are no “free-floating” moral acts whose moral evaluation can be
made without reference to the agent, and therefore the agent’s intention
and circumstances
- Cf. Thomas Aquinas: ST I-II q. 18 (On Human Acts)
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- “Against nature”
- Not against the “laws of nature”
- But against the “nature” or purpose of a faculty of the human person
- Thus, contraception was wrong since it frustrated the “nature” of sexual
relations in blocking procreation.
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- "God does not command of humans things which are impossible to do”
- Thus, God’s grace was understood to always be present to enable people
to do the morally correct thing.
- E.g., as used in 1930 in Casti Connubii by Pope Pius XI to condemn the
practice of contraception.
- Yet, we must keep in mind that if something is impossible then it cannot
be commanded by God.
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- From the Greek word for “fitting”
- Source of some debate among medieval theologians, some of which saw it
as a grudging “dispensation”
- But according to Thomas it is “virtue” which ought to become habitual
- Since it seeks to “perfect” the law
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- To correct an impossible law
- To correct an inhuman law
- To correct a law which did not foresee this particular set of circumstances
(the so-called “reading the mind of the legislator”
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- Traditionally epikeia was applied only to human laws, since being human
were often imperfect
- The natural law, as grounded in God’s eternal law, was seen as
“off-limits” for epikeia since God’s laws would not be imperfect
- Yet it has been debated that since nature itself does change over time
this would require changes in the natural law so that it would more
truly reflect God’s creative will
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- The natural law is only a “law” by analogy, not by direct apprehension
- Thus, it functions like a law
does, not as a law does
- The Catholic moral tradition has always recognized that application in
the concrete is evaluated primarily in terms of the individual as
subjective moral agent
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- Abstract norms arise out of speculative reason
- These will tend to be universally true
- Less open to change
- Though with time there can be refinement
- E.g. certain human rights
- Material norms apply practical reason to a concrete situation
- The concrete situation will always be to some extent unique
- Therefore, there will necessarily be differences and exceptions with
these concrete material norms
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- Abstract norms since they are based in speculative reason can be
universally true and knowable by all with sufficient reflection
- Material norms since they are exercises of practical reason will be more
fallible, less accepted, and more changeable (contingent)
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- The preceding is based on Thomas Aquinas
- Be careful not to confuse abstract norms for concrete material norms, or
vice versa
- Many of the contemporary debates come down to a disagreement over
whether a given norm is truly abstract or concrete
- If abstract it should be universally true
- If concrete it’s open to fallibility [incompleteness] and contingency
[change]
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- In fide, unitas: in dubiis, libertas; in omnibus, caritas
- "In faith, unity; in doubt, liberty; in all things, charity."
- Unity in faith is important, but in cases of doubt a plurality of
opinions and practices should be allowed, and the over-riding principle
must always be charity towards each other.
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