I. INTRODUCTION TO THE COURSE (using Matthew 16:19-22 (The Rich Young Man), which was used in Veritatis Splendor, Pope John Paul II’s 1993 Encyclical on fundamental moral theology. The passage introduces key words for opening up this passage in relation to moral theology

A. “Good”: initially the rich young man asks a question about “doing” a “good deed,” but Jesus responds with a question of his own which indicates that the source, ground, and ultimate reference for our understanding of “goodness” is God the Father. A key theme of Matthew’s Gospel is the necessity of all (including Jesus) to be obedient to the will of the Father (who is all good). This question of Jesus also shows us that the key criterion of Christian ethics then is not just “doing” the good or right thing, but “being” in a right relation with God.

B. “Commandments”: Remember that for the Jewish people the “Ten Commandments” were not primarily negative boundaries that limited their activities (cf. the cartoon of Moses coming down the mountain carrying the tablets and saying “It’s just a first draft, but we’re not going to get away with anything!”). Rather, for the Israelite nation the Ten Commandments were the Decalogue, the Ten Holy Words, which were a gift from God to God’s Chosen People. The Decalogue was a “code” in both senses of the word, i.e., a collection of laws, but more importantly a way of deciphering God’s own holiness. The context of the gift of the Decalogue is key to understanding how we are to view the Ten Commandments, namely given “on the way” (a pilgrimage, a holy journey) from slavery to freedom, as God’s revelation, and as a sign of God’s special relationship (the Covenant) with the Chosen People.

C. “Lack/Perfect”: The question about what is lacking is answered by the desire “to be perfect” and this vocabulary needs to be carefully understand. “Perfect” is a Latin derivative and often connotes something that is absolutely complete, without any blemish or deficiency, e.g., a room that is in “perfect” order. This notion of “perfection” is rather static and certainly is not what the Greek text here primarily means to convey. The Greek term is derived from τελειος (teleios) and might be related best to the Hebrew concept of shalom. This notion is one of wholeness, harmony, health, peace, and in that combined sense “complete” and “perfect.” The Greek word is related to the moral theory of “teleology” which stresses the sense of moral striving, becoming, character, and virtue.

D. “Go, sell what you have”: Jesus gives the rich young man a mission, not a moral norm. The Christian moral life should be understood in the sense of being on a God-given mission. “Sell what you have” has two meanings here for the young man. Jesus is inviting him to a new self-understanding that is not predicated on “possessions,” but a new and more authentic identity. Even without one’s “possessions” (whether these be material possessions, honors, accomplishments, etc.) the individual is still worthy in God’s eyes. Secondly, the meaning of divesting oneself of one’s possessions is not meant to leave one bereft of all means of livelihood, but is explained in the next phrase,

E. “And give to the poor”: Care and concern for the poor is a key Gospel theme, and thus in some sense should mark our Christian moral living. We might see this as an example of what later has become termed the “preferential option for the poor” but I think we can also understand this mandate in terms of a key insight in St. Ignatius’ meditation, the Contemplation to Obtain the Love of God, which comes in the 4^th Week of the Spiritual Exercises. Thus, Ignatius suggest that true love is shown more in deeds than words, and that the one who “has” shares with those who have not. He suggests as a concrete example the sharing of knowledge.

F. “Treasure in Heaven” In God’s economy there is no zero-sum game. The “selling” and “giving” of one’s possessions always enriches those who give. “Treasure” indicates a solid, lasting, and life-long richness. “Heaven” is used in Matthew’s Gospel often in the sense of the “Kingdom of Heaven” (βαιλεα τϖν ουρανϖν) and thus serves as a short-hand expression for the Kingdom itself. The Christian moral life is essentially about living in accord with the values and expectation of God’s Kingdom to come.

G. “Come, Follow Me” The mission given above to “Go, and sell your possessions” finds its completion in Jesus’ invitation to return and follow (after) him. The very “follow” in Greek takes as its object the preposition “after” and so literally means to come and “follow after” Jesus. This is the discipleship stance, following after Jesus. Discipleship, and not just “doing” the “right” action, really is the key to Christian moral living.

II. INTRODUCTION TO BASIC PRESUMPTIONS OF MORAL THEOLOGY AND/OR CHRISTIAN ETHICS AS SUCH

A. 3 Beginning questions which will be helpful to frame the nature of the discipline and its study, namely 1) What is “moral theology”?; 2) How does it differ from philosophical ethics? And 3) How is it a part of “theology”? Try and keep these questions in mind throughout the course, and perhaps again at the time of preparation for the M.Div. Comprehensive examination.

B. Methodological starting point and presupposition: There is an objective moral order (i.e., moral truth with an ontological basis), which can be known (i.e., moral truth with an epistemological basis), and which also can be done (i.e., moral truth with a normative basis), and which if lived will help us to be truly human and therefore truly free..

C. Further presupposition from the standpoint of moral theology as theology is the belief that we can "theologize" about this objective moral truth. This presumes philosophical ethics, but integrates theology as well, and which can be conceptualized, formulated, and expressed in a number of ways, two of the most common being as a duty and/or as a goal.

D. These two major ethical theories are usually called deontology and teleology, which expressions were first combined and contrasted in this sense by C.D. Broad in 1930 in his Five Types of Ethical Theory (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1930). For those unfamiliar with these basic philosophical terms it might be helpful to consult a dictionary of ethics such as James Childress and John Macquarrie’s New Dictionary of Christian Ethics.

E. Deontological ethical theory: The word "deontological" comes from the Greek δεον, [deon] which means "duty." This duty expressed as moral norm usually comes from a grounding in an understanding of our moral nature, which enables us to perform those moral tasks and fulfill those moral responsibilities and obligations which are proper to our particular nature. Deontological ethical theory stresses clear moral norms which establish parameters, or limits, of what must not be done (prohibitions and proscriptions) as well as prescriptions of what must be done. The latter are given as moral duties or responsibilities, and often indicate at least a certain basic minimum set of expectations as to what we must achieve in our moral life.

F. Teleological ethical theory: This is the realm of moral goals, sometimes also called moral "ends" and/or moral ideals. "Teleological" comes from τελος,[telos] the Greek word for "end." In general teleological ethics stresses two aspects of a moral telos, end-as-goal, which should orient proper moral action, and end-as-ideal, which furnishes a goal and a vision which supports us in our ethical growth and moral striving. Teleological ethical theory stresses therefore the identification of the "end" proper to each moral being or aspect (e.g. "faculty") of each moral being, as well as what will lead to the attainment and fulfillment of that proper end, and what will obstruct or frustrate the realization of that proper end.

G. Teleological ethical theory also will stress the "becoming" aspect of our moral nature, such as genuine moral growth and integration, often expressed in terms of moral character, and what aids this process, such as an understanding of our moral identity (e.g. as disciples of Jesus), coupled with a guiding moral vision, which in turn is sustained and nourished by the virtues to be cultivated and the vices to work against and to root out.

H. Teleological ethics as guide to moral discernment and moral decision-making: In moral conflict situations: i.e., in cases when one is confronted with the dilemma of having two or more "evils," one must always choose the lesser evil, or when faced with two or more options which seem to be good, then one must choose the better one. However, here the key issue becomes which set of criteria will govern the way the various values and disvalues, goods and evils are articulated, weighed, and decided.

I. Introduction to the notion of contra naturam in teleological ethics: “Against nature” and means “immoral”; if you label some action as contra naturam it is the same as calling this action morally wrong. But it is important to bear in mind that this does not mean the same as against the “laws of nature” (i.e., the physical laws of nature, such as gravity, or what is “found” in nature, such as the birds and the bees). Rather this was understood as against the proper “end” or goal of the human person, or some aspect (faculty) of the human person. Thus, contraception was seen as morally wrong since it blocked the proper “end” of sexual relations which was viewed to be procreation.

J. Some theological questions and themes for Christian ethics (i.e., the "theology" of moral theology or Christian ethics)

1. Who is God, and what does God as Trinity mean for us and our moral life?

a. Helpful is Fuchs' article, "Our Image of God and the Morality of Innerworldly Behavior." Chapter 3 in Christian Morality: The Word Became Flesh, 28-49. Translated by Brian McNeil. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press; Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1987. German original: "Das Gottesbild und die Moral innerweltlichen Handelns." Stimmen der Zeit 202 (1984): 363-382.

2. What is meant by Revelation and the range of authority of Scripture, especially for the moral life?

3. What is the notion of faith, and its relation to morality?

a. In this line, see James Walter's article, "The Relation between Faith and Morality: Sources for Christian Ethics." Horizons 9 (1982): 251-270. This article outlines a spectrum of six ways of relating faith and morality used by various theologians. E.g. from morality collapsed into faith (Barth) to faith collapsed into morality (extreme moral autonomy school).

4. Christology, i.e., who is Christ for us and our faith community? As well as other important areas of dogmatic theology, such as What is grace and salvation, and how do these relate to sin, conversion, and reconciliation? Also ecclesiology, especially in addressing the questions of what is the meaning and mission of the Church, and what does membership in that body mean?

5. Liturgy and spirituality: What does it mean to worship God and live a life of prayer, both individually and as a community?

a. See Rich Gula’s The Good Life: Where Morality and Spirituality Converge (New York: Paulist Press, 1999), as well as Marty Stortz’s 1998 GTU Distinguished Faculty Lecture “Discerning the Spirits, Practicing the Faiths.”

6. Thus, in your ongoing study of moral theology and the other branches of theology try to make the connections and see the possible inter-relations.

III. INTRODUCTION TO THE FOUR SECTOR MODEL OF MORAL METHODOLOGY

A. For the fuller treatment of this topic see my essay, “Mapping a Moral Methodology,” as well as the notes/outline which follow here:

B. Introductory note on the role and importance of fundamental moral theology or Christian ethics, which is meant to be foundational, in presenting a basic methodology and introduction to concepts and tradition, and which lays the ground for (but is nevertheless distinct from) applied or special ethics (such as bioethics, sexual ethics, business ethics, etc.). Perhaps the importance of fundamental moral theology can be caught in the old axiom, Parvus error in principiis, magnus error in conclusionibus [Small error in the beginning leads to great error in the conclusion].

C. Sources and "Languages" of moral theology or Christian ethics

1. Traditional understanding of "fonts" or sources of moral theology listed three: Scripture, Tradition, and the (current teaching of the) Magisterium.

2. These “fonts” were utilized and presented according to the mode or genre of the manualist tradition, which started with the current teaching of the Magisterium at that particular time on a given issue, and then worked back to Scripture and the Tradition to demonstrate how this teaching was harmonious and constant through the ages. Thus, we need to pay attention to how these three were inter-related and prioritized at various times throughout history, as well as to note how each is conceived of and interpreted itself.

3. Look briefly at how certain moral teachings have changed throughout the centuries, e.g., slavery and usury: what was once permitted is not forbidden (slavery), and what was once forbidden is now permitted (usury).

4. In answering this last question first, the notion of various "languages" can be helpful, ala Wittgenstein's understanding of language: "Wittgenstein was, in his later work, extremely sensitive to the different cultures and `language games' in the world. In the same way that each game has a different set of rules so has each culture. One cannot be checkmate [sic] in a game of basketball for that is to confuse the rules of two different games. So, argued Wittgenstein, it is equally inappropriate to use scientific language in a religious context or for that matter to judge a non-scientific culture by a scientific western rationality." [Ian S. Markham, Plurality and Christian Ethics, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994): 137.]

5. While Wittgenstein spoke more in terms of different cultures, but I would argue that the same concept can be applied to the internal language of the individual source itself. Thus, we need to recognize the diversity of "languages" employed by the different moral sources. Languages which will have different vocabularies, syntax and grammar, languages which can speak to one another, but which are NOT identical. Therefore, be careful not to use the language of normative moral philosophy when speaking of a biblical parable, and vice versa. We need to work out a conception of moral theology which allow for a certain amount of intra-religious dialogue among these different sources.

D. Epistemological considerations for authoritative moral discourse, and in this regard see John E. Thiel's "Tradition and Authoritative Reasoning." Theological Studies 56 (1995): 627-651. Thiel sses insights from non-foundational epistemology to discuss some of the problematic relations between argument and authority in magisterial teaching, and also uses Humanae vitae and Inter Insigniores to illustrate the issue.

IV. THE 6 “C’s” OF MORAL DISCOURSE (Practical considerations for selection and application the mode(s) of moral theological discourse: the “6 C's" (for a fuller exposition of this section see my article, “Charting the Common Ground: Moral Discourse and the Abortion Debate”). The outline follows:

A. Comprehensive in relation to the issue and problem: Does it treat the problem and issue in its complexity and completeness? Are there aspects, etc., which tend to be ignored, condemned as irrelevant, etc.? Does it tend to move to a "thick" description rather than simply a "thin" description of the issue?

B. Comprehensible, i.e., "understandable": Is the mode of discourse comprehensible by a variety of people, ecumenical, etc.? Does the language employ philosophical and/or religious belief systems which people use and understand? Be careful, especially in pastoral work, of using too much "jargon" (fundamental option, intrinsically evil acts, etc.), yet, make sure that key concepts are understood. This involves being sensitive to the dynamic of "language games" of moral and theological discourse.

C. Consistent and Coherent: Are the modes of argumentation, usage of moral sources, positions taken, etc. internally coherent and externally consistent with similar issues, cases, etc.?

D. Credible: in the sense of being "believable. “ i.e., a person of sound reason could logically hold this position. In this regard, the "credibility" or "plausibility" of our positions will have to be tested against the experts of a particular field. E.g., if we are to discuss or pronounce on ecological matter we have to get input from experts in the field, as well as test our responses with them. This whole area of "expert testimony" is a delicate area in matters such as marriage, sexual ethics, and the like, including business ethics, politics, etc.–areas in which the Church has been criticized for not developing a sufficiently credible and realistic moral discourse. Thus, dialogue, with its concomitant methodology is key here. No genuine dialogue reduces or eliminates credibility. However, a reluctance or refusal to dialogue will most likely have only the opposite effect of rendering one’s argumentation and discourse less credible (and not more credible). As a “credibility” check I would suggest taking some guidance from both ecumenism and inter-religious dialogue–endeavors which have developed a certain methodology which strives to ground real credibility in oneself and the other. In this line, consider the following passage taken from Complementary Norms to the Jesuit Constitutions in the section dealing with Ecumenical Activity: (CN#268): “It [ecumenism] seeks, namely, what unites rather than what divides; it seeks understanding rather than confrontation, it seeks to know, understand, and love others as they wish to be known and understood, with full respect for their distinctiveness, through the dialogue of truth, justice, and love.”(The Constitutions of the Society of Jesus and Their Complementary Norms. St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1996, emphasis added). This is what I mean about a “credibility check”–to make sure that our articulation of the “other’s” position reflects a knowledge and understanding which they would own: “Yes, you have stated my position fairly, completely, and respectfully.”

E. Convincing: Are the modes of argumentation that move from being merely credible to one that convinces, in the light of counter-arguments? Is the counter-argument being stated fairly? Would its proponents recognize and own the recapitulation presented? Does the argument convince me/others? Why? or why not? If an argument or line of reasoning does not convince, then what is our further response? Recast the argument? Repeat it, more loudly? Try to invoke sanctions of authority? Recognize that “convincing” is not a matter of majority acceptance, polls, and/or political correctness. An otherwise convincing argument may fail to convince because of the sin, hard-heartedness, lack of intelligence, etc., on the part of those addressed, and therefore would not be easily corrected by those engaged in the formulation of moral discourse. In this sense we can say that Jesus Christ failed to “convince” a good deal of his audience as well!

F. The sixth "C" for moral theology: Christian: Does the moral discourse, position, theory, response, application, etc. take into account the Christian nature of our moral life? Does it take into account adequately the aspects of Christian theology, such as creation, sin and forgiveness, grace, the Cross, redemption, the resurrection, eschatology, Christian moral community of discipleship, and so on. This sixth "C" does not replace or supersede the previous 5 "C"'s, but is meant to be integrative as the organizing symbol. We have to admit frankly that historically Roman Catholic moral theology has exhibited a certain deficiency in this regard.

V. ELABORATION OF THE FOUR SECTOR GRID FOR ACCESSING THE SOURCES OF MORAL THEOLOGY OR CHRISTIAN ETHICS

A. Introductory note on dangers to avoid, or negative tendencies to work against, such as a tendency to narrow the range of a particular sector, e.g., to identify all of Tradition with only the writings of a particular Church Father, theologian (such as Thomas Aquinas), or a particular member or segment of the Magisterium. Another tendency would be to exaggerate the voice of one sector so that it drowns out the others, or the tendency to ignore or shortchange the input from a particular sector or sub-sector. We also need to guard against retroactive anachronistic readings of the various sources, especially from Scripture and Tradition. Don’t be reductionistic and/or don’t evaluate authors and texts too harshly in light of contemporary concerns, insights, and sensibilities. For example, it wouldn’t be overly helpful to dismiss all of Thomas Aquinas as irrelevant because of his antiquated biology, or the problems in his theological anthropology in reference to women, etc. Nevertheless, modern concerns and sensitivities can unmask and highlight legitimate issues, past and current abuses, injustices, and so on. Thus, we have to pay special attention to more recent theologies coming out of feminist, liberationist, and cross-cultural perspectives.

B. Scripture

1. Important to recognize Scripture first of all as the pre-eminent "sacred text" for Christians, and therefore for Christian ethics. Its claim is exercised on the faith community, for whom the sacred text has a special, “sacred” claim. While this claim is “sacred” it is not meant to be simplistic or fundamentalistic. Scripture is a text, and therefore like all texts written in either a different language or time it must be translated. Remember basic principle of translation that it is virtually impossible to translate completely and unambiguously the whole range of meaning from one language into another. For example consider Matthew 5:48 and the normal translation of τέλειοι and as τέλειός "perfect." As a text, like all texts, Scripture must be interpreted (after it is translated). There is no such thing as a "self-interpreting text"; thus, the science of hermeneutics is fundamental to our doing Christian ethics. Keep in mind as well that the biblical text is a text of a community: it arose out of that community, is sacred to that community, and therefore is formative of the community's self-understanding. I.e., it is normative for the community's "story" and the story in turn is normative for the community and the individuals in the community.

2. Further claims as to what this "sacred text" means, among others:

a. canonicity (accepted as the revealed word of God). This involves principles of inclusion and exclusion of canonical material, as well as a certain tension and dynamic of creating a canon-within-the-canon

b. normativity, e.g., the Norma normans non normata (the norming norm which norms all other norms and is not normed itself by something higher, i.e., as over and above every other norma normata)

c. Relation to formation, inter-penetration, and maintenance of religious culture (relation to Tradition)

3. Proper uses for Scripture as sacred text: note the range and modes of this usage, such as Revelation, liturgical usages, prayer and spirituality, as a guide to praxis, as embodying a certain wisdom of moral insight, as well as understood as a "classic" in the hermeneutical sense.

4. Important to develop a lectio continua of Scripture: This will help keep ourselves in contact with the whole of Scripture, since it speaks in a variety of voices. I.e., there is no one "Biblical" theology or view on most areas. This point is helpful in order to correct the natural tendency to develop a canon-within-the-canon. It also cooperates with the work of the Holy Spirit which is to remind us of what has been taught by Jesus and to teach us those things we could not bear earlier (cf. John 14:16-17, 26; John 14:26; John 16: 7-15). Therefore, meditation on Scripture is key for the moral life of both the individual and the community. Plus the importance of moral dialogue, to see where the wind (the Spirit) is blowing in other communities.

C. Tradition(s) The Living Wisdom of the Community

1. First and foremost, Tradition speaks of the relationship we have as members of a faith community. This relationship is found not only in the present, to one another, but also to the past–to those people who have fostered the growth of the Church (including ourselves) through their own lives. In the same way we also must look to the future and our roles as faithful transmitters (and transformers) of the deepest meaning of the Christian faith. Therefore it is paramount to remember that Tradition is first and foremost grounded in the historical faith community, It is that faith community which not only is nourished by that Tradition, but which nourishes the Tradition in turn, augmenting it, refining it, pruning it, etc. Keep this in mind, lest the Tradition become the "dead faith of the living" (to borrow the well-known dictum from the church historian, Jaroslav Pelikan), rather than the ongoing, living faith of the communion of saints (whose members are both living and dead). Thus, Tradition, like Scripture, has to be continually re-translated, re-read and re-interpreted, within the context of a faith community that is a believing, worshiping, and acting Community of Disciples

2. Sandra Schneiders summarizes and expresses this fuller notion of the concept of Tradition as “effective historical consciousness”: "Tradition is the actualization in the present, in and through language, of the most valued and critically important aspects of the community's experience, or, more precisely, of the community's experience itself as it has been selectively appropriated and deliberately transmitted. Tradition is the primary form and norm of effective historical consciousness, which is the medium of ongoing community experience. It includes deliberately formulated belief, that is, dogma, but is by no means limited to dogma. It includes liturgy, spirituality, the lives and teachings of exemplary believers, historical experiences, legislation, artistic creations, customs and much more. One of the tasks of each generation of believers is to appropriate the tradition, to enrich and purify it by living interaction with it, and to transmit it to the next generation." [Sandra Schneiders, The Revelatory Text: Interpreting the New Testament as Sacred Scripture, (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991): 71.

3. Schneiders describes 3 meanings to tradition: “Tradition, as the foundational gift out of which the Church's experience unfolds throughout history, is the Holy Spirit who is the presence of the risen Jesus making the Church the Body of Christ. Tradition, as content, is the sum total of appropriated and transmitted Christian experience, out of which Christians throughout history select the material for renewed syntheses of the faith. Tradition refers also to the mode by which that content is made available to successive generations of believers, the way in which the traditioning of the faith is carried on throughout history." [Schneiders, p. 72.]

4. It is also important, however, to recall the “traditional” understanding, with a capital "T" as another virtual font of Revelation, transmitted through the Apostolic and Patristic authors, and the Magisterium (however this is conceived in a particular faith community, i.e., what functions as religious authority, and how this authority functions in a particular community. Be wary here too of short-circuit responses, such as Roma locuta, causa finita

D. Relationship between Scripture and Tradition: The Sacred Claim (or Faith Axis)

1. Because we call ourselves Christians the Scripture, as well as the Tradition out of which it grew, and which it continues to form and inform, have a special claim on us. I term this claim a “sacred claim”–not a claim which is counter to reason or “illogical” but which exercises its logic and persuasiveness primarily through the arena of faith. All religiously based ethics have this “sacred claim” dimension (e.g., the Koran for Muslims), but while the Koran may be an interesting and even inspiring book for us as Christians to read and reflect upon, it does not have this special “sacred” claim for us in the way it would have for Muslims. This returns us to the principle of norma normans non normata and norma normata.

2. And as Sandra Schnieders observes, "In short, the relationship between tradition and scripture is that of a hermeneutical dialectic. Scripture is produced as part of and witness to tradition; it // functions as the norm of that tradition; but it can only function as norm if it is interpreted from within and in terms of tradition." [Schneiders, pp. 82-83.]

E. Ethics: Rational Reflection or Reason (Philosophy)

1. “Ethics” exercises its primary claim “rationally” on the human community.

2. Remember that it is important to bear in mind that there is no "one" philosophical approach or system which is valid for all times, places, cultures, etc. In this context arises the problematic of dealing with the tradition of a so-called philosophia perennisis or "perennial philosophy,” a claim that a certain philosophical approach, such as an Aristotelian or Thomistic system, because of its abstract and "universal" rational basis and language would be virtually transcultural and trans-historical, and therefore valid for all peoples. This philosophical view is often tied to a classicist world-view, and a certain approach to the natural law. For example, consider Aeterni patris, the Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII which mandated the study of the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (1879).

3. While philosophy is key to theology (as it has often be called theology's "handmaiden"), we must bear in mind that in Christian ethics and moral theology the role and input of philosophy has to be done theologically, and not just as a sort of "philosophical excursus." Nevertheless, we should not undervalue the importance of the ongoing encounter between philosophy & moral theology, as expressed by John P. Langan, S.J. : "It is also an encounter between moral theology and a complex and increasingly autonomous culture, for which philosophy serves as one highly generalized expression of its deeper ambitions and conflicts. Law, history, the various social sciences, the professions, and assorted political and humanitarian movements all generate ethical questions and demands, many of which philosophy serves to articulate and concentrate. Furthermore, those parts of philosophy that do not focus on ethics, especially metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophical psychology, set the framework for the ways in which we conceive human action and the possible connections between action and ultimate meanings and realities." "Catholic Moral Rationalism and the Philosophical Bases of Moral Theology." Theological Studies 50 (1989): 28.

4. Recognition of two basic philosophical approaches, deductive and inductive, which will have great importance for the understanding of moral norms and their concrete applications:

5. Deductive, which is more easily linked with a classicist, static view of the world. In the area of methodology, the classicist deductive approach emphasizes norms as given, often expressed in propositional language, which are considered to be eternal, universal, immutable and unchanging, etc.

6. Inductive, which is more in line with a world-view of historical consciousness. The inductive approach emphasizes discovery of norms and values, an approach which stresses the concrete and particular, the individual and the personal, the contingent, as culturally and/or historically conditioned, and therefore, except in rather general abstract formulations, difficult to set out as detailed moral norms, binding for all times and in all cultures, situations, etc.

7. Import of the choice of one or the other of these basic approaches for how one will come to ethics.

F. Human Experience: Collection of Data and Modes of Interpretation

1. Experience refers not only the individual and his or her self-awareness and subjectivity, but also as a member of a number of different human communities. Thus, the locus for the experience sector is the individuals in relationship to themselves, to others, and to a multiple set of human communities (from the local to the global). We have to keep this understanding of the locus of experience in mind in order to avoid the trap of simple subjectivism and/or total relativism. It is important to understand what “Experience” in this sector involves. Every human person obviously has “experiences” and these can serve as an important moral source and resource. Experience also highlights more the affective, emotional, intuitive, and imaginative sides of our personhood, and these aspects are crucial for a holistic understanding of, and approach to, the moral life. Often the affective dimension can help us in terms of motivation for our moral living. It’s hard to lay down your life for a moral norm, but you may well do it for a friend, or even a cause in which you believe very much.

2. The affective dimension can also correct distortions and/or lacunae in the “reason” sector. As Charles Curran observes, “At times the affective can correct the errors of reason as illustrated by the change in U.S. public opinion on Vietnam precipitated by having the war in our living rooms for the first time in human history.” Curran, The Catholic Moral Tradition, p. 184.

3. Curran recognizes that the emotions and intuition can be wrong or erroneously interpreted, but he notes that the same has to be said for the moral “rational” side of our perception as well (cf. Curran, The Catholic Moral Tradition, p. 185.)

4. We also need to attend to incorporating as many people’s experiences as possible into our moral analysis. Often the experiences of any number of marginalized groups have been minimized or completely neglected, and even the experience of lay people in general has been not taken historically into very great consideration in moral theology in the past. We might want to ask ourselves explicitly, in reference to our own social location, just who are the marginalized and under-represented, if not explicitly oppressed. To give a hypothetical example, at the Democratic National Convention we might observe that the views of Republicans are “marginalized” to say the least. This does not mean that the delegates should necessarily include registered Republicans in their deliberations, but if the assembled body seeks to address the concerns of the whole polity of the nation, then it would be logical to conclude that a Republican point of view might legitimately inform and nuance the discussion to some extent. (This point is related to my 4^th C of Credibility in the section on the 6 C’s of moral discourse)

5. Methodologically speaking, this point is connected to the essence of the claim of experience (as individual and collective) to be a key source and resource for moral theology. We should note the insights produced by liberation theologians and others in this respect. Speaking of liberation theology’s method, Cristina Traina makes two helpful points in her recent book, Feminist Ethics and Natural Law: The End of the Anathemas (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1999):

a. “For liberation theology, questions of method (the approach to moral reason) and procedure (the institutional execution of method) are indivisible because the trustworthiness of moral reflection depends greatly on the social location of the author. This was true for Thomas too; that the general principles of the natural law were universally accessible did not imply that just anyone could reason well.” p. 118.

b. “Liberationists concur that ignorance and ill-chosen ends obstruct moral reasoning. ... The person most likely to see clearly the cause of injustice is not the comfortable ‘ivory tower’ academic (who benefits from the unconscious participation in moral vice), but the victim of injustice (who is likely to inquire more deeply into the causes of her own suffering) or her genuine advocate.” p. 119

6. Experience, though, needs to be accessed in some sort of systematic manner, in order to avoid complete relativism and/or subjectivism. Here the social sciences can play an important role. It is also important to keep in mind that the social sciences do not present us with raw data or simple facts, but that the various approaches and methodologies of the sciences themselves will help to raise and shape questions and answers as well. Science is never neutral in this process. For a brief article on this point see Erica Haimes, “What Can the Social Sciences Contribute to the Study of Ethics? Theoretical, Empirical and Substantive Considerations,” Bioethics 16 (April 2002): 89-113..

7. Moral importance of data: [Gustafson on Rahner]: "The moralist is no longer self-sufficient in knowing the subject matter that is analyzed from a moral point of view, but must rely on knowledge that comes from relevant scientific specialists [e.g. bioethics]. Rahner is not naive about reliance on specialists, but emphasizes the requirement for the moralist to take their conclusions into account. A moral conclusion might well be altered by the inclusion or omission of relevant data." [Gustafson, Theocentric Ethics, V. 2, p. 67].

8. [Quoting Rahner]: "`It is at least possible that the very `detail' of which the theologian is ignorant, or of which he has only a vague notion, might be the decisive factor in his case; it might be the very detail which would alter the whole conclusion.'" [Gustafson, p. 69; Rahner TI 9:225] [Cf. Theological Investigations 9: 205-24; 225-52]

G. Example of the medieval opinion about the sinfulness of sexual relations during a woman's menstrual period.

1. In the Old Testament this was considered a capital offense, though no reason is given, but it seemed to violate the purity laws (or taboos)

2. We might also observe that it is unlikely (though not impossible) for conception to occur, and so conclude that these relations were proscribed since they did not seem “open” to procreation. However, for the early and medieval theologians, none of these reasons was the ground of their theological objection. Early Christian writers reacted in various ways, according to John Noonan: "Some Christian writers repeated the condemnation without analysis (e.g., Chrysostom, On 1 Corinthians 7, PG 51; Didascalia 6,28). Philo's explanation that conception was impossible does not seem to have been used. The developed Christian view was to see the prohibition not as a mysterious and inexplicable ordinance of God, but as a protection for the child. St. Jerome wrote, `If a man copulates with a woman at that time, the fetuses conceived are said to carry the vice of the see, so that lepers and gargantuans are born from this conception, and the corrupted menses makes the foul bodies of either sex too small or too big' (Commentary on Ezechiel 6, 18 PL 25: 173). It was a common belief that children conceived in menstruation were born sickly, seropurulent, or dead (Pliny, Natural History 7.15.67). The protection of future life became the articulated basis for the prohibition of the act as serious sin." p. 85. [From John T. Noonan, Jr. Contraception: A History of Its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and Canonists. Enlarged edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965, 1986.] In this book Noonan takes great care to investigate the social context of the various positions in order to demonstrate that while the "teaching" against contraception may have been "constant" in the Church, the reasons given for that teaching and the concomitant issues involved have changed very much throughout the centuries. Thus, bad “biological” information (i.e., improper attention to human experience) furnished a “wrong” moral norm, and illustrate for us the necessity of proper attention to all of the human sciences in interpreting and utilizing the Human Experience source/resource.

H. Relationship between Human Experience and Normatively Human (the Rational Claim Axis): In much the same way as we observed the interplay between Scripture and Tradition along the “Sacred Claim” axis, there is a similar dynamic between human experience and normative claims which come out of that experience. We must start from experience; we cannot impose moral norms from the abstract in an a priori manner. But once we have established something as “normatively” human, then it functions on the lives of our human experience as a type of norma normans. For example, once we have articulated free expression as a fundamental human right, then we say that this should apply normatively to all peoples, in all places and cultures and in all times. Similarly, if we proscribe an activity or institution, such as slavery, as offensive to basic human dignity, then again we say this applies normatively to all peoples. To violate this normative claim would be to move against the basic claim of reason and rationality. Of course this has often been done throughout history, but we can see here how the “rational claim” axis may help correct these deficiencies.

VI. MEDIATION FACTORS OF ONE'S WORLD THEOLOGICAL VIEW

A. The key to understanding how one’s theological world-view functions is the point Charles Curran describes as one’s “stance”: “As the logical first step stance must be broad enough to encompass all reality but narrow enough to provide some critical understanding of how all aspects of reality fit together.” (“Stance,” Ch. 2 in his The Catholic Moral Tradition Today: A Synthesis): 30.

B. Curran himself proposes a five-fold Christian stance of creation, sin, incarnation, redemption, and resurrection destiny (cf. The Catholic Moral Tradition, pp. 33-34).

C. Building on whatever stance we use, implicitly or explicitly, we need to be aware of how modes of mediation of data from experience function on a number of different levels, such as the personal, collective, communal, and cultural, (which is a key aspect of humanity that is often overlooked or misunderstood by moralists).

D. Influence of Classical vs. Historical World-view on One's Theological Model and World-view

1. Especially important in the 20th Century, Post-Vatican II developments in moral theology. The relevance of this world-view is brought out well by Brian Johnstone in his article on physicalist and personalist paradigms, which we will discuss in greater detail when we treat the topic of the human person, but which I asked be read now so as to understand better the framework of contemporary moral theology.

2. Notion of Classicist (or classical) and Historical (or historicist) world-views was developed by Bernard Lonergan, and which sets out two extremes in reference to acceptance/non-acceptance of change, and then in between these two extremes describes two other major positions in the contemporary world:

3. "One may be named classicist, conservative, traditional; the other may be named modern, liberal, perhaps historicist (though that word unfortunately is very ambiguous). The differences between the two are enormous, for they differ in their apprehension of man, in their account of the good, and in the role they ascribe to the Church in the world. But these differences are not immediately theological. They are differences in horizon, in total mentality. For either side really to understand the other is a major achievement and, when such understanding is lacking, the interpretation of Scripture or of other theological sources is most likely to be at cross-purposes." Bernard Lonergan, S.J. "The Transition from a Classicist World-View to Historical-Mindedness," in Law for Liberty: The Role of Law in the Church Today, ed. James E. Biechler, (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1967): 127.

E. The Physicalist Paradigm, which comes out of the background of Neo-scholasticism and uses primarily a classicist and essentialist method which stresses faculties and finalities and in which the understanding of the natural law is often identified too simplistically with the "order of nature" rather than the "order of reason" (or stating that these two orders would be morally identical).

F. The Personalist Paradigm

1. Found in Janssens' classic article for the expression of the principle of totality in the personalist model, "Artificial Insemination: Ethical Considerations." Louvain Studies 5 (1980): 3-29. Also found more recently in Janssens' "Personalism in Moral Theology," in Moral Theology: Challenges for the Future. Essays in Honor of Richard A. McCormick, S.J., ed. Charles E. Curran, (New York: Paulist Press, 1990): 94-107.

2. Janssens' moral personalist model in which he claims eight fundamental dimensions for the human person: (1) subject; (2) embodied subject; (3) part of the material world; (4) inter-relational with other persons; (5) an interdependent social being; (6) historical; (7) equal but unique; (8) called to know and worship God.

3. How one conceives the moral universe, the natural law, personhood, etc., obviously will have important ramifications for how one understands the whole enterprise of the moral life.

G. This understanding is further mediated also by one's understanding of the key elements of an adequate contemporary theological anthropology,

1. Which is grounded in a realistic human anthropology, which in turn will be informed by the social sciences, especially psychology, sociology, and cultural anthropology. There is an important moral need for integration of these disciplines into Christian ethics. As Robin Gill notes, "If Western philosophy has tended to foster individualism--encouraging individuals to believe that each can work out afresh his or her own moral framework--sociology tends to pull in the opposite direction. In the process moral communities become an essential ingredient in understanding moral agents. Selfless care, although practised by individuals, is generated and nurtured by certain types of moral community." Robin Gill, Moral Communities, The Prideaux Lectures for 1992, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1992): 55.

2. Key aspects seen, re-visioned, re-shaped, etc. in this light: e.g., individual, communal, cultural, ecological. This latter is a more recent "discovery" that we are part of nature and therefore interdependent, and therefore we need to redo our theological bias of domination, and consider instead one of stewardship. (We will address this whole area in greater depth when we consider Christian anthropology).

3. Human reason, etc.

4. Law, normativity, etc. and their function in human society. E.g., the notion of universal human rights and the "globalization" of ethics

5. The world, which is basically good, positive, etc., yet still has elements which are evil, sinful, dangerous, impure, etc. (Ignoring or downplaying either dimension will distort our moral theology).

VII. THE HERMENEUTIC DIMENSION OF MEDIATION OF EXPERIENCE AND WORLD-VIEW

A. Recall that basically "hermeneutics" involves a "practical interpretation," i.e., an interpretation which is personal: this text has this meaning for me/us, etc. and which at the same time is practical, it leads me/us to apply this interpretation to our lives..

B. Such an interpretation in turn, according to James Gustafson, is usually structured around some central "organizing concept, idea, principle, analogy, metaphor, or symbol around which the [4] base points are organized." [Gustafson, Theocentric Ethics, v. 2, p. 143]. And I think that Curran’s notion of stance also speaks to this basic point.

C. According to Gustafson, "The [4] base points are (a) the interpretation of God and God's relations to the world and particularly to human beings, and the interpretation of God's purposes; (b) the interpretation of the meaning or significance of human experience--of historical life of the human community, of events and circumstances in which persons and collectivities act, and of nature and man's participation in it; (c) the interpretation of persons and collectivities as moral agents, and of their acts; and (d) the interpretation of how persons and collectivities ought to make moral choices and ought to judge their own acts, those of others, and states of affairs in the world. [Gustafson, Theocentric Ethics, v. 2, p. 143]

D. This basic process of judgment will also be conditioned by one's basic world-view (in Lonergan's sense), either classicist or historicist. We mentioned this notion above, and will discuss this again in greater detail when we consider the "paradigm shift" in moral theology, but for now it is sufficient to recall that these different world-views basically concern the notion of relative change and stability in the world, and especially how this relates to the knowledge of human nature, and the ability to predicate a universal natural law applicable to all men and women in every conceivable situation, irrespective of culture and/or circumstance and trans-historical, therefore valid for all times. The classicist or historicist world-view will manifest marked differences in apprehension over the meaning of human person/community, understanding of the "good,”and the role of the Christian community of the Church in the world. These differences will seriously condition the use and interpretation of the theological sources, such as Scripture, Tradition, teachings of the Magisterium, etc.

E. Related to the world-view in one’s judgment it is important to bear in mind the existence and role of one’s own cultural ethos, especially the notion of “bias” in the Longerganian sense. Mark O’Keefe describes Lonergan’s notion of bias as “the human tendency to eliminate from consideration data upon which understanding, judgment, and decision will be based because the data is perceived to be a potential threat to our well-being or accustomed ways of viewing the world.” Mark O’Keefe, What Are They Saying About Social Sin? (New York: Paulist Press, 1990): 77. It is important to bear in mind that every individual human and every human collectivity or community will have these biases. The key is to try to be aware of them and to take pains so that they will not improperly exclude information needed for a balanced judgment.

F. Though not using Lonergan’s vocabulary, but moving in a manner which is complementary to this basic insight, James Gustafson also highlights different basic types of judgment on the sources of theological ethics, and identifies four:

1. "(a) which sources are relevant, and why;

2. "(b) which sources are decisive when they conflict [or seem to conflict], and why;

3. "(c) what specific `content' is to be used from these // sources, and what is to be ignored or rejected, and why; and

4. "(d) how this content is to be interpreted, and why." [Gustafson, Theocentric Ethics, v. 2, pp. 143-144]

5. I would add a fifth question, namely what is re-interpreted and why.

G. Potential weakness of an overly strong "organizing" concept which may be too restrictive or narrow and which may not adequately reflect the range of diversity of human moral experience, or to allow each and every voice in the various languages to be raised and heard, and/or may skew some of the information. Thus, the difference between an "organizing" concept and a "domineering" or "dominating" concept. For example, in sexual ethics, consider the following from Paul M. Quay who spoke of "each single act of coition is a natural sign of the full, mutual procreative love of two partners, and that contraception substitutes a sign of ‘monstrous selfishness’. The woman who uses a diaphragm has closed herself to her husband. She has accepted his affection but not his substance. She permits him entrance but does not suffer him to be master'. The sign and symbol of wifely submission, of patriarchal authority, is made over covertly to serve the purposes of a weakly uxorious male and a domineeringly feminist wife....Sometimes the man will use a condom for the same reasons; sometimes for more characteristically masculine reasons of selfishness. In either even he no longer dominates his wife as person, he does not permit his activity to penetrate her; he takes no responsibility for her. Her helplessness is deceptive--if she is not armored, he is without efficacy. He worships her with his body--but not enough to share with her his substance." [From Quay's "Contraception and Conjugal Love." Theological Studies 22 (1961): 35.

H. How one interprets reason and experience and their interplay will have significant ramifications for subsequent reflection on a wide variety of moral concepts such as moral agency, moral intention, moral norms, and even the proper roles of the Magisterium in moral discourse. For a helpful recent article that explores this theme in reference to two contemporary schools of moral theology see Todd A. Salzman, “The Basic Goods Theory and Revisionism: A Methodological Comparison on the Use of Reason and Experience as Sources of Moral Knowledge,” The Heythrop Journal 42 (October 2001): 423-450. Salzman compares and contrasts Grisez–Finnis “Basic Goods Theory” with contemporary revisionists such as Fuchs, giving a good analysis of some of the methodological presuppositions of the Grisex-Finnis theory which are difficult to support from sound epistemological perspectives. Salzman concludes that the that the Grisez-Finnis Basic Goods Theory “attributes the ultimate authority to interpret and explain reason and experience and their relevance in discerning moral truth to the magisterium, [while] revisionism attributes certain autonomy to these sources of moral knowledge, regardless of whether or not the magisterium recognizes or acknowledges their contributions to the discernment process” and notes that while the Grisez–Finnis approach “may be commendable from a certain ecclesiological perspective, such deference may be at the expense of moral truth from an ethical perspective. Past errors in Catholic moral doctrine on issues such as slavery, usury and religious freedom support a revision interpretation of the role and function of reason and experience in ethical method. Such errors warrant caution in positing absolute specific norms in light of conflicting arguments derived from reason and human experience.” p. 446.

VIII. MODES OF MORAL DISCOURSE

A. Need to be attentive to how our moral discourse is basically construed and organized. E.g., basic ethical theories, such as deontology and teleology, as well as the understanding of the purpose of moral discourse and ethics as such. Also instrumental here is one’s world-view, e.g., classicist, historical, devolutionary, evolutionary, revolutionary, etc.

B. Varieties of moral discourse (ala Gustafson). Cf. James M. Gustafson, Varieties of Moral Discourse: Prophetic, Narrative, Ethical, and Policy, The Strob Lectures, (Grand Rapids: Calvin College and Seminary, 1988). Gustafson outlines four types of moral discourse: prophetic, narrative, ethical, and policy, and discusses the strengths and weaknesses of each. His basic point is that no one mode of discourse is sufficient for ethics, and that all four have to be employed.

C. Prophetic Discourse

1. Basic feature of passionate "indictment"

a. First, they usually, though not always, address what the prophet perceives to be the root of religious, moral, or social waywardness, not specific instances in which certain policies are judged to be inadequate or wrong.

b. "Detailed policy recommendations, matters of strategy and tactics are seldom the focus of a prophet's intentions." (Gustafson, Varieties of Moral Discourse, p. 8).

c. "The second feature of prophetic indictments that I want to note is the language and symbols that are used to make it. In the biblical materials we the language of harlotry, or infidelity. This is passionate language. The prophets in the Scriptures did not establish their indictments on the basis of statistical analyses; they did not use moral arguments of a philosophically rigorous sort. They used language, metaphors, and symbols that are directed to the `heart' as well as to the `head'." (Gustafson, Varieties of Moral Discourse, p. 11).

2. Point or goal of prophetic moral discourse: "... it is used to move us, to stir us to a deeper moral concern and to action. The more rational and rigorous discourse of ethics does not communicate the sense of urgency that prophetic discourse does." (Gustafson, Varieties of Moral Discourse, p. 12).

3. Utopian or eschatological ideal

a. "The second aspect of prophetic discourse (indictment being the first) is utopian. It portrays an alluring vision of the future, of possibilities for life in the world in which the forms of strife and suffering we all experience are overcome." (Gustafson, Varieties of Moral Discourse, p. 13).

b. "The utopian allure is, we are told over and over, not only important but necessary. It provides hope in the midst of despair; it lifts the eyes and the aspirations beyond what hard realists see as possible to the possibilities that lie beyond. For Christian theology and ethics, it is grounded in deep theological convictions: the breaking of the bondage of death in the accounts of Jesus' resurrection, the assurance of the coming Kingdom of God in which peace and justice will reign forever." (Gustafson, Varieties of Moral Discourse, p. 14).

4. Yet, we must note the insufficiency of prophetic discourse alone, as there is a legitimate need for both for moral theory, and especially moral norms and its concomitant casuistry.

D. Narrative Discourse

1. The functional roles of narrative discourse in the moral agent and moral community. "Narratives function to sustain the particular moral identity of a religious (or secular) community by rehearsing its history and traditional meanings, as these are portrayed in Scripture and other sources. Narratives shape and sustain the ethos of the community. Through our participation in such a community, // the narratives also function to give shape to our moral characters, which in turn deeply affect the way we interpret or construe the world and events and thus affect what we determine to be appropriate action as members of the community. Narratives function to sustain and confirm the religious and moral identity of the Christian community, and evoke and sustain the faithfulness of its members to Jesus Christ." (Gustafson, Varieties of Moral Discourse, pp. 19-20).

2. Narratives as critical moral discourse: Here we do not find the moral calculus of casuistry. "Narratives as response to moral inquiries about circumstances of quandary do not provide single, clear, and argued answers.” Rather, what H. Richard Niebuhr might call "revealed reality": "Rather they can provide nuanced and subtle illumination both of what is at stake and of what conduct might be most appropriate. Ethical casuistic argument brings choice to a focus by distinctions and arguments; narrative evokes the imagination, stimulates our moral sensibilities and affections. Its conclusion is not as clearly decisive, but it enlarges one's vision of what is going on; one acts in its `light' more than in conformity to it--as one does to a casuistic moral argument." (Gustafson, Varieties of Moral Discourse, p. 21).

3. Methodology of narrative discourse: "It often assumes an analogy between the story or parable and the circumstances out of which the question comes. Thus, `Go and do likewise'." (Gustafson, Varieties of Moral Discourse, p. 21). This bears a resemblance to Sittler's notion of the shape of the engendering deed, e.g., the foot-washing commandment in John 13 is not about pedicures. (Spohn's example)

4. Insufficiency of narrative discourse alone: While it is true as Christians we are a story-formed people, we in fact characters in many stories and in a pluralistic society we need to both recognize and live according to that complex reality.

a. "Symbolic prophetic indictments need to be checked against facts and figures and political analysis. Perceptive intuitions informed by parables need to be checked against more rational analysis. And we all belong to several communities. To live by the story of only one might impede our capacities to communicate with those with whom we share moral responsibilities who are informed by different stories and different communities. [Implied critique of Stanley Hauerwas]

b. "And our individual moral integrity is shaped in relation to more than the story of the Christian community; it is shaped by our social backgrounds, our roles in society, and other things." (Gustafson, Varieties of Moral Discourse, p. 26).

E. Ethical Discourse

1. There is no substitute for careful and close ethical reasoning which takes into account all of the morally relevant features and concomitant moral principles which should inform each aspect of our evaluation of our moral landscape. This is a landscaped inhabited by peoples of many different faiths, non-faiths, cultures, etc., and ethics has traditionally played an important role in bridging what otherwise could be huge chasms

2. Gustafston raises the issue of the proprium of Christian ethics: "Is Christian ethics so specifically Christian that at least aspects of Christian morality are obligatory only for Christians? Example: love of enemies." (Gustafson, Varieties of Moral Discourse, p. 34)

3. "If there is a common basis, should that not be supported by arguments and groundings that all human beings can share, rather than those that make particular appeals to the Bible, to Christian theological themes, and to the faith of Christians?" (Gustafson, Varieties of Moral Discourse, p. 34).

4. Christians must take "ethical" discourse seriously, and therefore also moral philosophy.

5. Insufficiency of ethical discourse alone: "It does not have the capacities that prophetic discourse has vividly to point to some devil, some root of evil that must be extricated, to some deep loyalties and beliefs that systematically distort human life and human community. Nor does its vocabulary move persons with a sense of urgency. Ethical discourse cannot shape the ethos of a community in the way that narratives // can, in part because its language and symbols are abstract and do not have the evocative power to sustain and cultivate the nourishing common memories of a community. Its casuistic forms aid precision, but they can excessively delimit what ought to be taken into account in a good moral choice. A narrative, at the point of a choice, might help persons see themselves and circumstances in a broader context of time and history; it might enlarge the perception and imagination so that features are included that the concepts and procedures of casuistry conceal." (Gustafson, Varieties of Moral Discourse, pp. 42-43).

F. Policy Discourse

1. Regrettably this mode of discourse is often overlooked, or given very short shrift by Christian ethicians. Gustafson notes two important distinguishing features: "First, in its most important form it is conducted not by external observers, but by the persons who have responsibility to make choices and to carry out the actions that are required by the choices. In other words, policy discourse is discourse by the agents who have accountability for the following actions and outcomes--not primarily by philosophers, theologians, political scientists, and economists who have at least one of their feet outside the arena of primary accountability." (Gustafson, Varieties of Moral Discourse, p. 46). "The second feature is the particularity of conditions within which policy is developed." (Gustafson, Varieties of Moral Discourse, p. 46). "These conditions both limit the possibilities of action and enable them." (Gustafson, Varieties of Moral Discourse, p. 47).

2. Methodology of policy discourse: "The first question of the policymaker is likely to be `What is going on?' and not `What ought we to do?'" (Gustafson, Varieties of Moral Discourse, p. 47). "What is desirable is always related to what is possible; it is always under the constraints of the possible. And a critical factor of judgment is precisely what is possible." (Gustafson, Varieties of Moral Discourse, p. 47).

3. Strengths of policy discourse: "An ethical argument, per se, would have been insufficient. The ethical had to give direction to the policy but per se could not determine the policy. Our recommendations had to be spelled out not merely in terms of general concepts or general aims; they had to be quite specific in terms of reasonably accurate estimates and assessments of `what was going on'." (Gustafson, Varieties of Moral Discourse, p. 50). "Policy discourse requires more than the concepts and procedures of ethical discourse." (Gustafson, Varieties of Moral Discourse, p. 50).

4. Insufficiencies of policy discourse: "But to limit moral discourse to policy discourse would be a mistake. Policy discourse necessarily works within limited visions, limited frames of reference. It accepts certain conditions which from prophetic and ethical perspectives could themselves be judged morally wrong, or at least morally inadequate." (Gustafson, Varieties of Moral Discourse, p. 51).

G. Conclusion: There is an absolute necessity of policy discourse (cf. the interplay with the first five of the 6 "C's”): "Churches and Christians who aspire to affect the course of events with moral aims and principles need to be able to participate in policy discourse. It is not that prophets are powerless, but that their power is different from that of persons whose vocations and roles affect incremental, but important, changes in the course of events and states of affairs." (Gustafson, Varieties of Moral Discourse, p. 52). I [JTB] would add that we need to develop a sensitivity or awareness for the modes and varieties of moral discourse at work in a given author, issue, approach, etc. Work so as to integrate better this awareness and also the strengths of the four varieties of moral discourse. In this context attention to the Six “C's” of Christian moral discourse will be helpful.

IX. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF FUNDAMENTAL MORAL THEOLOGY

A. Repetition of General Thesis on History in Reference to Moral Theology: Moral theology did not spring full-blown from the heads of the apostles, or any other figure since. Rather, it developed in relation, or resistance, to events, movements, currents, pastoral needs, etc. throughout history. Inasmuch as moral theology developed over time in relation to both concrete ethical issues and sustained rational reflection on the undergirding theology behind the principles that were, and are, used to respond to these issues we must recognize that our moral doctrine itself develops over time. As James Keenan has recently observed, “History leads us therefore to understand that moral theology must not only develop but also be sensible to the fundamental fact that norms need to be congruent with human maturation. Indeed, history affects the proprium of moral theology.” [James Keenan, S.J. “Moral Theology and History” Theological Studies 62 (March 2001): 93]. At the same time we should not historically naive and therefore we need to recognize that not every “development” has been salutary. Certainly some of these developments have led to unfortunate and improper theological understandings and questionable "moral" practices, even as we would judge that overall the general development is basically good, biblically informed, and led by the Spirit. The study of the history of moral theology is helpful also for a sense of perspective, and to see beyond the immediacy of any particular moment. The study of the history of moral theology is helpful also for a sense of perspective, and to see beyond the immediacy of any particular moment. A good study of history can also free us from the confines of our more recent history. As Keenan observes, “Historical investigation has served as a corrective. It has effectively repudiated the manualists’ general claims regarding the unchangeablity of moral truth.” (Keenan, “Moral Theology and History, p. 93.).

B. Bibliographical Footnote: I’ll be using Mahoney primarily in this course, but see below for some other helpful titles.

1. John Mahoney, S.J. The Making of Moral Theology: A Study of the Roman Catholic Tradition. The Martin D'Arcy Memorial Lectures, 1981-2. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.

a. Treats the development of moral theology from a thematic perspective. Is to be read by all in its entirety as a course core text.

2. Bernard Häring, C.Ss.R. "How Free and Creative Was and Is Moral Theology?" Chapter Two in Free and Faithful in Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and Laity: Volume 1, General Moral Theology, 28-58. Slough: St. Paul Publications, 1978.

a. Also found in Ronald Hamel and Kenneth Himes, Introduction to Christian Ethics: A Reader. New York: Paulist Press, 1989. An anthology of generally excellent articles arranged topically on the major themes of fundamental moral theology. Well-known Catholic and Protestant authors are represented, though mainly Anglophone from the North Atlantic region. The selection by Häring gives a good basic overview of the history of moral theology in the light of Häring's organizing themes of creative freedom and fidelity.

3. Richard A. McCormick, S.J. "Moral Theology 1940-1989: An Overview." Theological Studies 50 (1989): 3-24.

a. Presents a thematic overview of the last fifty years of moral theology, especially as its development was reflected in various articles published in Theological Studies.

4. See McCormick's collected Notes on Moral Theology, published annually in Theological Studies from 1965-1984, collected and published as two volumes: Notes on Moral Theology: 1965 through 1980. Boston: University Press of America, 1981, and Notes on Moral Theology: 1981 through 1984. Boston: University Press of America, 1984.

5. Continue to "track" the March issue of Theological Studies.

6. John A. Gallagher, Time Past, Time Future: An Historical Study of Catholic Moral Theology. New York: Paulist Press, 1990.

a. Treats particularly the history of moral theology as it moved from the neo-Scholasticism and neo-Thomism of the manualist tradition through Conciliar and post-Conciliar developments.

b. Title taken from a line from T.S. Elliot's "Four Quartets" (Burnt Norton): "Time present and time past are both perhaps present in time future and time future contained in time past."

7. Raphael Gallagher, C.Ss.R. "Fundamental Moral Theology 1975-1979: A bulletin-analysis of some significant writings examined from a methodological stance." Studia Moralia 18 (1980): 147-192.

a. Looks at recent moral syntheses in terms of four basic and dominant methodologies for formulating moral theology, based on: 1) a consciously constructed system of adequately formulated material norms as the first and principle step; 2) an explicitly articulated system of a coherent Christian ethos; 3) giving coherence and continuity to moral analysis through a systematic reflection on morally relevant experiences; 4) searching for the historical continuity with past forms and placing a statement of contemporary moral theology in the context of present historical and cultural realities.

b. Quite well-done, though, with a very few exceptions (e.g. Stanley Hauerwas), does not treat Protestants.

X. EARLY STAGES OF MORAL THEOLOGY

A. Not a branch of theologia moralis really until the 16th century. Early development of the material would be tied generally with the notion of orthopraxis, i.e., the right living of the community of Christian disciples. A bit pious, but the biblical expression, "by their love for one another, they shall know they are Christians," is accurate of the early "moral theology" of the Church. Certainly we can read much of the Pauline literature in this light: i.e., what does our identity as followers of Jesus Christ require of us in the concrete? Thus, it would be correct to say that the early emphasis of moral theology fell in the area of Christian spirituality as lived in the concrete.

B. Development of a theology of sin and its relation to the development of moral theology. Here Mahoney's first chapter is key. He notes in particular three negative aspects of the theological heritage of the Penitentials and the whole of moral theology up to Vatican II: "a preoccupation with sin; a concentration on the individual; and an obsession with law." [Mahoney, Making, p. 27]. However, don't vilify the Penitentials; they had many positive aspects, and represented in particular an important practical reflection on the notion of moral responsibility and factors which would increase or decrease that responsibility, e.g., "ignorance, inadvertence, carelessness, and contempt." [Mahoney, Making, p. 8.], plus "circumstances" and "intention." Eventually this will be developed into a fairly complex casuistry, but at the outset it is good to recall the "catechism" teaching on sin and moral responsibility.

C. Three requirements for "serious sin"

1. Serious (or grave) matter

2. Sufficient knowledge and reflection

3. Sufficient consent (freedom)

D. Three aspects for evaluation of moral acts (the so-called fontes moralitatis or “fonts of morality”)

1. The moral nature of the action in itself

2. Circumstances impinging on the action (cf. ST I-II, q. 18, aa. 10-11)

3. Intention of the agent

4. We will discuss these, as well as the concept of intrinsece malum in se, in much greater detail throughout the course.

XI. THE AUGUSTINIAN LEGACY FOR MANUAL THEOLOGY

A. See Mahoney's Chapter 2, and we will return to these themes throughout the course. It is important to read Augustine also in an historical mode, and not deify nor vilify him in the abstract.

B. Historical currents of Manichaeism, Neo-platonism, and Stoicism

C. Augustine's Theology of Sin, and subsequent development of distinction between mortal and venial sins. This raises, however, the recurring question of whether the notion of the biblical voice is that which functions as the norma normans or not. Augustine's moral pessimism can be seen in his development of the notion of original sin, as Mahoney observes: "For Augustine that original sin of Adam disrupted for all human time the divine order of things,..." [Mahoney, p. 46].

D. Massa damnata: "The melancholy consequence of that original sin is that human nature is vitiated, and lust and ignorance are its lot, to such an extent that it lacks even the ability to appreciate the full seriousness of that first wicked act of disobedience which resulted in the whole human race, which had its roots poisoned in Adam, being a `condemned throng', a massa damnata." [Mahoney, p. 46.]

E. Augustine's theology of grace and its relation to the moral life: Sanctifying and actual grace, and the latter would seem to suggest that we are always assisted to do the right and moral thing, no matter how difficult.

F. Yet, keep in mind another ancient maxim: `Deus impossibilia non iubet' ("God does not command of man things which are impossible to do"): "The principle that God asks of no one what is impossible but that his grace is always available thus was confirmed as a central moral and pastoral principle in moral theology in general and in the Church's moral teaching." [Mahoney, p. 53.] ..."... applied in 1930 by Pope Pius XI, in his encyclical on marriage [Casti connubii], as a theological and pastoral comment on his condemnation of the practice of contraception." [Mahoney, p. 53.]. In short, if something is virtually “impossible” it is highly doubtful that it is really being commanded by God.

G. Mahoney’s 3 reflections on the maxim Deus impossibilia non iubet (cf. Mahoney, pp. 55-57)

1. “The first is to ask whether the principle, as understood by Augustine, is unduly separatist, bot in its consideration of man in himself and in its consideration of man within society.” p. 55

2. (Due to Augustine’s Neo-platonist background [i.e., how his philosophical “organizing metaphor” shapes his theological world view])

3. “For him, grace is almost exclusively isolated in the will of man, in its attempts to exercise a spiritual mastery over the whole self.” p. 55.

4. Mahoney notes that this view “has result for the Church in an impoverished view of grace which locates it for all practical purposes in the human will, as enabling the individual through sheer supercharged will-power to overcome all other personal and social deficiencies in his attempt to comply with God’s commands. “Such a separatist view of grace, remote from the totality of the person and abstracting from other resources, or their lack, can easily sound like maintaining that a sufficiently high grade of petrol in a car will substitute for a faulty clutch of even for a lack of viable roads.” p. p. 55. [or to use a more home-spun metaphor, it gives us a Catholic sense of “guilt” as expressed in Garrison Keillor’s parish of “Our Lady of Perpetual Responsibility”] So Mahoney argues for the expansion of the notion of grace, especially into the social dimension. (Cf. p. 56)

5. “A second reflection on the Augustinian maxim that God does not command the impossible is to do with the theology underlying this principle, and with noting that it is primarily a statement God, and not about man’s moral abilities.” p. 56.

6. [Thus, if we find something to be virtually impossible we should be virtually certain that God has not commanded it!] “The harder thing isn’t the better thing, it’s just harder.”

7. “The third reflection which the principle that God does not command the impossible evokes is that, from the beginning to end of the history of the origin and application of this principle, it appears presumed that we always know exactly what God’s commands are.” (Mahoney, p. 57.)

8. [This, and the two preceding “reflections” point to many and varied problems and problematic implications, not the least of which is voluntarism]

H. Augustine's theology of sexuality (which I treat in greater detail in the course on sexual ethics)

1. One representative quote, though, speaking about Casti connubii:

2. “In so faithfully following Augustine in logic, sentiment, and even tone of language, this twentieth-century Church teaching on Christian marriage [Casti connubii] may be seen as the outstanding modern instance in recent moral theology of the legacy of Augustine. For him, sexuality was exercised either for children [i.e, procreative intent] or for lust.” (Mahoney, p. 60).

XII. THE INFLUENCE OF NOMINALISM

A. Basic philosophical position: "According to nominalism, only individual realities exist. They are unique in their singular existence. Universals are simply convenient labels, having no reality in themselves and only nominal value. Within the moral domain, reality lies in the individual decision of the free will." Servais Pinckaers, O.P., The Sources of Christian Ethics, trans. Sr. Mary Thomas Noble, O.P., (Washington, D.C.: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1995): 242.

B. Understanding of God and relation to the human moral life

1. "Ockham contrasted human freedom with the freedom of God. His thought was dominated by the idea of the divine omnipotence, which enabled him to carry his idea of freedom to an absolute degree. For him, the divine will was totally free; it governed moral law itself and all the laws of creation. What God willed was necessarily just and good precisely because he willed it. Law, and all moral value or qualification, flowed from his will." (Pinckaers, p. 246.)

2. As a corrective to this view keep in mind Thomas Aquinas’ teaching on God as the summum bonum (Supreme Good) of human life. Thus, for Thomas true human flourishing and “following God’s will” will coincide, as Thomas expressed in the Summa contra gentiles, namely that “We do not offend God except by doing something contrary to our own good.” (Summa contra gentiles 3, ch. 122)

3. Also very helpful here is Fuchs’ article, "Our Image of God and the Morality of Innerworldly Behavior" Ch. 3 in his Christian Morality: The Word Became Flesh (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press; Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1987).

C. Moral obligation and its relation to voluntarism

1. "Thus divine and human freedom were conceived as two absolutes, but with this difference: God was omnipotent in regard to his creatures could, consequently, impose his will upon us." (Pinckaers, p. 247).

2. Understood in general as placing the emphasis on morality as the fulfilling of God's will and/or commandments which God "legislates" for God's creatures.

D. Voluntarism and the Notion of Moral Goodness/Rightness

1. Issue arises of relation of God's will to moral goodness, i.e., is something "good" only because God so wills it and God could will otherwise, or is something good in itself, which even God could not change without destroying God's own nature?

2. Problematic aspect of voluntarism is understanding morality and moral goodness in this first sense, i.e., something is good only because God so wills it, and the moral response is to obey this divine "law," moral goodness then being predicated on simple obedience. Thus, law becomes the ultimate and supreme norm of the moral rightness of human action.

E. Connection to the growth of casuistry

1. "Human action then would be made up of a succession of free decisions or independent acts--cases of conscience as they would later be called--having only superficial relation to one another. Each would have to be studied in isolation. Like each individual person, each act became a kind of absolute, like a small island." (Pinckaers, p. 244).

2. This portrait is a bit of an oversimplification and even a caricature of casuistry!

3. Nevertheless, Pinckaers is correct in pointing out that the emphasis on casuistry did seem to have as a negative counter-effect a de-emphasis on the theology of virtues and the moral development of the Christian character.

F. Distortion of Natural Law in Nominalism

1. "Moral obligation was determined and refined by law. Law therefore confronted human freedom in the form of obligations issuing from the divine will and, to some extent, assumed the role of this will." (Pinckaers, p. 248).

2. "Natural law was no longer based, for him, on human nature and its inclinations, which reason could reveal. It consisted rather in the authority of right reason presenting directly to the human will the orders and obligations that emanated from the divine will, without there being any need whatsoever to justify them, since the justification of law could be found only in the divine will itself." (Pinckaers, p. 249).

XIII. DEVELOPMENT OF MANUALIST MORAL THEOLOGY

A. Scholastic framework of four basic “treatises”

1. Law

2. Conscience

3. Human acts (i.e., actus humanus)

4. Sins

B. Very strong over-arching legal model

1. Strong relation to canon law and proper administration of the sacraments

2. Practical moral reasoning expressed in casuistry

C. Impact of the Protestant Reformation and the Council of Trent

1. Look at some of the principal theological assertions of the Protestant Reformers and note how they were "answered" in Catholic theology

a. Rejection of Tradition and emphasis on sola scriptura

b. Rejection of the natural law

c. Emphasis on simul iustus et peccator

d. Rejection of the ministerial priesthood and the celebration of certain sacraments, especially Penance

2. Theological response of Trent

a. See in Mahoney (p. 23) the good excerpt from Trent, DS 1680-81 on need to confess sins accurately according to species and number, taking into consideration circumstances and other mitigating factors as well.

b. Reiteration of the "Easter Duty"

c. Development of seminaries and concomitantly the manualist tradition

D. Concerns and Themes Manualist Moral Theology Methodology

1. Model of the Church as Perfect Society

a. I.e., that the Church should have all the basic institutions and structures of a civil society, (such as law, governmental structures, etc.), and in that sense be “perfect” (understand as being “complete” and NOT as being without fault or blemish!)

b. Often associated with Robert Bellarmine

c. Historically tied to the Pope as a temporal ruler, and which historically came to a factual end with the Italian Risorgimento in 1870 during the pontificate of Pius IX, but which still lingers on in many places and many ways.

d. Theologically seen best as the Institutional Model of the Church

e. See Avery Dulles' Book, Models of the Church.

(1) Important to read his critique of the institutional model as the sole model.

(2) Recognize that since Vatican II we have been experiencing an ecclesial paradigm shift. Plus the "pendulum factor" in ethics.

2. Theological anthropology

a. Nature and Supernatural

b. Grace

(1) Sanctifying

(2) Actual

(3) Quantitative understanding of grace

(a) Metaphor of gasoline and a gas tank

(b) Led to over-emphasis on individual pious works to "merit" grace

c. Mahoney's Chapter 3 will be helpful here.

3. Basic understanding of the discipline of moral theology as such

a. In the 16th and 17th centuries moral theology began to develop as a discipline distinct and separate from dogmatic theology

(1) "The development of moral theology as a separate discipline distinct from dogmatic theology began in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the development of extended commentaries on the Secunda Pars of the Summa Theologiae such as those of Thomas de Vio (d. 1534), Francis de Vitoria (d. 1546), and Francis Suarez (d. 1617)." [Mark O'Keefe, OSB, "Catholic Moral Theology and Christian Spirituality." New Theology Review 7 (1994): 63.]

(2) Further elaboration and distinction with the development of moral manuals in the Post-Reformation seminary system, the Institutiones theologiae moralis.

E. Implications of the Historical Split between Moral Theology and the Rest of Theology (and Spirituality): "The moral theology of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, manifested not merely a process of developing theological specialization but a bifurcation in the inherent relationship of the moral and spiritual dimensions of Christian living. Catholic moral theology, under the influence of the philosophy of nominalism, gradually became focused on acts, rules, and casuistry, losing the broader Thomistic emphasis on virtues in the context of a striving to attain the ultimate end. Discussion of virtue was reduced almost to providing an organizing structure for discussing the sinful acts that `opposed' particular virtues. Catholic moral theology--all the way up to the manuals of moral theology in use before the Second Vatican Council--remained tied to and more akin with emphases in canon law than to dogmatic theology and spirituality." [O'Keefe, "Catholic Moral Theology and Christian Spirituality, p. 63]

F. Casuistry and the Traditional Moral Manuals

1. Understanding of relation between moral theology and canon law

2. Administration of the sacraments

3. Development of high casuistry

4. Examples of casuistic and moral manuals as vademecums

a. Heribert Jone, O.F.M., Cap. Moral Theology. Englished [sic] and adapted to the laws and customs of the United States of America by Rev. Urban Adelman, O.F.M. Cap. Westminster: The Newman Press, 1957, 1963.

(1) Translated into numerous languages.

(2) Figured in Graham Greene's Monsignor Quixote.

b. Antonio Arregui, S.J. Summarium Theologiae Moralis. Ad recentem codicem iuris canonici accommodatum. Editio tertia decima iuxta recentissimas declarationes Pontificiae Commissionis ad Codicis canones authentice interpretandos. Westminister MD: The Newman Bookshop, 1944.

(1) Arregui occupied the moral chair at the University of Deusto in Bilbao (1904-1915; 1918-1919). Succeeded by Marcelino Zalba, S.J. (1941-1962), who later went on to the Gregorian in Rome.

(2) Arregui's well-known moral compendium could serve as a good example of the popularity of this sort of moral manual: it went through 14 editions by the time of his death in 1942, and a further ten posthumously (revised by Zalba).

5. Some cases of course were extremely profound and important, while others strike us now as a bit frivolous, such as Stanislaus Woywood's chapter on "False Teeth and Holy Communion." (cf. his The Casuist: A Collection of Cases in Moral and Pastoral Theology. Vol. 3. New York: Joseph F. Wagner; London: B. Herder, 1910, 1925.

G. Some Pre-Vatican II Definitions and Descriptions of Moral Theology

1. Rev. Dublanchy, Dictionnaire de théologie catholique. Vol. 10. Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1929.

a. "Moral theology is that part of theology which, in the light of revealed principles, treats of human acts from the point of view of their direction toward ultimate supernatural ends, or, according to the definition that one can deduce from Saint Thomas, it is the part of theology that treats of human acts, Secundum quod per eos ordinatur homo ad perfectam Dei contemplationem, in qua aeterna beatitudo constitit (Summa theol. Ia, q. I, ad. 4)'. Or again, it has as its object `the study of human acts considered according to their relationship of propriety or impropriety with the ultimate supernatural end willed by God as obligatory for all men, whether in their individual lives or in their social life'."

2. Msgr. Giuseppe Graneris. "Moral Theology." In Dictionary of Moral Theology. Compiled and edited by Francesco Cardinal Roberti and Msgr. Pietro Palazzini. Translated from the Second Italian Edition Under the Direction of Henry J. Yannone. London: Burns & Oates, 1962.

a. "The part of theology which deals with human actions and studies the rules of human conduct in their relationship to the principles of revelation is called moral theology. Christian ethics does not eliminate, but embraces and perfects, natural ethics. For this reason, moral theologians include in their treatises the norms of the natural law. The field of moral theology embraces natural and supernatural ethics. It is the function of moral theology to dictate norms for all human activities in order that they may conform to the principles of reason and Christian revelation." p. 1219.

H. Genre of the Moral Manual in Particular

1. Organization and approach: organized either around the Ten Commandments, or a consideration of human nature and the necessary virtues, contrasted with the sinful vices.

2. Further Examples

a. Edwin F. Healy, S.J. Moral Guidance. Revised by James F. Meara, S.J. Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1942, 1960.

(1) Revised edition of Healy's 1942 moral manual.

(2) Healy taught at the Gregorian.

b. Msgr. Antonio Lanza and Msgr. Pietro (now Cardinal) Palazzini. Principles of Moral Theology, Vol. 1, General Moral Theology. Translated by W.J. Collins, M.M. Boston: Daughters of St. Paul, 1961.

c. Henry Davis, S.J. (abundant copies in the GTU library).

I. Legalistic Model of Pre-Vatican II Manualist Moral Theology

1. [Need to explain all the following terms, and note that this material will come up again in the treatment of moral norms and the natural law.]

2. "All agree that the manuals of Catholic moral theology which existed until the time of the Second Vatican Council employed the legal model as primary. According to the manuals of moral theology the proximate, subjective, and intrinsic norm of moral action is conscience. Conscience is the dictate of moral reason about the morality of an act. The remote, objective, and extrinsic norm of moral action is law. The function of conscience is thus to obey the law.

3. "Law is either divine law or human law.

a. "Divine law is twofold. First, the laws which // necessarily follow from God as the author and creator of nature involve the eternal law, which is the order or plan existing in the mind of God, and the natural law, which is the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature. Second, divine positive law comes from the free determination of God as the author of revelation."

b. Raises again the question of the relation of God to goodness: Is something good in itself (which God recognizes), or is something good because God says so?

c. Problematic with this second view

(1) Connection with moral voluntarism

(2) Often pastorally associated with scruples.

d. It might be helpful in this context to recall the point Thomas Aquinas made about “offending” God: “We do not offend God except by doing something contrary to our own good.” (Summa contra gentiles 3, ch. 122)

e. "Human law has human beings as its author and can be either church or civil law.

f. "Note that all law shares in the eternal law of God and that human law must always be seen in the relationship to and subordinate to the natural law and the eternal law.

4. "Thus the manuals of moral theology view the moral life as conscience obeying the various laws." [Charles Curran, Tensions in Moral Theology, pp. 96-97].

J. Impact of the Pre-Vatican Moral Manual on Moral Theology as a whole.

1. Presupposition of the classicist mentality

a. A bit later on we will discuss the classicist model and the paradigm shift to a more historical model (seen in Brian Johnstone's article).

b. Work of Lonergan, summarized in Richard Gula’s Reason Informed by Faith (see especially Gula's chart).

2. Homogeneous approach

a. "The traditional approach to moral theology was the classical world view approach. ... Human nature is conceived as static and unchanging. It is seen as a norm which traverses time and culture. Culture and actions of any age may be judged according to that unchanging nature. Moral absolutes of a very specific nature can very easily be derived from such a firm unchanging base." [Patrick Boyle, Parvitas Materiae in Sexto in Contemporary Catholic Thought, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1987): 46.

b. Thus, for example, in terms of sexual ethics, "Those who advocated this approach believed that the norm for sexual right or wrong could be known through the physical/biological nature." [Boyle, Parvitas, p. 46.

3. Neo-scholastic theology as "domineering" paradigm

4. Presentation of most of the major premises, theological anthropology, etc.

a. Expressed in propositional formulations

b. Largely taken for granted by men of sound mind and good will

5. Dissonant voices tended to be considered only to the point where they could be refuted, and then usually in a rather summary fashion. Thus, most Protestant ethicians, for example, dismissed out of hand.

6. Overall result: moral theology by definition (proposition) and and pastoral application by case (casuistry).

7. Casuistry sought to discover the morally relevant features and their relative moral weight, and disregard the rest, in order to arrive at a conclusion expressed in terms of a (re)statement of the relevant moral principle and its concrete application in this or that sort of case, which conclusion could then be used in analogous situations (understood in a rather strict sense).

8. Definite values of the moral manual.

9. Pastoral security of the classicist approach: "This classical world view approach had the advantage, pastorally speaking, of giving a person, faced with a moral decision, a high degree of certainty of the rightness or wrongness of an act. There is a certain clarity that is part and parcel of this approach even when the conclusions do not agree with a person's wants or desires." [Boyle, Parvitas, p. 46].

10. However, considerable limitations as well.

XIV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NOTION OF THE MORAL MAGISTERIUM

A. Thomas' understanding of twin authorities of Magisterium

1. Pope and bishops

2. Teachers

B. E.g. the University of Paris (and others) passing out sentences of excommunication and pronouncements of heresy.

C. Later development, especially after the Council of Trent and the creation of a papal bureaucracy.

1. In this regard, the talk given by Archbishop John Quinn in June of 1996 is helpful to see how part of this same problematic remains today.

2. See Quinn’s "The Exercise of the Primacy." Commonweal 123 (12 July 1996): 11-20. This point is amplified and developed in his The Reform of the Papacy: The Costly Call to Christian Unity. Ut Unum Sint: Studies on Papal Primacy. New York: Crossroad, 1999.

D. Greater centralization in Rome

1. Expansion of papal authority, culminating in the solemn definition of papal infallibility at Vatican I in 1870

2. Role of the Holy Roman Office of the Inquisition

E. Magisterium and Tensions with the Modern World

1. Development of liberalism in Europe

2. Political revolutions of 1848

3. Pontificate of Pius IX

a. Elected as a liberal in 1846

b. Would reign until 1878 (longest pontificate in history--to date!).

c. Forced to flee Rome in 1848

d. Became increasingly conservative

e. 1864 Encyclical Quanta Cura with the accompanying “Syllabus of Errors”

4. Condemnation of religious liberty: "From which totally false idea of social government they do not fear to foster that erroneous opinion, most fatal in its effects on the Catholic Church and the salvation of souls, called by Our Predecessor, Gregory XVI [in his 1832 Mirari Vos], an insanity, viz., that "liberty of conscience and worship is each man's personal right, which ought to be legally proclaimed and asserted in every rightly constituted society; ...".

5. Contrast this with Vatican II's Decree on Religious Liberty, Dignitatis Humanae, [#2]: "The Vatican Council declares that the human person has a right to religious freedom. Freedom of this kind means that all men should be immune from coercion on the part of individuals, social groups and every human power so that, within due limits, nobody is forced to act against his convictions in religious matters in private or in public, alone or in associations with others. The Council further declares that the right to religious freedom is based on the very dignity of the human person as known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself.

6. Involves the notion of development of doctrine.

7. Pontificate of Leo XIII

a. Elected as a "caretaker" pope in 1878,

b. but would rule until 1903

c. Noted for the development of Catholic social teaching, especially Rerum Novarum which was published in 1890.

d. And whose centenary anniversary was commemorated by John Paul II's Centesimus Annus.

8. Modernist Crisis under Pius X

a. Succeeded Leo XIII in 1903 and reigned until 1914

b. Lamentabili issued in 1907

c. Oath against modernism and crack-down on seminary professors

d. As Archbishop Rembert Weakland has remarked, "Unfortunately, such periods [of "fervor for orthodoxy"] also produced, in addition to the cruelty mentioned, fear. In such an atmosphere, amateurs--turned theologians--easily became headhunters and leaders were picked, not by their ability to work toward a synthesis of the new knowledge and the tradition, but by the rigidity of their orthodoxy, so that often second-rate and repressive minds, riding on the waves of that fear, took over. [From his weekly pastoral column in the Milwaukee Catholic Herald, 11 September 1986.]

XV. DEVELOPMENT OF PAPAL INFALLIBILITY

A. Historical Background connected to the development of the papacy itself

B. Solemn definition of papal infallibility

1. 1869-1870 Vatican I: Passage of the doctrine of papal infallibility

2. Worth reading!, contained in Pastor Aeternus, Dogmatic Constitution on the Church of Christ, Vatican I [DS 3074-3075].

3. It is a divinely revealed dogma that the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks ex cathedra, that is, when, acting in the office of shepherd and teacher of all Christians, he defines, by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held [tenenda] by the universal Church, possesses through the divine assistance promised to him in the person of Blessed Peter, the infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed his Church to be endowed in defining the doctrine concerning faith or morals; and that such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are therefore irreformable of themselves, not because of the consent of the Church (ex sese, non autem ex consensu ecclesiae). But if anyone presumes to contradict this our definition--which God forbid--anathema sit.

4. Note a certain "circularity" to the formulation and reasoning in this definition, as well as the implied limitations to this infallibility.

5. First Vatican Council never concluded due to the Franco-Prussian War and the entrance of the Italian troops into Rome, and Pope flees to the Vatican

C. Impact of notion of papal infallibility on the Conception and Development of Moral Theology

1. Pope as "answer man" on the moral questions of the day.

2. Development of "lobbying" in the various schools of moral theology

3. Procedures used in the formulation of papal positions: "papal moral theologians"

a. Example of Pius XI’s Casti connubii and Arthur Vermeersch, S.J. of the Gregorian and Pius XII and Francis Hürth (also of the Gregorian).

b. More positive examples also, e.g. Johannes Schasching (of the Gregorian) and the social encyclicals of John Paul II

XVI. RENEWAL OF MORAL THEOLOGY IN THE 20TH CENTURY

A. Movement in the 1950's

B. Dissatisfaction with the manualist approach

C. Attempt to find some central biblical theme, such as Law, Charity, etc., as the organizing concept for the moral manual.

D. Key works

1. Gerard Gilléman, S.J.

a. Taught in India

b. Le primat de la charité en théologie morale. Brussels: Editions Desclée, 1954. In English: The Primacy of Charity in Moral Theology. Translated by William F. Ryan, S.J. and André Vachon, S.J. from the second French edition. Westminster MD: The Newman Press, 1959.

2. Bernard Häring's watershed work: Das Gesetz Christi. Moraltheologie für Priester und Laien. Freiburg: Erich Wewel Verlag, 1954.

a. In English: The Law of Christ: Volume 1, General Moral Theology. Westminster: Newman Press, 1963.

b. Total revision in Häring's 1978 Free and Faithful in Christ.

XVII. VATICAN II AND MORAL THEOLOGY

A. Optatam Totius

1. Is a Decree (need to explain the distinction of the relative weight of various Conciliar documents).

2. Much of this material is summarized in James Bretzke’s “Scripture, the Soul of Moral Theology: The Second Stage,” Irish Theological Quarterly 60 (1994): 259-271.

a. Metaphor of Scripture as the "Soul" of theology.

b. Locus classicus is found in Vatican II's Decree on the Training of Priests, Optatam totius, at #16: "...Students should receive a most careful training in holy Scripture, which should be the soul, as it were, of all theology. ...They [seminarians] should learn to seek the solution of human problems in the light of revelation, to apply its eternal truths to the changing conditions of human affairs, and to express them in language which people of the modern world will understand. In like manner the other theological subjects should be renewed through a more vivid contact with the Mystery of Christ and the history of salvation. Special care should be given to the perfecting of moral theology. Its scientific presentation should draw more fully on the teaching of holy Scripture and should throw light upon the exalted vocation of the faithful in Christ and their obligation to bring forth fruit in charity for the life of the world."

B. Dignitatis humanae

1. Is a Declaration.

2. Acceptance of religious freedom as a basic human right.

3. Influence of the American experience of living in a pluralistic democracy

4. Role of John Courtney Murray, S.J. in the drafting of this document.

5. Fiercely opposed by Cardinal Ottaviani and others.

6. See Xavier Rynne's work on Vatican II.

C. Gaudium et spes

1. Is a pastoral constitution (as compared to a dogmatic constitution).

2. Importance of a constitution addressed to the whole world

3. Recognition of the presence of the Holy Spirit in non-Catholics and non-Christians.

4. Fight over the title as well as the whole document.

XVIII. POST-VATICAN II DEVELOPMENTS IN MORAL THEOLOGY

A. Birth Control Commission and subsequent Humanae vitae crisis

B. Situation ethics debate occasioned by both Humanae vitae and the publication of Joseph Fletcher's 1967 Situation Ethics.

C. Development of theory of proportionalism

D. New approaches to the moral manual

XIX. A TAXONOMY OF CONTEMPORARY CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND MORAL THEOLOGY

A. Plurality of approaches in this schematization; try to avoid "excommunication." The following approach highlights more Roman Catholic authors who are kKnown and/or translated in English

B. Bernard Häring, C.Ss.R. (Born 1912, died 3 July 1998) and the Redemptorist School

1. In the moral pastoral tradition of St. Alphonsus Liguori, C.Ss.R.

2. Bernard Häring's scriptural thematic approach

3. Marciano Vidal, C.Ss.R.

4. Sean O'Riordan, C.Ss.R.

5. Greater pastoral breadth and sensitivity

6. Oriented more to the concrete and particular

C. Josef Fuchs and the Gregorian School

1. Transcendental Thomism

2. Rahnerian theology

3. More heavily Philosophical in basic approach

4. Role of Proportionalism

5. Concerned more with questions such as

a. nature of moral norms

b. natural law

c. intrinsically evil (intrinsece malum) acts and the understanding of this concept

d. relationship of epikeia to understanding of the natural law

6. Other key figures

a. Alfons Auer

b. Franz Böckle

c. Klaus Demmer, M.S.C.

d. Richard McCormick, S.J.

e. Bruno Schüller, S.J.

f. And a host of their former students, such as James Keenan, S.J. and Thomas Kopfensteiner.

D. Louis Janssens and the Louvain School

1. Personalist morals

2. Key Figure: Louis Janssens

3. Other figures

a. Joseph Selling

b. James Walter

E. H. Richard Niebuhr and (earlier) James M. Gustafson

1. Importance of Scripture

2. Notion of "Revealed Reality"

3. God as enabler, thus, enabling humans to make a “fitting” response to the concrete situation here and now.

4. Human person are responsible for these fitting responses.

a. Yale and the University of Chicago

b. Some important Catholic representatives

(1) Lisa Sowle Cahill

(2) Margaret Farley, R.S.M.

(3) William C. Spohn

(4) David Hollenbach, S.J.

F. Situation Ethics and Theology of Compromise School

1. Joseph Fletcher

2. Other proponents

3. Charles Curran

4. Daniel Maguire

G. Moral Rigorists

1. Marcelino Zalba, S.J.

2. Carlo Caffarra

3. Servais Pinckaers, O.P.

4. Germain Grisez

5. John Finnis

6. William E. May

7. Msgr. William B. Smith

a. St. John's Seminary for New York (Dunwoodie)

b. Current "answer man" for Homiletic and Pastoral Review.

8. Opus Dei theologians

H. Moral Theologians of inculturation

1. Importance of social location as key criterion for doing moral theology

2. Latin America and Liberation Theology

a. Stress on social sin and structural evil

b. Liberation as key biblical theme

c. Examples

(1) Antonio Moser and Bernardino Leers

(2) José (Joseph) Comblin

(3) Enrique Dussel

3. Asia

a. Indian sub-continent: Aloysius Pieris, S.J., etc.

b. Philippines: Antonio Lambino

c. Chopstick countries

(1) Confucian countries and/or culture

(2) Buddhist

(3) Minjung theology

4. Africa

a. Particular problems in African setting

b. Bénézet Bujo

I. Summary remarks on this schematization

1. Obviously this sort of an approach will always be rather oversimplified.

2. There is overlap and some theologians obviously could be placed in more than one school. We will not take account of all of these theologians during this course, but I think it is important to have some "name recognition" of these contemporary figures.

3. Where I might place myself: educated initially at Weston by Sr. Mary Emil Penet, I.H.M., a disciple of Josef Fuchs and by William Spohn at JSTB, with my doctorate done at the Gregorian. Studied under Josef Fuchs and Klaus Demmer at the Gregorian, though I would not call myself a disciple of either. Nevertheless, especially due to my years of teaching at the Gregorian, I do know fairly well the moral autonomy school of Fuchs, Demmer, et. al. I find very congenial the basic approach of Bernard Häring, H. Richard Niebuhr, and the early James Gustafson as well as many of the insights of Josef Fuchs and Louis Janssens and the Louvain School. However, I also think it very important to move beyond the Anglo-European axis and consider other voices and approaches. Therefore, I consider important the contribution of the group I labeled moral theologians of inculturation and other Christians, Protestants and Orthodox. Of course, we cannot ignore the world which is not explicitly religious, nor should we discount voices of philosophers, sociologists, historians, etc.

XX. VARIOUS MODELS PRESENT IN CONTEMPORARY MORAL THEOLOGY, CHRISTIAN ETHICS, AND PHILOSOPHY

A. Model of Individual perfection

1. Psychological models

2. Voluntarism

B. Juridical model

1. Minimalism

2. Tutiorism, probabiliorism, probabilism

C. Philosophical models

1. Various, but common point is the pre-eminence given to the philosophical sector and methodology

D. Scriptural models

E. Social ethical model: "So the idea of social justice curves back to a model of salvation through the notion of a new creation. All the experiences of tension come back to the call for a new beginning, a making-new, here in the earth, of all the potentials of all living creatures. Models of social justice are clearly models of change." [Michael Keeling, The Foundations of Christian Ethics, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1990): 27.]

F. Contextual and/or Inculturation Model

G. Liberation theology model

1. Example of overlapping model

2. Clearly in the social ethic model, as well as in the Biblical model and the inculturation/contextual model.

H. A "Non-Model" would be one which denied or totally eclipsed the function of one of the 4 sectors

1. Magisterial positivism

2. Moral skepticism and/or nihilism

3. Karma and/or Fate

XXI. CHRISTIAN THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE MORAL PERSON

A. Basic task of Christian ethics is to develop a realistic and complete model of the human person. One that is realistic and complete, and therefore, particular and universal. Both aspects are essential to a proper understanding of morality. There is no universal morality that exists on a meta-human level.

1. Cf. Norbert Rigali's "Christian Morality and Universal Morality: The One and the Many." Louvain Studies 19 (1994): 18-33.

a. Responds to Charles Curran's critique of Rigali's position, made in Curran's "Catholic Social Teaching and Human Morality" (in One Hundred Years of Catholic Social Thought: Celebration and Challenge, ed. John A. Coleman, S.J., Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1990)

b. Rigali in turn further elaborates his original position on the relationship between universality and particularity in Christian morality, which position critiques that of Fuchs, Curran, and others of the moral autonomy school. Rigali teaches moral theology at the University of San Diego.

2. Here, contributions from non-Western cultures will be important, and as a point for inculturation. For example, "Francis Hsu claims, for example, that different patterns of relationship, different ways of conceiving what it is to be `a human being', in China and Japan compared with Europe and North America account for the low penetration by Christianity into these societies." [quoted in Michael Keeling's Foundations, p. 209]

B. Some Philosophical Understandings of the Human Person

1. How one views the human person will have great impact on how one conceives morality.

2. Essentialist--a human nature

a. Scholastic tradition which views the human person as being morally obligated to respects the ends of this nature. However, the question arises as to what constitutes the essential “nature” and what are changeable aspects. We can see this issue easily with the identification of certain traditional roles with one’s sexual gender.

b. There are additional problems, as we shall see with physicalism, and the use of a philosophical language which is no longer really current.

3. Universalist moral agent

a. Kantian, e.g., treat a person as an end, and never as merely a means; or Act so that moral actions can be universalizable (i.e., categorical imperative)

b. Strong emphasis in the Enlightenment, and a heavy stress on individualism, and individual human rights.

c. However, it would be good to note Alasdair MacIntyre's critique of this view: "To be a moral agent is, on this view, precisely to be able to stand back from any and every situation in which // one is involved, from any and every characteristic that one may possess, and to pass judgment on it from a purely universal and abstract point of view that is totally detached from all social particularity." [MacIntyre, After Virtue, pp. 31-32]

4. Moral Person as Social Being

a. The person by nature tends to communion and therefore to community. This implies a "moral community" and its attributes (such as character and common good) to be concepts of fundamental importance.

b. Working out of the work of Jacques Maritain, David Hollenbach expresses this understanding of the human person in the following way: "Personal existence is existence in relationship to other persons. Subpersonal beings, in contrast, can only exist in spacial juxtaposition to each other. They cannot form communities, but only physical collectivities. The capacity for community, therefore, is a positive perfection of personality. For this reason the dignity of persons can be realized only in community, and genuine community can exist only where the dignity of persons is secured. Personhood and community are mutually implicating realities." [From David Hollenbach's "The Common Good Revisited." Theological Studies 50 (1989): 86.]

c. Thus, this complex of affirmations is also the ground for our social ethics

(1) True end of the human person(s)

(2) Dignity of fellow human beings

(3) Notion of the common good.

d. Hollenbach notes that ""The biblical story of the Exodus remains revelatory of the fundamental moral basis of human existence: liberation is from bondage into community--into a community of persons who are both free and co-responsible for one another's fates. This biblical insight has strong parallels in the common-good tradition in authors such as Aristotle, Cicero and Thomas Aquinas." [Hollenbach, "Common Good Revisited," p. 93.]

5. Moral Agent as Character

a. Importance of social roles and moral models

b. Narrative: in many ways our “story” of who we are, individually and collectively, is the most intuitive and experientially based way of getting at the “human”–since as humans we live in time, which is connected from beginning to middle to end by our “stories” of who we are. This narrative dimension does stand in a certain amount of tension, if not opposition to a more “essentialist” or “nature-based” anthropology.

c. Communal focus

d. Greater prominence given to both the positive and negative role of the emotions in moral life and action. Virtues, as they relate to character formation, will have greater prominence in this theory, as well as attention to the social particularity of the moral agent. This view has stronger biblical basis, especially in reference to discipleship, as well as greater correspondence in other ethical systems, such as Confucianism.

e. As well, as more congenial to existentialism.

f. Cf. also the work of Alasdair MacIntyre and Stanley Hauerwas.

C. Classical Christian understandings of the human person

1. Created by God

a. Therefore, like all of God's creation, basically and intrinsically good. Thus, our human worth and dignity does not rest on any accomplishment or inheritance of our own beyond that simple fact that we owe our fundamental worth and dignity to the fact that God has created us. As Richard Gula notes “If we were to identify ourselves with a role (I am a CEO), an achievement (I am a marathon runner), or a social attribute (I am productive), then we would miss the truth that our dignity comes primarily from our relationship to God. To say that each person is sacred is to say that our worth or dignity is a gift of God.” Richard Gula, The Good Life: Where Morality and Spirituality Converge, (New York: Paulist Press, 1999): 12.

b. Cf. Genesis 1:31--2:1

Gen 1:31 God saw all that he had made, and it was very good. And there was evening, and there was morning-- the sixth day. Thus the heavens and the earth were completed in all their vast array. (NIV)

c. Also interdependent in and with the rest of creation. Again we can refer to the Genesis account: e.g. cf. Genesis 1:27-30

So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them. God blessed them and said to them, "Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it. Rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air and over every living creature that moves on the ground." Then God said, "I give you every seed-bearing plant on the face of the whole earth and every tree that has fruit with seed in it. They will be yours for food. And to all the beasts of the earth and all the birds of the air and all the creatures that move on the ground-- everything that has the breath of life in it-- I give every green plant for food." And it was so. (NIV)

d. For humankind this mandates stewardship, not rapacious exploitation.

2. Embodied spirit

a. As Tertullian (3rd century North African patristic author) said in his On the Resurrection of the Flesh, ch. 8, Caro cardo salutis [The flesh is the hinge on which salvation depends].

b. Authentic orthodox Christian anthropology holds that we are embodied spirits, NOT a separable dualistic combination of body and spirit.

c. This will be very important for a correct vision of important parts of applied moral theology as well, especially sexual ethics and bioethics.

d. More on this facet later when we take these areas in detail.

3. Designed for God

a. St. Augustine

b. "Our hearts are restless until they rest in thee." Confessions

4. Reflection of God

a. Book of Genesis: Created in the image of God, male and female (imago Dei)

b. St. Iranaeus: Gloria Dei Vivens Homo ["The Glory of God is the Human Person--Fully Alive." Adversus Haereses, Bk IV, ch. 20, sec. 7.

c. Importance of link of moral theology to spirituality. There was an unfortunate historical division of these two, in which moral theology was tied to law, often canon law, and/or proper administration of the sacraments language of sanctions, etc, which in turn led to a minimalist concept of moral fulfillment. On the other hand spirituality was tied to "ascetical theology" in which Christian "perfection" was conceived as the essential goal, mandated for "professionals" such as priests and religious to which the laity were largely "exempted" or dispensed. Such a split has been resolved, in theory at least, in Vatican II, especially in Lumen Gentium ch. 5 "The [Universal] Call to Holiness" and the role of the apostolate of the laity.

5. United in Christ

a. Neither Jew nor Greek, male nor female, slave nor free for you are all one in Christ (Gal. 3:28)

b. An "illuminative" use of Scripture

c. Cf. Paul’s theology of the Mystical Body of Christ

6. Theological importance of understanding the Trinity as a relation of persons

a. As Charles Curran notes, “The persons of the Trinity are revealed to us for our salvation. The divine Trinity of persons in God are in relationship–for one another and for us. Through our salvific relationship with the Trinity, we too become persons in relationship for others. Salvation is not a ‘me and Jesus’ relationship but // concerns the whole person in the totality of one’s relationships. The significance of the Trinity highlights the relational ontology of the human person.” Charles Curran, The Catholic Moral Tradition Today, pp. 92-93.

b. Moreover, to return to David Hollenbach's discussion of Jacques Maritain, "He maintained that the fact that persons are essentially relational beings has its supreme exemplification in the reality of the Trinity, the fact that God is not a monad but a communion of `subsistent relations'. To the extent that a being is personal, it will be a being-in-relation-to-other-persons." [Hollenbach, "Common Good Revisited," p. 86. {Maritain, p, 56}].

c. Similarly, the Protestant theologian, Gilbert Meilaender, avers, "for Christians the concept of `personhood' cannot help but be a theological one." [Meilaender, Faith and Faithfulness: Basic Themes in Christian Ethics, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1991): 45.

d. Helpful to relating our understanding of the human more in terms of "person" (relation) rather than "nature" (abstract essence).

e. Special significance of Jesus Christ, the Second Person of the Trinity, incarnated, etc. for our Christian anthropology.

f. See also L. Gregory Jones' Transformed Judgement: Toward a Trinitarian Account of the Moral Life. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990.

(1) Argues that the most superior form of moral judgement is one grounded in and lived in the presence of the mystery of the Triune God. Jones avers that the primary friendship a person should have is with God. Also discusses and critiques the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, Stanley Hauerwas, and others.

7. Social ethical implications of theological anthropology: "First, since it belongs in the nature of an image to imitate (in varying degrees and ways) the being and activity of the thing imaged (with the being and activity of God those of pure spirit knowing, loving, and creating), humans imitate God by reason of their intellectual nature and faculties for knowing and loving. Second, due to the creation as images and likeness of God, the Judaeo-Christian tradition maintains that all human beings have transcendent value, worth, and dignity--in ethical literature, this transcendent value is usually referred in // shorthand form as `human dignity'. Third, because of this human dignity, the Judaeo-Christian tradition declares that all humans are thus entitled to certain rights, and all societies, governments, and individuals are morally bound to respect these rights. At the heart of all ethic discussion of human rights in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, therefore, is the understanding/belief/doctrine that all men and women have been created by God in God's image, and thus have been endowed with inalienable rights." (From Michael A. Evans, S.J. "An Analysis of U.N. Refugee Policy in Light of Roman Catholic Social Teaching and the Phenomena Creating Refugees." Ph.D. Dissertation for the Graduate Theological Union, 1991.): 83-84.

D. Historical Nature of the Human Person

1. Under-emphasized in scholastic framework, which instead placed the stress on the immutable common aspects of human nature. The importance of the recognition of the historicity of the human person will dovetail with our consideration of the shift of paradigms from physicalist to personalist (to be taken up shortly). Vatican II noted the historical nature of the human person primarily in two documents, Gaudium et spes and Dignitatis Humanae.

2. Gaudium et spes noted

a. "the relation between the transcendental worth of persons and the historical realization of this worth [which] leads it to conclude that the full implications of dignity of the person cannot be known or affirmed apart from the concrete conditions of an historical epoch." [David Hollenbach, Claims in Conflict: Retrieving and Renewing the Catholic Human Rights Tradition, (New York: Paulist Press, 1979): 70.

b. "The permanent demands of human dignity and the historical form these demands now take are not viewed as if they were two levels or planes running parallel to each other." [Hollenbach, Claims, p. 74.]

3. Dignitatis Humanae

a. Declaration on Religious Liberty (1964)

b. DH gives "an important key to the problem of the foundation, interrelation and institutionalization of human rights. Responsible use of freedom defines the very nature of social morality. The definition of the content of this responsibility must occur within the context of changing cultural and social structures." [Hollenbach, p. 77.]

4. Importance and elaboration for these fundamental insights for social ethics.

5. The historical dimension of personhood means that the human person is always a "`someone who'--a someone with a history." [Meilaender, Faith, p. 46.]

a. If this is what it means to be a person, an obvious question faces us: How shall we locate or come to know persons if we are not to identify their personal existence with possession of certain qualities?

b. And the answer is clear. If a person is a `someone who', a someone with a history, we can know him or her only be entering into that history, only by personal engagement and commitment--or what Christians have called love." [Meilaender, Faith, p. 46.]

c. "If we do not tie ourselves to them in a common history, no bond is formed and no value disclosed." [Meilaender, p. 47.]

E. Cultural: Our basic modality of being human

1. The only way we can be human is to be human in a particular culture. There can be no “acultural” or “non-cultural” human nature in a meaningful sense of the term. Once you remove culture from a human being the resulting (abstract) construct ceases to be genuinely “human.”

2. Theologically, Christ’s Incarnation into a particular time and place, into a given culture, should be interpreted not as God’s canonization of 1^st century Palestine over against other times and cultures, but as God’s acceptance and ratification of our way of being human.

3. In Matthew’s Gospel Jesus’ final commission (Mt. 28:19) is to go and make disciples “of all nations” though this is somewhat of an anachronistic mistranslation of the original ,Greek, which is παντα τα εθνη [panta ta ethne]. This line would be more accurately (and literally) rendered as “to all ethnicities”–in other words to men and women of every culture.

4. This observation ties in with the basic thrust of inculturation, which according to Evangelii nuntiandi (Paul VI’s Apostolic Exhortation on Evangelization) should go to the very heart of a culture, and not stop at a superficial adaptation.

5. The relevant passage reads as follows: “All this may be summarized thus: evangelization is to be achieved, not from without, as though by adding some decoration or applying a coat of colour, but in depth, going to the very centre and roots of life. The gospel must impregnate the culture and the whole way of life of man, taking these words in the widest and fullest sense which they are given in the constitution Gaudium et Spes. This work must always take the human person as its starting point, coming back to the interrelationships between persons and their relation with God.” (EN #20).

F. Summary: Theological Marks of the Christian Understanding of the Human Person

1. Made in the image of God

2. Unique

a. Individual

b. Embodied spirit

c. Historical

3. Communal, social, cultural nature

a. Important to note here that the human person is also a cultural being

b. Concomitantly, moral theology and ethics will have to grapple not only with ethical systems, but also with various ethoses, which certainly have their dark sides.

c. In this view Karl Rahner refers to "global pre-scientific convictions" which reflect basic assumptions and cultural biases that affect moral analysis. [According to Richard A. McCormick's rendition of Rahner]: "... Rahner stated that such convictions are responsible for the impression we have that certain `proofs' in moral theology assume from the outset the conclusion they purport to establish. In this fashion the conclusions are `smuggled into' the premises of the argument. Hineingeschmuggelt is Rahner's sonorous word. He urged that one of moral theology's important tasks is the exposure and demolition of such prescientific convictions." [From Richard McCormick's "Value Variables in the Health-Care Reform Debate." America 168 (29 May 1993): 7.]

d. See also James T. Bretzke, "Cultural Particularity and the Globalization of Ethics in the Light of Inculturation," Pacifica 9 (1996): 69-86.

Abstract: Increased interest in the so-called "globalization of ethics" has led to a number of studies which utilize various hermeneutical and communicative theories to sketch out viable paradigms for developing a fundamental Christian ethics as a whole, as well as its various components such as moral reasoning, which together would be capable of entering into and maintaining such discourse. The accent of most of these studies falls on the universalizability of ethical discourse and scant attention has been given to the cultural particularity of each and every ethos and ethical system. This article briefly rehearses the principal elements of the concerns raised by the globalization of ethics and then focuses on the particularity of culture using insights from both cultural anthropology and inculturation. The Confucian context of Korea is employed to illustrate some of the issues raised by greater attention to cultural particularity.

4. Ecological nature

a. Inter-relation and interdependence with the rest of nature.

b. Relatively recent "ethical" discovery!

5. Transcendent

a. Internal, innate drive to realize oneself in an authentic manner which process necessarily takes one beyond oneself in the concrete. As a number of psychologists, such as Victor Frankl, have noted it is only in devoting yourself to a search for meaning outside of ourselves that we are able to "complete" ourselves and give our existence meaning.

b. As Roger Burggraeve observes, "By devoting oneself to a `meaning outside one's own skin', one completes the self. The more one is dedicated to this task, the more one is devoted to the other and the more one becomes human. Human existence, fundamentally, is self-transcendence and not self-actualization, since one ultimately does not long for happiness in itself but for a `reason' to be happy. Self-actualization and happiness only reveal themselves as side-effects of the striving for meaning, values, or ideals. From the moment they are desired for themselves, they become unattainable." [Roger Burggraeve, "Meaningful Living and Acting: An Ethical and Educational-Pastoral Model in Christian Perspective." Louvain Studies 13 (1988): 139.]

6. Saved in Christ and called to New Life in Christ: Therefore, a person of faith, living in a community of believers, and thus our identity as disciples will have some particular sacred claim on our moral life.

7. Graced: Is a term for integrating the above elements in a Christian understanding

8. All of the above points should be kept in mind as we look at one or another aspect of the Christian understanding of the moral life.

9. Summary of Bernard Häring: "The believer cannot consider his terrestrial journey in a purely individualistic perspective as if it were merely the occasion for him to save his soul and to prepare for an other-worldly reward. Confronting life in its transcendent dimensions, he realizes the uniqueness of the call to deploy his talents in the Lord's world and to labour in his vineyard as a member of the redeemed human family. This he accomplishes within a certain culture as a bearer of the greatness and the misery of past history and as co-creator of the future of many." [Häring, Medical Ethics, p. 66.]

10. Therefore, some conclusions:

a. "Our bodily life does not belong to us but to the One who has entrusted it to us for ourselves and for the service of our brethren." [Häring, ME p. 67.]

b. cf. Rm 14: 7-8: "For no one of us lives, and equally no one of us dies, for oneself alone. If we live, we live for the Lord; and if we die, we die for the Lord."

c. "Life, then, means existence in the saving solidarity of Christ with all men." [Häring, ME p. 67.]

d. "Readiness for God's final call is expressed by man's appreciation of each instant of his lifetime, and by vigilance for each favoured moment, in order to give our life its fullest sense in the service of others." [Häring, ME p. 67.]

XXII. KEY MORAL CONCEPTS

A. Freedom

1. Indispensable for morality: As John Paul II asserts: "The question of morality, to which Christ provides the answer, cannot prescind from the issue of freedom. Indeed, it considers that issue central, for there can be no morality without freedom: [quoting Gaudium et spes 11] `It is only in freedom that man can turn to what is good'." [Veritatis Splendor (6 August 1993), #34.]

2. Essential for human dignity: "Human freedom belongs to us as creatures; it is a freedom which is given as a gift, one to be received like a seed and to be cultivated responsibly. It is an essential part of that creaturely image which is the basis of the dignity of the person." (Veritatis Splendor, #86)

3. Liberty (freedom from)

4. Authenticity (freedom for)

a. Gal 5:1 "It is for freedom that Christ has set us free. "Stand firm, then, and do not let yourselves be burdened again by a yoke of slavery." (NIV)

b. This theme of "freedom for" is also central to John Paul II's Encyclical on Fundamental Moral Theology, Veritatis Splendor: "Within that freedom there is an echo of the primordial vocation whereby the Creator calls man to the true Good, and even more, through Christ's Revelation, to become his friend and to share his own divine life. It is at once inalienable self-possession and openness to all that exists, in passing beyond self to knowledge and love of the other. Freedom then is rooted in the truth about man, and it is ultimately directed towards communion." (Veritatis Splendor, #86).

5. Limitations on freedom: We are limited from without and we are limited from within. We might call this state "facticity" and it is important to recognize basic facticity as an intrinsic part of being human. Therefore, "absolute" freedom is not a reasonable or desirable goal (even in some abstract ideal order).

6. Transcendental aspect of freedom: In choosing to become someone in choosing God our freedom can be said to be transcendental.

7. Types of freedom: basic and moral

a. Basic freedom: ability to determine ourselves as persons in a stance before the Absolute (God) in a way that can be (and is) expressed by categorical moral choices. Therefore, basic freedom presumes also moral freedom.

b. Moral freedom: to recognize and choose categorical values or disvalues

8. Freedom and fundamental option

a. This understanding of human freedom is important for a correct and full understanding of the concept of the fundamental option.

b. However, this concept itself we will discuss a bit later, and to a certain extent as a way of summing up what we have to say about freedom, conscience, grace, the moral life, etc.

B. Conscience

1. What it is not:

a. Not a "feeling" such as good or bad

b. nor "internal price constraints" [Example of an economist speaking of what he conceived conscience to be, related by Robert Bellah in his informal remarks made in a GTU panel presentation on 22 September 1993.]

c. Nor is it merely the power of rational judgment

d. Nor is it what psychology calls the superego

2. Provisionally we can speak of conscience as a summons to love the good and foster it, and avoid evil (cf. Thomas Aquinas on the natural law). Also we can speak of conscience as the root (radical) experience of ourselves as acting as moral agents. In theological language we can speak of conscience as the experience of ourselves as new creatures in Christ, enlivened by the Holy Spirit. At the same time it is important to recognize a basic limitation or incompleteness of conscience, since we never know ourselves completely and therefore decisions of conscience are also necessarily incomplete and partial.

3. Traditional understanding of conscience viewed it as a faculty and "subjective" moral norm, seen as rationally apprehending the "objective" moral norm, which in turn was viewed in terms of law (natural or divine, eternal).

4. Transcendental Thomism theology, e.g., Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan. The work of these men, especially Rahner, will come out in the areas of individual moral conscience and the fundamental option.

5. Insights from Psychology

a. Levels of moral conscience and consciousness

b. Moral growth and formation

c. Work of Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan, etc.

6. John Glaser's article in which he makes a most important distinction between superego and genuine moral conscience. This is a very helpful distinction and understanding in deal with confession and counseling, especially in recognizing the dynamic of scruples. [Please read this carefully as I will not have time to discuss it much in class.]

C. Community: This foundational concept has been too little stressed in traditional moral theology, yet it is crucial for understanding the nature of the human person, not to mention its significance for for understanding social responsibility and social sin.

D. Actus hominis vs. Actus humanus

1. See James T. Bretzke, Consecrated Phrases Latin Dictionary for concise definitions of all these terms. Please keep in mind that it is difficult to make this distinction while being sensitive to inclusive language! Though there are some different versions of the description of these terms in the various manuals, for our purposes the distinction is useful in helping describe and distinguish what constitutes genuine human moral action from the other actions which a human person may perform or find him/herself involved in. Therefore, a starting point of commonality between the two terms is that they both describe actions which are characteristic of human beings (as distinguished from other living things).

2. Actus hominis: The actus hominis refers to an action performed by a human person, but which may in itself have no moral significance. While certain involuntary actions could fit into this category (e.g., sneezing), it is more helpful to consider this term as referring to actions which due to some combination of lack of intention, freedom, or mitigating circumstances combined to render the act devoid of moral meaning. For example, if the brakes fail on my Hertz® rental car (through no fault of my own, since I have sought to rent a car from a reputable agency!) and my car hits a pedestrian I am not morally guilty of a crime, as this would be an actus hominis and not an actus humanus. Similarly, other actions, even if they involve freedom and intention might not have what is normally seen as a moral end (i.e., something which aims at the doing or fostering of the good, or the avoidance or minimizing of evil). Putting on my black wing-tips instead of my black penny-loafers would not usually be considered a moral act (unless one took “fashion” VERY seriously indeed!).

3. Actus humanus equals "moral" acts

a. The moral manuals described an actus humanus as an act which proceeded from the free will with a knowledge of the end of the act itself. The end of the act is understood as a moral end (cf. finis operis). Not every action or activity of a human person would normally be understood as a moral act. For example, choosing which shirt to put on might involve freedom and intention, but as a general rule we would not understand this action to be a moral action. Instead, we might call this an actus hominis. Thus, distinguished from actus hominis (q.v.), the actus humanus refers to the moral dimension, responsibility, etc. for one's actions. Thus, an actus humanus is a "moral" act, and this distinction was made by St. Thomas Aquinas in the ST I-II, q. 1, a.3 "Idem sunt actus morales et actus humani"

b. This same notion is expressed in Veritatis Splendor in this fashion: "Human acts are moral acts because they express and determine the goodness or evil of the individual who performs them. They do not produce a change merely in the state of affairs outside of man but, to the extent that they are deliberate choices, they give moral definition to the very person who performs them, determining his profound spiritual traits."

c. Need to gloss a few words in this definition: "determine" should not be seen a mechanistic sense; "deliberate" choices does not mean simply without external physical coercion; "moral definition" refers to the transcendental, moral character of the human person, related to his fundamental stance toward the Absolute Good.

4. The inter-relationship between these two terms helps highlight the importance of intention and circumstances in both helping create the possibility of, as well as determining the moral meaning of an action. Not everything that is “done” by a human person would have the possibility of being evaluated morally, since freedom and intention would be indispensable key elements for making an action performed by a human individual into a truly moral (or immoral) action. If freedom and/or an intention are removed by either the nature of the act in itself (e.g., putting on my wing-tips–if we agree that which shoes I choose is not a moral act), or due to circumstances beyond my control (e.g., the brakes failing on my rental car) then we do not have a moral act, a actus humanus, but merely a actus hominis. This distinction shows us that there could not exist any supposedly moral action which could be abstracted from the concrete reality in which the moral agent finds him/herself and out of which s/he operates (including moral intention). This actus hominis and actus humanus distinction is just one more aspect in the manualist tradition which highlights the fonts of morality and the inter-relation between what is done (as viewed through the finis operis, q.v.) and the circumstances and intention out of which the agent operates in doing the action (as considered under the aspect of the finis operantis, q.v.).

E. Actus naturae ("Natural act"): Traditional moral norm, based on a physicalist paradigm, which required that an act (e.g., sexual acts) be performed in a "natural" way in order to be considered moral. This is also related to the complementary concepts of natura actus and actus personae.

F. Actus personae ("act of the person"): E.g., consideration of the moral nature of an act in terms of how it relates to the whole of the human person. This development is especially important in sexual ethics, as it moves away from physicalist conceptions of evaluation of conjugal acts (cf. actus naturae and natura actus). Gaudium et spes uses this understanding of actus personae in its teaching on marriage (cf. GS #51).

G. Natura actus ("Nature [form] of the act"): In traditional moral theology this refers to the manner in which a certain act, e.g., coitus, is performed. Traditionally, anything that blocked or destroyed the form of the act would be considered immoral. In the development of Roman Catholic sexual ethics, the conjugal act was considered moral, even if performed for the